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THE DISCRIMINATORY EXECUTIVE AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 
BY MARYAM JAMSHIDI* 
Today, the executive enjoys unprecedented power, particularly 
in the area of national security. By and large, this authority 
is not meaningfully restrained by Congress or the courts. How-
ever, some scholars argue that the presidency is still kept in 
check by the rule of law and politics. According to this view, 
substantive and procedural laws and internal executive 
branch rules combine with political efforts by the public, like 
voting, to hold the President accountable. This Article chal-
lenges this view. It argues that the rule of law and politics do 
not always work together to restrain the executive. Instead, 
law can sometimes undermine political efforts to check the 
presidency, particularly where minority rights or interests are 
concerned. 
Focusing on the national security domain, this Article demon-
strates how some laws and programs that are consistent with 
the rule of law frustrate executive accountability. These initi-
atives give the President far-reaching powers, threaten civil 
liberties, and disproportionately impact communities of color. 
While this is precisely where political accountability is most 
needed, it often fails to materialize. As this Article explains, 
the rule of law’s influence over social norms and behaviors 
helps explain this result. Facially neutral national security 
programs that disproportionately affect a small, disfavored 
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group of Americans—in this case, Arabs and Muslims—legit-
imize and further their marginalization. This legalized dis-
crimination undermines the solidarity—or “social cohesion”—
between groups necessary for political accountability. This 
contrasts with other legalistic national security initiatives 
that also involve broad executive powers and threaten civil lib-
erties but have generated efforts at political accountability. 
This Article compares various national security programs to 
understand how the rule of law and politics can better com-
bine to check presidential actions that negatively affects mi-
norities. In adopting this comparative approach, this Article 
unpacks the complex relationship between the rule of law, pol-
itics, and executive power in the national security arena. 
Based on the resulting insights, it presents preliminary solu-
tions to the rule of law’s failure to further political accounta-
bility for communities of color in some cases.  
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In a world where Congress and the courts have become less 
effective at checking presidential power, it is critical to find other 
ways of restraining the executive.1 For some scholars, politics 
and the rule of law provide this alternative route.2 According to 
this view, substantive and procedural law,3 as well as internal 
executive branch rules, combine with popular political mecha-
nisms, such as elections, to check the presidency.4 This theory 
holds appeal for the national security sector where Congress and 
the courts have notoriously failed to check executive power5 that 
often undermines individual rights.6 Unfortunately, the theory 
rests on a false premise—namely, that the rule of law neces-
sarily works hand in hand with politics. This Article argues that 
the relationship is more complex. Depending on a variety of fac-
tors, law can either lead to or undermine accountability for ex-
ecutive action. Executive programs that discriminate against or 
 
 1. While this Article focuses on the executive branch, it sometimes uses the 
terms “President,” “presidential,” or “presidency” to refer to that branch. 
 2. See infra Section I.A. 
 3. Throughout this Article, the “rule of law” and “law” are used interchangea-
bly to denote the same idea—government limited and bound by law. In some in-
stances, “law” is also used to refer to specific laws. 
 4. Richard Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1406–10 
(2012). This argument is discussed in more detail in Section I.A. 
 5. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (expanding surveillance author-
ities for the executive); DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE AGE OF DEFERENCE: THE 
SUPREME COURT, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 71, 84 
(2016) (describing how the common law state secrets privilege has insulated the 
executive from meaningful judicial review in national security cases). 
 6. See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(2006) (examining the civil liberty issues raised by the U.S. government’s counter-
terrorism activities). 
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have other negative effects on communities of color highlight 
this complexity. Focusing on the national security sector, this 
Article explains how the rule of law can either promote or un-
dermine political accountability for executive action that im-
pacts minority communities. Based on these insights, it suggests 
several solutions to help ensure law and politics better restrain 
executive programs that disproportionately discriminate 
against these communities. 
To explore these issues, this Article compares several do-
mestic national security programs7 that affect minority commu-
nities either exclusively or alongside other groups. These pro-
grams, which are mostly facially neutral,8 comply with the rule 
of law. They are also ideal candidates for executive accountabil-
ity since they bolster presidential authority and threaten indi-
vidual rights no matter who is impacted.9 These rights-eroding, 
executive-emboldening programs are precisely where law should 
work with politics to restrain executive power. However, these 
restraints do not always materialize. 
The first group of initiatives—and the primary focus of this 
Article—consists of national security programs that are facially 
neutral10 but disproportionately impact Arab and Muslim 
 
 7. This Article focuses exclusively on domestic national security programs. 
These are programs that have a substantial impact on U.S. citizens whether imple-
mented inside or outside the United States. Because citizens have greater political 
rights than noncitizens, they are better positioned to hold the government account-
able, making their inability to do so particularly noteworthy. 
 8. Generally, as far as U.S. citizens are concerned, facially neutral national 
security laws—i.e., laws that do not expressly distinguish in the text between cate-
gories of people based on protected characteristics—are the norm. See, e.g., Na-
tional Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 500–01) (facially neutral law providing “specific authority 
for the monitoring of communications” between any inmate and his or her attorneys 
or their agents “where there has been a specific determination that such actions are 
reasonably necessary in order to deter future acts of violence or terrorism . . . .”). 
This trend also aligns with U.S. law more generally. See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit 
Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 530 (2018) (noting that “official policies of explicit 
[discrimination] . . . are all but gone”). The only program addressed in this Article 
that is not facially neutral is President Donald Trump’s travel ban against coun-
tries with large Muslim populations or Muslim majorities. 
 9. See infra Sections II.A–B. Even though these laws and programs often 
threaten civil liberties, they still comply with the rule of law since they are con-
sistent with applicable constitutional jurisprudence. Consistency with other laws is 
amongst the rule of law’s important elements. See infra Section I.B. 
 10. Notably, under the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, laws that are 
facially neutral but have a disparate impact on a class of persons do not violate 
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Americans,11 a disfavored minority community that makes up a 
small subset of the U.S. population.12 These programs are rep-
resented by the FBI’s domestic surveillance initiative13 and 
criminal laws prohibiting “material support” for terrorism,14 as 
well as their private analogues.15 Though these programs are 
 
equal protection unless there is proof of discriminatory purpose. McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). 
 11. The disparate impact that FBI surveillance, citizen-on-citizen monitoring, 
and material support cases have on Arabs and Muslims does not undermine their 
rule of law credentials. Indeed, the rule of law does not require that law act imper-
sonally or only apply to “general classes” of persons. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY 
OF LAW 47 (1969). To the contrary, it can be explicitly directed at a “singular named 
individual,” never mind being used against particular groups. Id. 
 12. There are an estimated 3.35 million Muslims in the United States and an-
ywhere between 2.04 and 3.66 million individuals of Arab descent. See PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., U.S. MUSLIMS CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR PLACE IN SOCIETY, BUT 
CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IN THE AMERICAN DREAM 30 (2017), https://www.pewre-
search.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/07/U.S.-MUSLIMS-FULL-REPORT.pd 
f [https://perma.cc/7XFH-92NP] (estimating number of Muslim Americans); 
DEMOGRAPHICS, ARAB AM. INST. FOUND. (2018), https://censuscounts.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/03/National_Demographics_SubAncestries-2018.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/49HH-UEGL] (estimating number of Arab Americans). While this Article fo-
cuses on Arab and Muslim Americans, the U.S. government’s post-9/11 national 
security policies have also impacted those who are not in fact, but appear to be, 
Arab or Muslim. See Muneer I. Ahmed, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 
Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1278–79 (2004) [here-
inafter A Rage Shared by Law]. 
 13. See infra Section II.A.1. As described below, some of these surveillance pro-
grams are run in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
See infra Section II.A.1. 
 14. These programs are a sampling of the vast array of domestic national secu-
rity tools that have a disproportionate impact on Arab and Muslim Americans. Rep-
resentative examples, not discussed here, include use of the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C §§ 1701–1708, to freeze the assets of U.S. 
individuals and entities allegedly affiliated with “specially designated global ter-
rorists,” without due process; and the Terrorist Screening Database (“TSDB”) and 
associated Selectee and No Fly lists, which place draconian travel restrictions on 
designees, including U.S. citizens, without notice to those designated and based on 
a loose “reasonable suspicion” standard and secret evidence. DAVID COLE, ENEMY 
ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 76–78, 81 (2005); Matthew Howell, Alleviating the Power of Secret Evi-
dence: An Analysis of No Fly and Selectee List Determinations and Redress Proceed-
ings, 90 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6–8, 14 (2018). 
 15. As described below and in Sections II.A–B, various laws and programs en-
courage private parties to participate in the government’s surveillance and mate-
rial support efforts. An underlying premise of this Article, which distinguishes it 
from other scholarship, is that the FBI’s domestic surveillance program and mate-
rial support prosecutions are closely connected to, and should be examined in con-
junction with, the private versions of these programs. Because this Article treats 
these public and private programs as one, it applies its rule of law analysis to both, 
even though the rule of law is typically directed to government conduct only. 
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consistent with the rule of law, they have generated little to no 
political accountability for the executive. The second group of 
programs is composed of initiatives that also disparately impact 
Arab and Muslim Americans but are broadly viewed as explicitly 
discriminatory.16 They are represented by the Trump Admin-
istration’s travel ban against various countries with Muslim ma-
jorities or substantial Muslim populations17 (“Muslim Ban”).18 
These programs, which are also consistent with the rule of law, 
have inspired political efforts to restrain the President.19 The 
third group of programs consists of initiatives negatively affect-
ing the rights of many Americans, including Arabs and Muslims. 
They are represented by secret mass surveillance under Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act20 and Section 702 of the 2008 
Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA)21 (collectively “Section 215 and 702 surveillance”),22 both 
of which amended FISA.23 Like the Muslim Ban, these legalistic 
programs have generated political checks on the President. The 
fourth and final group of programs consists of initiatives that 
negatively impact a diverse but small group of individuals 
 
 16. See infra Section III.C. 
 17. See infra Section III.C. The ban was ultimately issued three times and 
grounded in the President’s broad authority under Section 212 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”). See infra Section III.C. While questions were raised 
about the rule of law credentials of all three bans, the Supreme Court’s decision 
upholding the ban’s final version settled those disputes. See infra Section III.C. 
 18. See infra Section III.C. 
 19. See infra Section III.C.  
 20. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). Section 215 expired on March 15, 2020 but is 
widely expected to be reauthorized by Congress. See India McKinney & Andrew 
Crocker, Yes, Section 215 Expired. Now What?, ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/yes-section-215-expired-now-what 
[https://perma.cc/M99J-RXCY]. 
 21. See infra Section III.D.1. The secret surveillance programs—a telephony 
metadata collection program and an Internet and telephone content collection pro-
gram known as PRISM—were initially developed without clear legal authority. Sec-
tions 215 and 702 were later used to provide ex post justification for these initia-
tives. See infra Section III.D.1. 
 22. As discussed in Section III.D.1, while the telephony metadata and PRISM 
programs arguably had rule of law problems, Sections 215 and 702 are consistent 
with the rule of law. 
 23. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885. Though this Article focuses on surveillance under 
Sections 215 and 702, there are other domestic national security programs that 
have also broadly impacted the U.S. population and generated popular pushback. 
See COLE, supra note 14, at 72–73 (explaining how public opposition curbed efforts 
to create a national identity card days after 9/11 and placed limits on airport screen-
ing protocols).  
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including various communities of color as well as non-identitar-
ian groups focused on social justice issues. They are represented 
by the Trump Administration’s efforts to commandeer private 
land to build a wall along the Mexican border (“Border Wall” or 
“Wall”).24 As with the Muslim Ban and Section 215 and 702 sur-
veillance, these efforts are consistent with the rule of law25 and 
have inspired political backlash against executive power. 26 
Law plays a crucial role in determining whether rights-erod-
ing, executive-emboldening programs like these generate politi-
cal accountability on behalf of communities of color. To appreci-
ate this dynamic, it is necessary to understand how the “rule of 
law” and “political accountability” are commonly understood and 
how they relate to a concept this Article terms “social cohesion.” 
Political accountability refers to the extra-congressional ways in 
which members of society ensure government is responsive to 
their interests. It includes public opinion, civic organizing, and 
elections.27 The success of these accountability efforts depends, 
in turn, upon social cohesion. Social cohesion is the process by 
which different individuals and communities join together polit-
ically to support or advocate for a particular objective.28 This co-
hesion can involve intergroup convergence on material and/or 
moral interests.29 It can also involve minorities working with 
the white majority, other minority groups, or social justice 
groups to realize their goals. 
Achieving social cohesion depends, in part, on the rule of 
law. The rule of law, which is generally defined as the principle 
 
 24. See infra Section III.D.2. The Border Wall, which is framed as a national 
security program, affects the property rights of indigenous tribes, as well as mem-
bers of the Latinx community. The Wall has also generated opposition from other 
groups, like environmental organizations, whose interests are adversely affected. 
See infra Section III.D.2. 
 25. See infra Section III.D.2. While the Administration’s authority to build the 
Wall and take private property is consistent with the rule of law, the Trump Ad-
ministration’s financing of the Wall may not be, as reflected in ongoing legal chal-
lenges to that financing. See infra Section III.D.2. 
 26. These different types of programs may overlap. As demonstrated by the 
Border Wall case, for example, a legalistic program may be explicitly discriminatory 
while also impacting the rights of small but diverse groups. See infra Section 
III.D.2. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, this Article treats these ideal types 
separately. 
 27. See infra Section III.A. 
 28. See infra Section III.A. 
 29. See infra Section III.A. 
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that government is limited and bound by law,30 influences social 
norms, attitudes, and behaviors.31 The rule of law undermines 
social cohesion and political accountability when it negatively 
impacts disfavored minorities in socially acceptable ways but 
does not hurt other groups. By contrast, the rule of law generates 
social cohesion and political accountability when it leads to per-
vasively negative consequences for society. 
The domestic national security programs discussed in this 
Article reflect these dynamics. The rule of law undermines social 
cohesion and political accountability for FBI surveillance, the 
material support statutes, and their private analogues, which 
align with social perceptions about Arabs and Muslims without 
negatively impacting other groups. In the United States, Arabs 
and Muslims are politically marginalized and socially disfa-
vored,32 in part, because they are stereotyped as terrorists and 
viewed as threats to U.S. national security.33 FBI surveillance, 
the material support statutes, and their private analogues rein-
force these perceptions in a facially neutral way that is generally 
accepted within society.34 This undermines social cohesion be-
tween Arabs and Muslims and other members of society who are 
unaffected by these initiatives and unlikely to politically mobi-
lize with this marginalized group.35 As a result, political ac-
countability for these programs becomes unlikely. 
By contrast, law facilitates social cohesion and political ac-
countability for the Muslim Ban because it is viewed by many 
members of society as explicitly discriminatory.36 Explicit dis-
crimination—discrimination overtly embodying negative views 
or treatment of a particular group or individual due to their 
membership in that group37—is generally seen as socially 
 
 30. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 
137–38 (2004). 
 31. See infra Section III.A. 
 32. See infra Section III.B.3; Ramzi Kassem & Diala Shamas, Rebellious Law-
yering in the Security State, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 671, 695–96 (2017). 
 33. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 34. See infra Sections III.B.1–2. 
 35. Though exceeding this Article’s scope, the rule of law may further a group’s 
marginalization and undermine social cohesion by making members of the group 
less willing, for psychological and other reasons, to seek accountability. See Kassem 
& Shamas, supra note 32, at 684, 688, 694. 
 36. See infra Section III.C. The Muslim Ban’s explicitly discriminatory nature 
is reflected in various statements by Trump and, to a lesser extent, through the text 
and promulgation of the Muslim Ban’s first version. See infra Section III.C. 
 37. See infra Section III.B.1 and accompanying text. 
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unacceptable and offensive even when a disfavored minority 
community is disproportionately affected.38 This discrimination 
generates social cohesion between Arabs and Muslims and other 
members of society who are unaffected but also offended by this 
discrimination.39 Law also facilitates social cohesion and politi-
cal accountability for Sections 215 and 702 surveillance and the 
Border Wall, which negatively impact diverse groups. While mi-
norities are also affected, the broad adverse consequences of 
these programs create a common interest in checking executive 
action.40 
In addition to illuminating the rule of law’s effects on exec-
utive accountability, this Article’s comparative approach adds 
nuance to the standard account in legal scholarship that majori-
tarian politics necessarily undermine minority rights and inter-
ests.41 As it demonstrates, laws that are explicitly discrimina-
tory or that negatively affect the rights and interests of a small 
but diverse array of actors can lead to executive accountability,42 
whether or not the white majority or its material objectives are 
substantially implicated.43 
 
 38. Nicholas A. Valentino et al., The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhet-
oric and the End of Racial Priming, 80 J. POL. 757, 758–59 (2017). 
 39. See infra Section III.C. 
 40. See infra Section III.D. 
 41. As discussed in Section III.A, the idea that majoritarian democratic politics 
often fails to further the interests of minority groups is well-established in the legal 
literature, particularly in the works of Derrick Bell and John Hart Ely. Though they 
took different routes, both Bell and Ely reached roughly the same conclusion, 
namely, that majority support is typically required to achieve minority rights. Der-
rick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–33 (1980); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: 
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–104, 135–79 (1980). For Ely, this dynamic is 
especially true for minority groups that are socially disfavored. Id. at 151. 
 42. See infra Sections III.A, D.2. Legal scholarship has increasingly docu-
mented the existence and/or importance of building coalitions amongst communi-
ties of color to achieve civil liberty and rights gains. See, e.g., Adrien Wing, Civil 
Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War 
on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 745 (2003) (“Despite the frictions and problems 
between various traditional and nontraditional groups, coalition building can be a 
useful tool of critical race praxis [amongst minority groups in the United States].”); 
Kevin R. Johnson, The Struggle for Civil Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, 
Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups, 63 LA. L. REV. 759, 766 
(2003) (arguing that “coalitions between communities of color will be necessary to 
displace white domination of the electoral process in this country”). This Article 
adds to this scholarship while also emphasizing the importance of non-identitarian 
social justice groups to these coalitions. 
 43. See infra Section III.B. Bell and Ely’s theories assume that the white ma-
jority’s material interests—whether political, economic, or social—must be 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the schol-
arship on executive power, the rule of law, and politics. It chal-
lenges the assumption that law necessarily supports political ef-
forts to check the President. Instead, it argues that law often 
undermines political accountability where it is most needed. In 
presenting these arguments, this Part briefly explores two other 
strands of scholarship: first, on the rule of law and what it re-
quires, and second, on the disproportionate impact national se-
curity programs have on Arab and Muslim Americans. As this 
discussion demonstrates, legalistic programs that bolster execu-
tive power, threaten individual rights, and discriminate against 
minority groups do not necessarily lead to political restraints on 
the executive, especially in the national security sector.44 
Part II analyzes several national security programs that 
disproportionately affect Arab and Muslim Americans—FBI sur-
veillance, material support cases, and their private analogues—
and establishes their rule of law credentials.45 Since 9/11, the 
FBI has developed extensive domestic intelligence gathering 
practices for counterterrorism purposes.46 These practices, 
which give the FBI broad powers to surveil Americans, raise con-
stitutional concerns but are still compliant with the rule of 
law.47 Supporting these efforts are various initiatives, primarily 
developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), urg-
ing citizens to surveil one another.48 These citizen-on-citizen 
monitoring efforts are similarly compliant with the rule of law 
but further bolster executive surveillance powers and their 
rights-threatening effects.49 These initiatives include the See 
Something, Say Something program, which urges members of 
the public to report “suspicious” activity to law enforcement, and 
the Countering Violent Extremism Program (CVE), which calls 
 
implicated in order for democratic politics to address minority concerns. See infra 
Section III.B. 
 44. See COLE, supra note 14, at xxvi–xxvii (emphasizing importance of account-
ability in national security since the executive “cannot be trusted to balance secu-
rity and liberty fairly” and will “always overemphasize security needs and under-
count liberty interests”). 
 45. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 46. See infra Section II.A. 
 47. Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2014). 
 48. See infra Section II.A. 
 49. See infra Section II.A. 
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on communities to monitor their members for signs of “radicali-
zation.”50 
As for material support, these laws, which prohibit a broad 
range of support for terrorist groups or activities, give the exec-
utive substantial authority to prosecute terrorism-related 
crimes.51 As defined by statute, material support includes a host 
of nonviolent activities ranging from monetary assistance to ed-
ucational training.52 Pursuant to two criminal statutes, 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the government prose-
cutes individuals providing this prohibited support. While these 
cases often threaten civil liberties,53 they are rule of law compli-
ant. These prosecutions are complemented by two civil laws en-
couraging private individuals to also bring suit against those 
materially supporting terrorist groups or activities. These are 
the private right of action under the Antiterrorism Act of 1992 
(“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and the terrorism exception to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A.54 As with citizen-on-citizen monitoring programs, these 
tort suits indirectly aggrandize executive power in ways that 
raise civil liberty concerns without violating the rule of law.55 
Part III examines why political accountability for these dis-
criminatory programs has been elusive, and compares these pro-
grams to legalistic national security initiatives that also bolster 
executive power and erode individual rights56 but have gener-
ated political checks on the executive: the Muslim Ban, Section 
215 and 702 surveillance, and the Border Wall.57 It 
 
 50. See infra Section II.A. 
 51. See infra Section II.B. 
 52. 18. U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). See infra Section II.B for the complete definition 
of material support. 
 53. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Ter-
rorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10–15 (2003) [hereinafter The New McCar-
thyism]. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court cleared the 
way for the government to use the material support laws to prohibit First Amend-
ment-protected speech. 561 U.S. 1 (2010); see also infra Sections II.A–B. 
 54. See infra Section II.B. Relying on material support’s sweeping definition, 
citizens have used these civil laws to bring claims against private entities, as well 
as foreign governments designated as state sponsors of terrorism. See infra Section 
II.B. 
 55. See infra Section II.B. 
 56. See infra Section III.D.2. While most of the other programs discussed in 
this Article erode civil liberties, the Border Wall’s main threat is to property rights. 
See infra Section III.D.2. 
 57. See infra Sections III.B–D. Some of these efforts remain ongoing and in-
complete (the Muslim Ban and the Border Wall), while other efforts, such as 
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demonstrates how some of these accountability efforts have oc-
curred even though the white majority and/or its material inter-
ests have not been substantially involved.58 
Applying insights from this comparative approach, Part IV 
presents three possible solutions to the accountability problems 
facing FBI surveillance, the material support statutes, and their 
private analogues.59 The first strategy calls for an end to the dis-
criminatory national security programs discussed in this Article. 
The second allows these programs to continue but calls for their 
civil liberty problems to be addressed. The third strategy calls 
for both fixing their civil liberty shortcomings and applying 
these programs more broadly across American society.60 A brief 
conclusion follows. 
Recent events are a reminder of the executive’s expansive 
authority.61 At a time when judicial and congressional checks on 
that power are less than robust, this Article aims to prompt ad-
ditional scholarly work on the ways law can effectively support 
political restraints on the executive’s national security authori-
ties—especially for communities of color. Its insights may also 
apply outside the national security sphere. The rule of law’s dis-
criminatory impact reaches deeply into American society, as un-
derscored by police brutality against Black and Brown commu-
nities.62 Here, too, judicial and legislative checks have been 
 
surveillance under Sections 215 and 702, have achieved concrete accountability 
gains. See infra Sections III.C–D. 
 58. See infra Sections III.C, D.2. For example, while reactions to the Muslim 
Ban may be partly motivated by “majority” concerns—including handwringing 
about the ban’s impact on national security—opposition to the ban is mostly driven 
by widespread perceptions about its explicitly discriminatory intentions. See infra 
Section III.C. In addition, efforts to secure private land for the Border Wall have 
been restrained by a small but diverse coalition of groups that represent not only 
the interests of white ranchers but also various communities of color as well as 
social justice organizations. See infra Section III.D.2. 
 59. See infra Section IV. 
 60. See infra Section IV. This Article’s proposal that discriminatory laws and 
policies be applied across American society draws inspiration from a similar sug-
gestion made in early post-9/11 scholarship on national security and civil liberties. 
COLE, supra note 14, at 23. 
 61. Trump’s impeachment is the most recent example of the executive’s exten-
sive powers vis-a-vis the other branches. 
 62. See Ryan W. Miller, Shake-up at Atlanta Police Department Latest in Law 
Enforcement Firings Following Protests, USA TODAY (updated June 15, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/08/george-floyd-protests-hav 
e-sparked-some-police-firings-charges/5318019002/ [https://perma.cc/V7UL-YRRH 
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elusive or ineffective.63 Understanding law’s effects on politi-
cally restraining executive power—whether at the federal, state, 
or local level—may prove useful in addressing this systemic cri-
sis. 
I. RISING EXECUTIVE POWER AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Most scholars agree that the modern executive has accrued 
substantial power.64 According to prevailing accounts, Congress 
and the courts have increasingly been subordinate to and ruled 
by executive prerogatives, especially in the areas of national se-
curity and foreign affairs.65 One proposed solution to this prob-
lem looks at how the rule of law and politics combine to restrain 
the executive, independently of Congress and the courts. By and 
large, the consensus view is that, however imperfectly, the rule 
of law and politics keep the President in check. 
As Part I demonstrates, this view rests on a mistaken prem-
ise—namely, that the rule of law always furthers political ac-
countability. To the contrary, law often undermines accountabil-
ity where it is most needed. To demonstrate this, Part I starts 
by canvassing the scholarly literature on the role of law and pol-
itics in constraining executive power. It then examines two other 
areas of scholarship: first, on the rule of law and what it re-
quires, and second, on the disparate impact national security 
 
] (reporting on nation-wide protests demanding accountability and change in law 
enforcement activity against communities of color). 
 63. See, e.g., Kate Levine, We Cannot Prosecute Our Way to Making Black Lives 
Matter, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG (June 10, 2020), https://lpeblog.org/2020/06/10/pros-
ecuting-police-wont-make-black-lives-matter/ [https://perma.cc/H75D-FC6N] (ar-
guing that “there is ‘no equality under law’ in our criminal legal system, which im-
prisons black Americans at a rate far outstripping white Americans”); Jocelyn 
Simonson, Power Over Policing, BOS. REV. (June 8, 2020), https://bostonreview.net
/law-justice/jocelyn-simonson-power-over-policing [https://perma.cc/YTR8-WF25] 
(arguing that technocratic reforms to policing are insufficient for realizing account-
ability). 
 64. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 181–82 (2010) (arguing that executive power has become dangerously 
expansive and that existing institutional arrangements no longer constrain the 
President); Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319–22 (2006) (arguing that 
Congress and the courts have abdicated their duties, which has allowed the execu-
tive to become increasingly powerful). 
 65. Curtis Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Power, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1098–1101 (2013); 
ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 184–85; Katyal, supra note 64. 
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laws have on Arab and Muslim Americans. Together, these ar-
eas of scholarship show how some legalistic programs bolster ex-
ecutive power, threaten individual rights, and discriminate 
against minority groups without generating political restraints 
on the executive. This is particularly evident in the national se-
curity sector, where there has been little accountability for le-
galistic programs that give the presidency broad powers that dis-
proportionately affect the rights of Arabs and Muslims,66 
including U.S. citizens.67  
A. The Executive Unbound 
A number of scholars have discussed how the rule of law and 
politics interact to constrain the President. Much of this schol-
arship is either implicitly or explicitly in conversation with ar-
guments presented by Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Ver-
meule.68 As Posner and Vermeule argue, our constitutional 
system of checks and balances is both inadequate for realizing 
executive accountability and ill-suited to the modern adminis-
trative state.69 Because the executive stands at the center of that 
state, the courts and Congress are marginal actors, reacting to—
rather than setting—policies created and enforced by the execu-
tive.70 In emergency situations, Congress and the courts are 
even more ineffective.71 This means the executive “governs, sub-
ject to legal constraints that are shaky in normal times and weak 
or nonexistent in times of crises.”72 For Posner and Vermeule, 
this is not only a factual reality but also normatively preferable. 
In their view, an executive unbound by the rule of law produces 
better outcomes, particularly when it comes to making “rapid 
ongoing adjustments in complex policy matters.”73 
 
 66. See Engy Abdelkader et al., Mass Violence Motivated by Hate: Are New Do-
mestic Terrorism Laws the Answer?, 44 HARBINGER 116, 132 (2020) (noting “long 
history of misuse of terrorism related or national security related authorities to 
target minority communities . . . .”). 
 67. See infra Section I.C. 
 68. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE 
UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010). 
 69. Id. at 4–5, 14–15. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 19. 
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However, all is not lost when it comes to checking executive 
power. For Posner and Vermeule, democratic politics serve as 
the primary check on presidential authority.74 While acknowl-
edging that law and politics “lie on a continuum,” they argue 
that the political end of the spectrum—specifically elections and 
public opinion—effectively restrains the executive on its own.75 
Many scholars have challenged Posner and Vermeule’s 
skepticism about the rule of law and argued that it works along-
side politics to constrain presidential authority.76 Critiquing 
what they see as the pair’s binary approach, various scholars 
underscore the dialectical relationship between law and political 
practice.77 While not engaging directly with Posner and Ver-
meule’s position, Professor Jack Goldsmith argues that legal ac-
tors inside and outside the executive branch, including govern-
ment lawyers, departmental inspectors general, and private civil 
rights attorneys, combine with investigative journalists to bring 
the force of law and politics to bear on the President’s actions.78 
Still, others describe the separation between the rule of law and 
politics as largely semantic, insisting that constraints on the ex-
ecutive arise “from some inextricable mix of law and public re-
sponses tied to the law . . . .”79 Others argue that “while standing 
alone, legal and political mechanisms each yield only fragile con-
straints on government, when they work together they can prove 
effective.”80 
 
 74. Id. at 4–5. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Some have also challenged the notion that the other branches do not check 
presidential power in any way. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law 
or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 781–82 (2012) [hereinafter Binding the Ex-
ecutive] (arguing that Congress restrains the executive to some degree). 
 77. Id. at 782–83. 
 78. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 passim (2012); but see ACKERMAN, supra note 64, at 26–
29, 68 (arguing that the media has stopped playing its checking role and executive 
branch lawyers often rubberstamp broad exercises of presidential power). While 
Goldsmith also argues that the courts—and to a lesser extent Congress—have re-
stricted the President post-9/11, he concedes that this checking is substantially 
strengthened by the executive branch’s legal bureaucracy, as well as outside polit-
ical forces. GOLDSMITH, supra, at xi–xvi. 
 79. Pildes, supra note 4, at 1410. 
 80. Binding the Executive, supra note 76, at 826. See also Julian David Morten-
son, Law Matters, Even to the Executive, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1015, 1037 (2014) 
(“[S]ometimes law . . . creat[es] a set of electoral facts on the ground to which a 
politically aware executive must respond . . . .”). 
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While these scholars rightly insist on law’s critical role in 
realizing political accountability, they mistakenly assume that 
law necessarily furthers this accountability.81 In fact, the rule of 
law does not always promote political checks on the executive. 
To understand why, it is necessary to appreciate what the rule 
of law does and does not require. As explored in the next section, 
the dominant approach to the rule of law is formalistic. Accord-
ing to formal legality, what matters is that government acts in 
accordance with relevant rules. These rules can support govern-
ment action that bolsters executive power, undermines individ-
ual rights, and disproportionately impacts minority groups 
while still satisfying formal legality’s requirements. These sorts 
of programs may, however, make it harder for the rule of law to 
promote political accountability and keep the executive in check. 
B. Understanding the Rule of Law 
There are two main approaches to the rule of law: formalist 
and substantive.82 In general, formal legality focuses on the 
proper form of law and government obedience to law, while sub-
stantive legality also requires that law have a particular con-
tent, usually aligned with justice and morals.83 Within and be-
tween these schools of thought, the rule of law remains a highly 
contestable concept whose normative meaning and descriptive 
elements have long generated disagreement.84 
Nevertheless, there are important areas of convergence. In 
particular, all conceptions of the rule of law embrace certain for-
mal requirements.85 Professor Lon Fuller’s influential descrip-
tion of these requirements breaks them down into eight 
 
 81. Some executive accountability scholars have gestured toward the idea that 
political accountability requires social cohesion. See, e.g., Binding the Executive, su-
pra note 76, at 836 (“The political foundations of executive constraint . . . may be 
fraying as greater legislative polarization and political inequality create political 
dynamics in which political elites are increasingly unlikely to converge on opposi-
tion to a President . . . .”). 
 82. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 91. 
 83. Id. at 92. 
 84. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997). 
 85. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 93. There are also various procedural require-
ments which govern how courts administer the rule of law but that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, THE RULE OF LAW 
§ 5.2 (2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/#ProcAspe [https://
perma.cc/VH2J-CWAR]. 
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features.86 According to Fuller’s formulation, law must be: (1) 
general, meaning that there are rules to guide government con-
duct;87 (2) publicly promulgated, which means law must be pub-
lished but not necessarily known by all its subjects;88 (3) non-
retroactive, except where necessary to correct the legal system;89 
(4) clear and understandable, meaning law is neither obscure 
nor incoherent;90 (5) free of contradictions both internally and 
with respect to other laws;91 (6) capable of obedience such that 
law does not demand the impossible from its subjects;92 (7) con-
stant, meaning law is not changed too frequently or suddenly;93 
and (8) congruent with official action, meaning that government 
officials act in accordance with law.94 Law must also be the prod-
uct of a “rational law-making process.”95 
According to formalist legality, law is presumptively valid 
as long as it satisfies these requirements. The eighth require-
ment—government compliance with relevant rules—is particu-
larly important.96 This requirement means state officials cannot 
change the law outside established procedures or break it with-
out consequence.97 This limits manifestations of “arbitrary 
 
 86. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 93. 
 87. FULLER, supra note 11, at 4. 
 88. Id. at 51. 
 89. Id. at 54. 
 90. Id. at 63. 
 91. Id. at 65–66, 68. A law that is free of contradictions is not only internally 
consistent but also consistent with other laws. See id. at 69 (noting that laws that 
contradict one another, for example, by “fight[ing] each other, though without nec-
essarily killing one another” can be “very hurtful to legality”). 
 92. Id. at 70 n.29. A law that is impossible to comply with is different from a 
law that is extremely difficult to obey. The latter can be “harsh and unfair but it 
need not contradict the basic purpose of a legal order, as does a rule that demands 
what is patently impossible.” Id. at 79. 
 93. Id. at 79–80. 
 94. Id. at 81. 
 95. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 359 (1973). While 
there is general agreement on these basic elements of the rule of law, different 
scholars describe the rule of law’s elements slightly differently, though these de-
scriptions are usually coextensive with Fuller’s list. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 84, 
at 8 n.27 (presenting a list of requirements for the rule of law that “differs in detail 
from, but is in spirit consistent with” Fuller’s eight criteria). 
 96. See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (Bruce Caldwell ed. 
2007). 
 97. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Power, Rules, and Compliance, in DEMOCRACY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 62, 71 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds. 2003). 
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power”98 and ensures the “rule of law, not men” prevails.99 No-
tably, formalist legality does not require all government activi-
ties be rule-bound, but instead leaves that decision to social 
choice.100 Where formalist legality does require formal rules—
specifically for government deprivations of liberty or prop-
erty101—it does not demand that law constrain the state in a 
particular way.102 Law can give the government substantial dis-
cretion, create meaningful civil liberty restraints, or strike a 
middle ground.103 Formalist legality is largely agnostic about 
which option is chosen, as long as the state continues to enforce 
and obey the law.104 
The formalist rule of law also does not require that law have 
a particular normative content.105 Law can serve “bad” ends, in-
cluding by institutionalizing racial and religious discrimina-
tion.106 Nor does formalism make demands regarding funda-
mental rights, equality, or justice.107 For example, though some 
argue that the rule of law’s first formal requirement—the gen-
erality principle—demands “impartial” application of law,108 it 
still allows for invidious discrimination109 and does not require 
 
 98. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 211, 219 (2009). 
 99. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 5. 
 100. Id. at 97. 
 101. Id. at 139. 
 102. Formal legality may, for example, be less necessary in areas where the 
state’s coercive power is minimal as in “the sphere of community activities.” Id. at 
140. 
 103. As theorists note, “formal legality . . . [may be] counter-productive in situa-
tions that require discretion, judgment, compromise or context-specific adjust-
ments.” Id.  
 104. See RAZ, supra note 98, at 218 (arguing that the “discretion of the crime-
preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law” including by 
“avoid[ing] all effort to prevent and detect certain crimes or prosecute certain clas-
ses of criminals”). The scholar F.A. Hayek had a particularly dim view of discretion 
and its corrosive effect on the rule of law. Id. at 120. As others have noted, however, 
Hayek’s view, which was primarily driven by opposition to socialism and the wel-
fare state, failed to align with formal legality or appreciate how discretion can be 
restrained through legislative mandates and procedural requirements. TAMANAHA, 
supra note 30, at 98. 
 105. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, supra note 97, at 62, 67; José María Maravall, 
Rule of Law as a Political Weapon, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra 
note 97, at 261, 274. 
 106. RAZ, supra note 98, at 211, 214. 
 107. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Fuller, himself, rejected this view. FULLER, supra note 11, at 47. 
 109. See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 85 (noting that 
while the principle of generality means law should apply “impersonally and 
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individuals or groups receive equal treatment.110 This is not to 
say that formalists do not care about the content of law, but ra-
ther that law’s content is a matter of “substantive justice.”111 
In contrast to formal legality, the substantive rule of law 
both embraces law’s formal aspects and has specific content re-
quirements.112 Most commonly, it incorporates individual rights 
and liberties into the rule of law regardless of what is required 
by statutory or constitutional provisions.113 This approach to the 
rule of law does not distinguish “between the rule of law and 
substantive justice [and instead] requires . . . that the rules . . . 
capture and enforce moral rights.”114 
In short, while the formalist rule of law is fundamentally 
concerned with state adherence to law, regardless of its content, 
the substantive approach requires compliance not only with law 
but also with a set of higher-order individual rights that may or 
may not be reflected in law.115 
The scholarship on executive accountability falls far more 
on the formalist, rather than substantive,116 end of the rule of 
law spectrum.117 Implicitly guided by formalism, the central rule 
 
impartially” it also allows for “invidious discrimination so far as its substance is 
concerned”). 
 110. Robin West, Paul Gowder’s Rule of Law, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 308 
(2018). While there are some approaches to the formalist rule of law that center 
substantive principles of equality, they remain in the minority. See Paul Gowder, 
The Rule of Law and Equality, 322 L. & PHIL. 565, 567 (2013) (noting that the 
“equality rationale” for the rule of law is a “minority position”). 
 111. Ronald Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law, 64 PROC. OF THE 
BRIT. ACAD. 259, 262 (1978). 
 112. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 102. 
 113. Id. at 102, 104. 
 114. Dworkin, supra note 111, at 262. 
 115. TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 102. 
 116. Professor David Cole’s work on executive accountability, law, and politics 
is a notable exception to the scholarship’s formalist trend. Cole’s theory of “civil 
society constitutionalism” focuses on the centrality of constitutional rights to polit-
ically checking the executive. David Cole, Where Liberty Lies: Civil Society and In-
dividual Rights After 9/11, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1203, 1254–61 (2011). For Cole, “in 
the first post-9/11 decade, constitutional and rule-of-law values were brought to 
bear on executive conduct by the interaction of the informal political, legal, and 
cultural work of civil society and the formal operation of law.” Id. at 1209. 
 117. The focus, here, is on the scholarship about executive power, rule of law, 
and political accountability, rather than on the scholars themselves. Indeed, some 
of the scholars discussed here have explored the discriminatory impact of national 
security policies in their other work. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Article II and Antidiscrim-
ination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2019) [hereinafter Article II and Antidiscrim-
ination Norms] (examining the executive’s “discretion-to-discriminate” under 
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of law issue for this literature is executive compliance with law, 
regardless of law’s content. Professor Goldsmith argues that var-
ious intra and extra-governmental actors help curb the Presi-
dent’s national security actions by ensuring legal compliance.118 
For Goldsmith, the success of these efforts is determined not by 
their embrace of individual rights, protection of vulnerable 
groups, or elimination of broad presidential discretion, but ra-
ther by the fact that executive power is subject to constraint of 
some kind.119 Taking a slightly different approach, another 
scholar claims that law and politics restrain the executive be-
cause perceptions about presidential compliance with law (what-
ever that law may be) impact public opinion about executive ac-
tion.120 
These arguments fail to consider how executive compliance 
with certain substantive laws and programs may make it harder 
for the rule of law to support political checks on the presidency. 
As demonstrated in the next section, this issue is both urgent 
and pervasive in the national security sector. 
C. A Discriminatory National Security Environment 
Since 9/11, scholars have demonstrated how Arabs and 
Muslims, citizen and noncitizen alike, have been the primary 
targets of national security laws and programs that bolster ex-
ecutive power and erode civil liberties. For nearly twenty years, 
there has been little accountability for these programs. This ac-
countability is both necessary and important, despite some sug-
gestions to the contrary. 
While the literature on discriminatory national security 
programs is vast and defies efficient summary, it is worth noting 
a few streams that highlight the law’s role in these ongoing prac-
tices. For example, scholars have shown how criminal counter-
terrorism laws give the executive broad prosecutorial powers 
that are used to target and undermine the rights of young Arab 
 
Article II using the Supreme Court’s decisions on Japanese internment during 
World War II and Trump’s Muslim Ban). 
 118. GOLDSMITH, supra note 78, at xi–xii. 
 119. Id. at xii, xv. 
 120. Pildes, supra note 4, at 1409–10. 
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and Muslim men.121 They have also shown how legal approaches 
to international and domestic terrorism result in harsher treat-
ment for Arabs and Muslims, who are primarily identified with 
international terrorism even if they are Americans.122 Others 
have described the government’s No Fly List—which bans cer-
tain people from all air travel with few due process protections—
as involving “back-end discrimination”123 that “disproportion-
ately impact[s] those populations [stereotypically] associated 
with terrorism, such as military-age Muslim males . . . .”124 
These and other discriminatory programs are generally 
grounded in the rule of law125 yet have failed to generate mean-
ingful political checks on presidential power. One possible expla-
nation is that these programs simply should not be restrained. 
According to this view, these are valid national security initia-
tives designed to target “terrorists,” who just happen to be 
mostly Arab and/or Muslim. Indeed, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Su-
preme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy presented a variation of 
this perspective. Instead of allaying concerns about these pro-
grams, Kennedy’s perspective demonstrates why accountability 
for the government’s discriminatory national security practices 
is so necessary.  
In his majority opinion, Kennedy dismissed allegations that 
the government had arrested and detained thousands of Arab 
and Muslim men in the weeks after 9/11 because of their race, 
religion, or national origin.126 In justifying his conclusion, Ken-
nedy argued that: 
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Mus-
lim hijackers who counted themselves members in good 
 
 121. Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself?: Sentencing Young American 
Muslims in the War on Terror, 126 YALE L.J. 1520, 1560 (2017) [hereinafter Is His-
tory Repeating Itself?]. 
 122. Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “Interna-
tional” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1395–97 (2019) [hereinafter Separate 
and Unequal]. 
 123. Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 668 (2017). 
The No-Fly List’s potential back-end discrimination is defined as “emerg[ing] from 
the supposedly neutral analytics of the digital watchlisting and database screening 
system itself.” Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: THE RELENTLESS RISE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND SECRECY 50–55 (2017) (describing executive efforts 
to ensure national security policies comply with formalist legality).  
 126. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al 
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin 
Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim dis-
ciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy 
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce 
a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though 
the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Mus-
lims.127 
For three reasons, this view underscores the importance of 
political accountability for these sorts of programs. First, the “Iq-
bal view” fundamentally ignores the devastating impact many 
national security programs have had on minority communities. 
Notwithstanding Kennedy’s description, the government’s post-
9/11 detention policy was “[f]ar from a ‘legitimate’ effort to arrest 
those who had a ‘suspected link to the [9/11] attacks,’” and, in-
stead, indiscriminately targeted “people who were simply brown 
and undocumented and who happened to fall under the gaze of 
law enforcement officers or fearful members of the public.”128 
While the Court should have been shocked by “mass detentions 
of any kind in the United States,” it behaved “as if it were en-
tirely natural that horrific violence committed by nineteen men 
should generate suspicion of thousands of others who shared (or 
appeared to share) their broadly defined racial or religious iden-
tity.”129 
Second, the Iqbal view is out of step with current realities 
about terrorist incidents in the United States. For nearly twenty 
years, domestic right-wing extremist groups have been respon-
sible for the majority of U.S. terrorism incidents resulting in fa-
talities. According to a 2017 report from the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO), far right-wing violent extremists— 
which include white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and members of 
the Ku Klux Klan130—have been responsible for 73 percent of 
 
 127. Id. at 682. As Professor Shirin Sinnar has pointed out, in Iqbal the Court 
conflated Muslims with Arabs while failing to grasp that many of those detained in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were Muslim, but not Arab. Shirin Sinnar, The 
Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L. J. 379, 416–17 (2017). 
 128. Sinnar, supra note 127, at 420. 
 129. Id. at 429. 
 130. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-300, COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM: ACTIONS NEEDED TO DEFINE STRATEGY AND ADDRESS PROGRESS OF 
JAMSHIDI_FINAL DRAFT_CLEAN_12.28.20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/20 2:08 PM 
2021] THE DISCRIMINATORY EXECUTIVE 99 
 
terrorism-related incidents that resulted in deaths from Septem-
ber 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016.131 According to reports from 
the Anti-Defamation League, which tracks extremist violence in 
the United States, right-wing groups were responsible for almost 
all “extremist-related” murders in 2018132 and 2019.133 These 
numbers suggest, at the very least, that terrorism is hardly a 
problem exclusive to Arab and Muslim groups.  
Third, the Iqbal view depends on the normative assumption 
that to be a terrorist is to be a member of a certain racial, reli-
gious, or national community—specifically, to be Arab or Muslim 
or from an Arab or Muslim country.134 It categorically excludes 
individuals who do not belong to one of these communities, even 
if they have engaged or have attempted to engage in criminal or 
violent activity. In these ways, the Iqbal view is notably remi-
niscent of other forms of racial profiling that have been exposed 
as illegitimate, including practices of equating “African Ameri-
can and Latino appearance . . . with criminality, Latino appear-
ances with illegal border crossings, and Asian appearance with 
treason.”135  
In short, political accountability for the executive’s discrim-
inatory national security programs remains necessary and ur-
gent. It cannot, however, be achieved without understanding 
how the rule of law influences accountability for rights-eroding, 
executive-emboldening programs that impact communities of 
color. The next section begins this exploration by establishing 
the legalistic nature of several of these programs—FBI surveil-
lance, material support prosecutions, and their private ana-
logues. 
 
FEDERAL EFFORTS 29 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C8WF-SBK9]. 
 131. Id. at 4. As the GAO report notes, the number of deaths caused by right-
wing groups and groups identifying as Islamic were roughly equal during the re-
porting period. Id. at 4–5. 
 132. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, A Report from the Center on Extremism: Mur-
der and Extremism in the United States in 2018 at 10 (Jan. 2019), https://
www.adl.org/media/12480/download [https://perma.cc/XQS4-CHD7]. 
 133. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, A Report from the Center on Extremism: Mur-
der and Extremism in the United States in 2019 at 18 (Feb. 2020), https://
www.adl.org/media/14107/download [hereinafter 2019 ADL REPORT] [https://
perma.cc/J4SL-SJ3B]. 
 134. Ahmed, supra note 12, at 1278. 
 135. Id. 
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II. NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS: FBI SURVEILLANCE, 
 MATERIAL SUPPORT, AND THEIR PRIVATE ANALOGUES 
As Professor Bernard Harcourt has observed, “our govern-
ment does everything possible to legalize its [national security] 
measures and to place them solidly within the rule of law 
. . . .”136 This section focuses on two of these domestic initiatives: 
FBI surveillance and material support cases. It also describes 
their relationship to various citizen-volunteer programs that en-
courage private individuals to further the executive’s national 
security prerogatives and bolster its power. The purpose of this 
section is to demonstrate how these laws and programs give 
broad authority—either directly or indirectly—to the executive, 
raise serious civil liberty concerns, and comply with the formal-
ist rule of law. This frames the discussion for Part III, which ex-
plains how these legalistic initiatives have failed to generate 
meaningful efforts at political accountability because of their 
disproportionate impact on Arab and Muslim Americans. 
A. FBI Surveillance and Citizen-on-Citizen Monitoring 
Since 9/11, the FBI’s domestic surveillance authority has 
grown significantly137 in ways that threaten civil liberty protec-
tions.138 This problem has been exacerbated by citizen-on-citi-
zen monitoring programs that bolster the executive’s surveil-
lance power while raising similar civil liberty concerns. Despite 
these constitutional threats, the FBI surveillance program and 
its private analogues comply with the rule of law’s formalistic 
requirements.  
1. Bolstering Executive Power 
At the heart of the FBI’s domestic surveillance regime are 
two sets of rules: the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic 
 
 136. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION: HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT WENT TO WAR AGAINST ITS OWN CITIZENS 213 (2018) (emphasis 
added). 
 137. Samuel Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 588–89 
(2010) [hereinafter Domesticating Intelligence]. 
 138. See Berman, supra note 47, at 6 (arguing that the FBI’s “broad investigative 
powers operate in tension with fundamental rights,” including privacy and free-
doms of expression, association, and religious practice). 
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FBI Operations (“Guidelines”)139 and the FBI’s Domestic Inves-
tigations and Operations Guide (“DIOG”).140 The Guidelines, 
which are developed by the Attorney General, create a basic 
framework for FBI operations.141 The DIOG, which is the FBI’s 
internal rulebook, implements the Guidelines’ directives.142 Af-
ter 9/11, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft made sweeping 
changes to the Guidelines that fundamentally expanded and 
transformed the FBI’s domestic surveillance work.143 These 
amendments, as well as other changes to the Guidelines and 
DIOG, underscore the executive’s substantial surveillance pow-
ers over Americans. 
In contrast to its previous version, which required suspicion 
that crime was afoot, Ashcroft’s amended Guidelines allowed the 
FBI to “visit any place and attend any event that [was] open to 
the public, on the same terms and conditions as the members of 
the public generally,” as long as the visit was for “the purpose of 
detecting terrorist activities.”144 This applied to houses of wor-
ship and meetings of political organizations.145 As originally 
 
 139. MICHAEL MUKASEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS (2008), https://www.justice.gov/ar-
chive/opa/docs/guidelines.pdf [hereinafter 2008 GUIDELINES] [https://perma.cc
/JUH4-XSBD]. The Guidelines were first created in 1976. They were developed in 
response to revelations about the FBI’s long-standing, abusive intelligence gather-
ing practices made by the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (“Church Committee”). Berman, 
supra note 47, at 12–13. To stave off calls for Congressional limits on the FBI’s 
practices, then-Attorney General Edward Levi issued internal rules to govern those 
practices, known as the “Levi Guidelines.” Id. at 13. The Guidelines limited domes-
tic intelligence-gathering and investigatory practices and continue to serve as the 
primary restraint on the FBI’s work. Id. at 13–14. 
 140. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DOMESTIC 
INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE (2011), https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/3416775-DIOG-Redactions-Marked-Redacted.html [https://perma.cc
/3Q52-KP2L] [hereinafter DIOG]. 
 141. Berman, supra note 47, at 8. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM 
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS, § VI (2002). The broadening of the FBI’s practices 
was accompanied by a new mission to “prevent[] the commission of terrorist acts 
against the United States and its people.” Id. at 1. 
 144. Marvin J. Johnson, Interested Persons Memo: Analysis of Changes to Attor-
ney General Guidelines, AM. C.L. UNION (June 5, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/other
/interested-persons-memo-analysis-changes-attorney-general-guidelines?redirect= 
national-security/interested-persons-memo-analysis-changes-attorney-general-gui 
delines [hereinafter INTERESTED PERSONS MEMO] [https://perma.cc/WHA8-JSEN]. 
 145. Id. 
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promulgated, the rules did not restrict these practices or require 
oversight from the courts, FBI headquarters, or local supervi-
sors.146 The implications for executive power were startling. As 
critics argued, “the tendency will be to collect more information, 
rather than less, in the hopes some of this ‘innocuous’ infor-
mation will be helpful when it comes time to ‘connect the 
dots.’”147  
In 2008, the Guidelines were amended again.148 Most nota-
bly, these amendments gave the FBI the authority to open “as-
sessments” in order to prevent crime, protect national security, 
or collect foreign intelligence.149 These assessments, which did 
not exist before the 2008 amendments, strengthen the FBI’s 
ability to initiate investigations without any concrete evidence 
of criminal or terrorist activity.150 All the FBI needs to do in or-
der to open an assessment is “determine that it is acting to pro-
tect against criminal or national-security threats, or to collect 
foreign intelligence.”151 
Though the Guidelines have not been changed since 
2008,152 the DIOG was amended in 2011.153 Some of these 
changes reined in previous guidance, including by placing limits 
on attending religious services, while still allowing surveillance 
of these spaces under certain circumstances.154 Other changes 
loosened existing rules. These changes included removing limits 
on the use of surveillance squads.155 The 2011 amendments also 
clarified and seemingly weakened existing rules relating to FBI 
agent or informant’s “undisclosed participation” in an 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 139. 
 149. FACT SHEET – NEW ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES (2008), ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/other/fact-sheet-new-attorney-general-guidelines?redirect=national-
security/fact-sheet-new-attorney-general-guidelines [https://perma.cc/29AV-FBPX] 
[hereinafter 2008 GUIDELINES FACT SHEET]. Depending upon the type, an FBI 
agent can open an assessment without seeking supervisory approval. DIOG, supra 
note 140, § 5.4.1. 
 150. Berman, supra note 47, at 18–19. 
 151. Id. at 18. 
 152. Id. at 15. 
 153. Charlie Savage, FBI Gets Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html [https://
perma.cc/5G86-3T2J]. 
 154. DIOG, supra note 140, § 18.5.1.3.1. 
 155. Savage, supra note 153. As a result of these amendments, FBI surveillance 
squads, which surreptitiously follow individual targets, can be used repeatedly dur-
ing an investigation’s assessment phase. Id. 
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organization or group.156 As a result of these changes, an agent 
or informant can now surreptitiously attend up to five organiza-
tional or group meetings, including those organized for political 
purposes, before certain special rules157 apply.158 
Supplementing the FBI’s robust surveillance powers, the 
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (“Nationwide SAR”) 
initiative encourages information sharing and reporting across 
local and federal law enforcement and intelligence units.159 Es-
tablished in 2007 and primarily led by the FBI and DHS, the 
program focuses on gathering information about individuals en-
gaged in “suspicious activities.”160 Because “suspicious activity” 
is broadly defined, Nationwide SAR effectively encourages law 
enforcement to gather data on individuals engaged in innocuous 
every day activities. For example, while “suspicious activity” in-
cludes various types of criminal behavior, like sabotaging “se-
cure sites,” it also includes noncriminal behavior that is less 
well-defined.161 This includes “[q]uestioning individuals or oth-
erwise soliciting information . . . about a public or private event” 
or “[d]emonstrating unusual or prolonged interest in facilities, 
buildings, or infrastructure” in a “manner that would arouse 
suspicion of terrorism or other criminality in a reasonable per-
son.”162 
In addition to these government-run surveillance programs, 
the executive encourages members of the general public to serve 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. Under the amended DIOG rules, if the agent or informant is trying to 
join the group, then the DIOG’s special rules apply immediately. Id. 
 158. Id. Before the 2011 amendments, the DIOG’s special rules had broader ap-
plicability to the FBI’s undisclosed participation in groups. Id. 
 159. Nationwide SAR Initiative: About the NSI, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/na-
tionwide-sar-initiative-nsi/about-nsi (last visited June 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc
/T5GN-QNTG]. 
 160. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., ISE-FS-200, INFORMATION SHARING 
ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONAL STANDARD SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING VERSION 
1.5.5., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/15_0223_NSI_ISE-Func 
tional-Standard-SAR.pdf [hereinafter Functional Standard] [https://perma.cc
/DY7E-2PDD]. As part of its work, the Nationwide SAR program aggregates reports 
about suspicious activities made by private parties to law enforcement. 
NATIONWIDE SAR INITIATIVE, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING: INFORMATION FOR 




 161. Functional Standard, supra note 160, at 44, 46, 49. 
 162. Id. 
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as volunteers and engage in domestic intelligence gathering 
themselves. These volunteer initiatives, which do not provide 
citizens with a meaningful opportunity to critique government 
policy,163 aggrandize the executive’s already substantial power 
in this area. Shortly after 9/11, these efforts began to take shape 
with Operation TIPS—the Terrorism Information and Preven-
tion System. Operation TIPS was a “nationwide program giving 
millions of American truckers, letter carriers, train conductors, 
ship captains, utility employees, and others a formal way to re-
port suspicious terrorist activity.”164 Established by the Justice 
Department, the program was intended to focus specifically on 
workers who had access to private spaces, including homes.165 
Information provided by these workers would be transferred by 
the Justice Department to government databases at the FBI, 
CIA, and elsewhere.166 
Because of public outcry,167 Operation TIPS was dismantled 
in 2003.168 However, its component parts have continued to op-
erate through other federal citizen-on-citizen monitoring pro-
grams. They include “Airplane Watch,” a joint program between 
the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) and the private 
sector that encourages airline pilots to detect and report per-
ceived security threats.169 Another joint program between TSA 
 
 163. See, e.g., Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 834 (2015) [hereinafter Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows] (describ-
ing CVE as a “top-down” rather than “grassroots” effort in which the government, 
and not targeted communities, sets the agenda). 
 164. See Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 
1444 (2010) (referencing material about Operation TIPS that no longer appears on 
the Justice Department’s website). 
 165. Id. Volunteers were encouraged to sign up on a government website to par-
ticipate in Operation TIPS. Nat Hentoff, Death of Operation TIPS, VILLAGE VOICE 
(Dec. 17, 2002), https://www.villagevoice.com/2002/12/17/the-death-of-operation-
tips/ [https://perma.cc/6JMD-S5XG].  
 166. Hentoff, supra note 165. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 880, 116 Stat. 2135, 
2245 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 460 (2006)). As with Section 215 and 702 surveillance, 
Operation TIPS is an example of a domestic national security program that bol-
stered government authority, eroded individual liberties, and impacted American 
society writ large. Like sections 215 and 702, it received substantial political back-
lash as a result of its rights-eroding effects on a broad swath of the American public. 
COLE, supra note 14, at 73. 
 169. Airport Watch, AOPA, http://aopa.org/advocacy/airports-and-airspace/secu-
rity-and-borders/airport-watch-security (last visited May 15, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/HBS7-6XFJ] (providing a twenty-four-hour hotline where the country’s 
approximately 560,000 pilots can report possible national security threats). 
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and the private sector, called “First Observer,” focuses on provid-
ing volunteer truck and bus drivers with training to detect, re-
port, and even respond to situations that might threaten na-
tional security.170 The “Maritime SAR Initiative” brings 
together various government stakeholders, including DHS, FBI, 
and the U.S. Coast Guard, to empower and improve the capabil-
ity of private port and safety officials to report suspicious activ-
ity to federal, state, local, and territorial law enforcement.171 
The spirit behind Operation TIPS is also present in the See 
Something, Say Something program. Launched by DHS in July 
2010, the program “engages the public in protecting the home-
land” by encouraging individuals to report “suspicious activity” 
to local law enforcement.172 
In tandem with these explicitly surveillance-oriented pro-
grams, the government has developed more subtle initiatives, 
like CVE, to encourage communities to monitor their members 
in the name of national security.173 While CVE efforts have 
manifested in different ways174 across various government 
branches, DHS has historically assumed a key role in coordinat-
ing and implementing the program.175 First embraced by the 
 
 170. See Oliver Patton, Eyes on the Road: First Observer Takes Over for Highway 
Watch, TRUCKING INFO (Aug. 10, 2009), https://www.truckinginfo.com/149551/eyes-
on-the-road-first-observer-takes-over-for-highway-watch [https://perma.cc/DM3D-
S9DW]; First Observer Plus, TSA, https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/firstobserver 
(last visited May 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5UPH-FDPE]. 
 171. Maritime Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (MSI), DHS, https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/15_1216_NSI_Maritime-SAR-Handou 
t.pdf [hereinafter Maritime SAR Initiative] [https://perma.cc/9DSA-2QVV]. 
 172. If You See Something, Say Something, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/see-some-
thing-say-something (last visited June 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/S676-RE9B]. The 
See Something, Say Something program was initially developed and implemented 
by the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 2002. If You See Some-
thing, Say Something – About the Campaign, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/see-some-
thing-say-something/about-campaign (last visited June 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc
/4YDV-F9BD]. 
 173. Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, supra note 163, at 885. CVE 
is a public-private partnership between Muslim community and religious leaders 
and federal and local law enforcement officials to combat terrorism by countering 
“radicalization.” Id. at 834. 
 174. Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of 
Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 147 (2012) [hereinafter Rascoff, Es-
tablishing Official Islam?]. 
 175. U.S. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR 
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016_strategic
_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf [hereinafter 2016 
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Obama Administration, CVE is premised on the notion that cer-
tain worldviews encourage or “radicalize” individuals to tolerate 
and support terrorism, even if they never engage in terrorist vi-
olence themselves.176 This theory, which has been criticized as 
empirically and scientifically weak,177 posits a connection be-
tween “larger ideological, political, and social currents on the one 
hand, and personal crises that lead to ‘cognitive openings’ on the 
other.”178 To prevent this supposedly radicalizing connection 
from forming, CVE targets individuals and groups that are “vul-
nerable” to such transformations.179 Though it has been pre-
sented as a softer, more progressive approach to counterterror-
ism, CVE has been used to “mask efforts to gather intelligence, 
identify individuals who are not suspected of wrongdoing for sur-
veillance, recruit informants, and co-opt community leaders to 
promote government messaging.”180 While the Trump Admin-
istration has dismissed CVE as soft on terrorism181 and 
 
STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN] [https://perma.cc/67BS-NSZU] (describing 
DHS’s key roles in implementing CVE). Although DHS shares primary responsibil-
ity for CVE with the Justice Department (DOJ), government-wide CVE efforts are 
coordinated through the CVE Taskforce, which includes DHS, DOJ, FBI, and the 
National Counterterrorism Center. Id.; Countering Violent Extremism Taskforce: 
What is CVE, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/cve/what-is-cve (last visited June 15, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/4AXU-6JLG]. 
 176. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 174, at 140–41. The turn 
to CVE reflects a concern with a rise in “homegrown” terrorism, which is believed 
to require more robust domestically-oriented, preventative approaches. Id. at 128–
29. 
 177. See, e.g., id. at 140 (noting that radicalization theories “inevitably exhibit 
the shortcomings of predictive social science applied to limited data sets”). 
 178. Id. at 141. In order to counter radicalization, CVE programs may focus both 
on the behavioral transformation of individuals, as well as on particular ideologies 
viewed as encouraging terrorist violence. Id. at 144. 
 179. Id. at 142. 
 180. Why Countering Violent Extremism Programs Are Bad Policy, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/why-countering-violent-extremism-programs-are-bad-policy [https://perma 
.cc/9YEM-HKCY]. 
 181. Peter Beinart, Trump Shut Programs to Counter Violent Extremism, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10
/trump-shut-countering-violent-extremism-program/574237/ [https://perma.cc/CG 
66-4GXC]. 
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privileged law enforcement-centered counterterrorism ef-
forts,182 CVE continues to be used at the state and local lev-
els.183 
The executive branch’s extensive domestic surveillance 
powers are bolstered by these citizen-on-citizen monitoring pro-
grams. Through the Operation TIPS’ spin-offs, as well as CVE, 
citizens participate in national security surveillance as arms of 
the state, enforcing its policies and objectives. These private vol-
unteers act as “force multipliers” that can “reach more broadly 
than the government,” including through superior access to pri-
vate spaces.184 While the extent of citizen monitoring under 
these programs is unclear, it is important enough to the U.S. 
national security agenda that individuals enjoy legal immunity 
for reporting suspicious activities under some of these initia-
tives.185  
2. Civil Liberty Concerns 
In addition to bolstering executive power, these public and 
private programs raise serious civil liberty concerns. For exam-
ple, while the Attorney General Guidelines prohibit the FBI 
from surveilling Americans “solely for the purpose of monitoring 
. . . First Amendment [activities],”186 “investigative activity 
prompted in part by these factors is not barred.”187 While this 
 
 182. Faiza Patel & Andrew Lindsay, Countering Violent Extremism Programs in 
the Trump Era, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 15, 2018), https://www.brennan-
center.org/blog/countering-violent-extremism-programs-trump-era [https://perma. 
cc/6ELA-KXLR]. 
 183. See, e.g., Michael Duffin, Local Governments Ramping Up Efforts to Coun-
ter Violent Extremism, DIPNOTE, (July 17, 2018), https://blogs.state.gov/stories
/2018/07/17/en/local-governments-ramping-efforts-counter-violent-extremism [http 
s://perma.cc/7R28-SNCV] (describing community-based CVE efforts undertaken by 
various U.S. cities including San Diego and Los Angeles). 
 184. Michaels, supra note 164, at 1438. 
 185. 6 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (statutory provision for SAR reporting relating to 
transportation which mandates that any person, including private individuals, who 
“in good faith and based on objectively reasonable suspicion, makes, or causes to be 
made, a voluntary report of covered activity to an authorized official shall be im-
mune from civil liability under Federal, State, and local law for such report”). 
 186. 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 139, at Part I.C.3. 
 187. Berman, supra note 47, at 26. Even more so than the Guidelines, the DIOG 
contains multiple sections detailing the importance of various civil liberty protec-
tions, including First Amendments rights and equal protection under the law. 
DIOG, supra note 140, §§ 4.2–4.3. It also makes clear that civil liberty protections 
must be balanced against investigatory needs. Id. 
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sort of surveillance is unlikely to run afoul of First Amendment 
jurisprudence,188 it nevertheless threatens First Amendment-
protected activities. As one advocate describes, these practices 
effectively empower the FBI to “use unlimited physical surveil-
lance, conduct pretextual interviews, and deploy confidential in-
formants, absent any suspicion of wrongdoing, or ‘particular fac-
tual predication’” all of which can be mobilized “based mostly on 
First Amendment protected activity.”189 
The FBI’s intelligence gathering practices are similarly con-
sistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but still under-
mine privacy rights.190 For example, assessments authorized 
under the Guidelines permit the FBI to use a “wide array of 
highly intrusive investigative tools,”191 including allowing 
agents to “engage people in conversation while misrepresenting 
the agent’s status as a federal official” and to “station [them-
selves] . . . outside a target’s home or office—or even have [a tar-
get] followed—so that their movements are tracked day and 
night.”192 
Despite including express language calling on government 
actors to protect civil liberties, the Nationwide SAR initiative 
also threatens those liberties by undermining individual pri-
vacy, stifling forms of expression, like photography and video 
 
 188. See Berman, supra note 47, at 16–17 (arguing that the FBI’s intelligence 
collection efforts do not violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause unless 
they are intended to suppress religiosity or are so expansive they outweigh compet-
ing interests in preventing terrorism); Domesticating Intelligence, supra note 137, 
at 591 (noting that the Supreme Court has explicitly exempted “human intelli-
gence” gathering, including through undercover agents and confidential inform-
ants, from First and Fourth Amendment protections). 
 189. Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, supra note 163, at 856. 
 190. See id. at 856 (noting that the FBI’s post-9/11 surveillance techniques do 
not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment). Even where a warrant is 
required for FBI intelligence gathering, the requirement can be waived where the 
FBI obtains the target’s consent. Id. Where a Fourth Amendment right otherwise 
exists, it may be defeated in court if it was not legally recognized at the time of 
surveillance. See Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 916 F.3d 1202, 1220–
24 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs had a Fourth Amendment expectation of 
privacy with respect to the FBI’s secret recordings at a mosque but concluding that 
the right was not cognizable because it was not legally recognized at the time of 
surveillance). 
 191. Berman, supra note 47, at 19. 
 192. Id. at 19–20. 
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recording,193 and suppressing political speech.194 The citizen-
on-citizen monitoring programs raise similarly troubling civil 
liberty concerns.195 
3. Rule of Law 
Notwithstanding these rights-eroding, executive-embolden-
ing tendencies, all these programs—FBI surveillance, the Na-
tionwide SAR Initiative, See Something, Say Something, the 
Maritime SAR Initiative, Airplane Watch, First Observer, and 
CVE—are aligned with the rule of law. First, and most im-
portantly, they are consistent with applicable executive branch 
rules, as well as statutory and constitutional authority. For ex-
ample, the FBI’s surveillance authority is consistent with the 
Guidelines, the DIOG, and various federal statutes.196 For its 
part, the Nationwide SAR Initiative derives its authority from 
and is consistent with various laws, including the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004.197 See Something, Say 
 
 193. Under Nationwide SAR’s Functional Standard, photography and video are 
included in the behavioral categories that have a “nexus to terrorism.” Nicolas Du-
que Franco, Suspicious to Whom? Reforming the Suspicious Reporting Program to 
Better Protect Privacy and Prevent Discrimination, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 611, 633, 637–38 (2019). 
 194. Id. at 637–42. There are reports, for example, of law enforcement monitor-
ing the political activities of groups like Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter 
as part of the Nationwide SAR initiative. Id. at 640–42. Despite these and other 
serious concerns mentioned above, it is unlikely the Nationwide SAR program vio-
lates the First and Fourth Amendment on its face. See infra note 201. 
 195. See, e.g., Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam?, supra note 174, at 186–88 
(suggesting that private parties implementing the government’s counter-radicali-
zation programs may undermine First Amendment Establishment Clause values); 
Michaels, supra note 164, at 1463–66 (arguing that while private-party surveillance 
under Operation Tips spin-offs may not be prohibited under Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence this surveillance raises privacy concerns because it is conducted on 
the government’s behalf). 
 196. The FBI’s legal authority to conduct national security investigation is 
based, in part, on Executive Order 12333 and 50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. 2008 
GUIDELINES, supra note 139, at 7. The Attorney General’s authority to promulgate 
and revise the Guidelines are grounded in and consistent with 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 
510, 533–34 and Executive Order 12333. 2008 GUIDELINES, supra note 139, at 2. 
Notably, there is no statute that specifically governs the FBI’s operations. Berman, 
supra note 47, at 14 n.34. 
 197. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–
458, 118 Stat. 3638. The Nationwide SAR Initiative is also aligned with federal 
policy, as outlined in the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing. WHITE 
HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING (2007), https://
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Something and Maritime SAR were launched in conjunction 
with the Nationwide SAR Initiative198 and are consistent with 
the same legal authority. The Airplane Watch and First Ob-
server programs grew out of and align with the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA).199 As for CVE, executive 
authority to develop and promote the program across various de-
partments draws on and is consistent with the Attorney General 
Guidelines, as well as DHS’s legal mandate.200 Generally, there 
is no contradiction between any of these policies and applicable 
constitutional jurisprudence.201 
These programs satisfy formal legality’s other requirements 
as well. As prospective initiatives, these programs are publicly 
accessible,202 clear, and understandable. They are general in na-
ture, meaning they consist of “rules of some kind . . . .”203 Indeed, 




 198. If You See Something, Say Something – About the Campaign, supra note 
172; Maritime SAR Initiative, supra note 171. 
 199. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107–17, 115 Stat. 
597 (2001). 
 200. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? supra note 174, at 155–57.  
 201. On the constitutionality of FBI surveillance see sources and cases cited su-
pra note 188, 190. As for the Nationwide SAR program, Fourth Amendment protec-
tions do not apply, while First Amendment based claims would likely fail, at least 
on facial grounds. Duque Franco, supra note 193, at 634–37, 646–47. As mentioned 
earlier, it is unlikely that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence applies to citizen-on-
citizen monitoring programs. See supra note 195. Nor would current First Amend-
ment jurisprudence since that civil liberty applies to government action only. See, 
e.g., Redden v. Women’s Center of San Joaquin Cnty., No. C 05-03099, 2006 WL 
132088, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2006) (“[T]he First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution only applies to government actors . . . .”). But see Rascoff, Es-
tablishing Official Islam?, supra note 174. 
 202. Beginning in 2010 and continuing throughout President Obama’s Admin-
istration, the government’s CVE program was articulated and explained in several 
publicly available White House documents. See, e.g., 2016 STRATEGIC 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN; WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/89YD-7ETW]. 
While the other citizen-on-citizen monitoring programs have also always been pub-
lic, the 2011 edition of the FBI’s DIOG is the first FBI guidance that is publicly 
available in unredacted form. Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 
INTERCEPT (Jan. 31, 2017), https://theintercept.com/document/2017/01/31/domes-
tic-investigations-and-operations-guide/#page-1. A previous version, from 2008, 
was publicized, though with redactions. Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in Na-
tional Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1608 (2016). The Attorney General Guide-
lines themselves have long been publicly available. Id. 
 203. FULLER, supra note 11, at 47. 
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under these programs, that discretion is created by and con-
sistent with applicable rules. While the issue of congruence be-
tween law and official action is complex,204 there is no evidence 
of systemic inconsistencies between what these programs re-
quire and official action. As surveillance initiatives, they do not 
demand the impossible from those subject to them. In fact, 
where FBI surveillance is concerned, no demands are made of 
anyone other than the FBI itself, which is bound by the Attorney 
General’s Guidelines.205 As for citizen-on-citizen monitoring, 
participation is voluntary. 
On top of all this, evidence suggests that the development 
and implementation of these programs has followed formalistic, 
rules-based processes. For example, many of the policies dis-
cussed here have been created or implemented by DHS, which 
adheres to an internal policy-making system subject to internal 
guidelines.206 This policy-making process includes review by 
DHS’s general counsel’s office, which ensures department pro-
grams are legally compliant.207 The process also includes DHS’s 
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (“CRCL”) and the de-
partment’s Privacy Officer, both of which are responsible for en-
suring that civil rights and civil liberty concerns are addressed 
across all DHS policies and programs.208 
 
 204. FULLER, supra note 11, at 81. 
 205. The Guidelines bind the executive up to and until a valid amendment or 
abrogation. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695–96 (1974) (“So long as 
this regulation [created by the executive branch] remains in force the executive 
Branch is bound by it . . . .”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Ex-
ecutive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 895 (2007) (“[A] duly promulgated executive rule or 
order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated . . . .”). While 
the FBI is authorized to amend the DIOG on its own, those amendments cannot 
violate the Guidelines. Berman, supra note 47, at 28 n.90. 
 206. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-300, RESULTS-
ORIENTED GOVERNMENT: IMPROVEMENTS TO DHS’S PLANNING PROCESS WOULD 
ENHANCE USEFULNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2005), https://www.gao.gov
/new.items/d05300.pdf [https://perma.cc/56WG-D5NP] (report to Congress detail-
ing recommended improvements to DHS’s planning processes). 
 207. Office of the General Counsel, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/office-general-
counsel (last visited June 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/E7GR-WP8L]. 
 208. 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(5). CRCL’s effectiveness as a rights-protecting body is a 
matter of debate. See Susan Ferriss et al., Homeland Security’s Civil Rights Unit 
Lacks Power to Protect Migrant Kids, NPR (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/health-shots/2019/08/02/746982152/homeland-securitys-civil-rights-unit-lack 
s-power-to-protect-migrant-kids [https://perma.cc/7PZG-QMRW] (reporting on 
CRCL’s inability to prevent rights-abuses by DHS entities). 
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As for the Attorney General Guidelines and DIOG, they are 
formulated and promulgated by the Attorney General and the 
FBI, without any formal external oversight.209 Despite the se-
crecy that shrouds their development,210 evidence suggests both 
the Guidelines and DIOG are subject to an internal review pro-
cess and, at least occasionally, include input from outside the 
Justice Department. For example, according to the latest version 
of the DIOG, it is “a direct result of more than 700 comments 
received from field and Headquarters employees . . . [and] re-
viewed by a working group comprised of experienced field agents 
and Chief Division Counsels, as well as representatives from the 
. . . Office of General Counsel . . . and the Office of Integrity and 
Compliance . . . .”211 In advance of the Guidelines’ 2008 amend-
ments, the Justice Department reportedly briefed relevant Con-
gressional committees212 and asked outside interest groups, in-
cluding civil liberty organizations, to weigh-in on its proposed 
changes.213 
As this section has shown, the FBI’s surveillance programs 
and citizen-on-citizen monitoring initiatives satisfy the rule of 
law, while also bolstering executive power and eroding civil lib-
erties. As discussed in the next section, a similar dynamic can 
be seen with respect to material support litigation, which also 
aggrandizes executive authority and raises civil liberty concerns 
while remaining consistent with the rule of law. 
B. Public and Private Material-Support Cases 
Since 9/11, the government has primarily relied on the con-
cept of “material support” to prosecute terrorism cases in U.S. 
courts.214 Under two federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. section 2339A 
 
 209. See Berman, supra note 47, at 42–43 (suggesting various administrative 
law strategies to create more meaningful oversight for the Guidelines and DIOG, 
including public scrutiny and civil liberty reviews). 
 210. See Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
883, 886 n.16 (2014) (noting that “secrecy still enshrouds processes” for various 
kinds of executive branch rulemaking relating to national security, including the 
FBI’s DIOG). 
 211. DIOG, supra note 140, at xxix. 
 212. Berman, supra note 47, at 62. 
 213. Rascoff, supra note 137, at 645–46. 
 214. Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives 
Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 5–6 
(2005) [hereinafter The Material Support Terrorism Offenses]; Norman Abrams, A 
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(“Section 2339A”) and 18 U.S.C. section 2339B (“Section 
2339B”), providing such “support” to terrorist groups or activi-
ties is a federal crime. As explored below, these laws have helped 
expand the executive’s national security powers, often at the ex-
pense of individual constitutional rights.215 These efforts have 
been complemented by two civil statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“Sec-
tion 2333”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (“Section 1605A”). Through 
these laws, private parties are encouraged to bring tort suits 
against individuals and entities that engage in terrorism, in-
cluding by providing material support to terrorist groups or ac-
tivities. As with citizen-on-citizen monitoring, these private ini-
tiatives aggrandize executive power while reinforcing the rights-
threatening aspects of the government’s public programs. Not-
withstanding their constitutional threats, both the public and 
private material support suits accord with the rule of law. 
1. Bolstering Executive Power 
In different ways, Sections 2339A and 2339B give the exec-
utive broad powers to pursue individuals who have given sup-
port to terrorist groups or activities. Under Section 2339A, indi-
viduals are prohibited from knowingly providing material 
support in preparation for or to carry out specifically enumer-
ated crimes of terrorism.216 Under Section 2339B, individuals 
are prohibited from providing material support to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTO), regardless of how individ-
uals intend that support to be used or how the FTOs use that 
support.217  
 
Constitutional Minimum Threshold for the Actus Reus of Crime? MPC Attempts and 
Material Support Offenses, 37 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 199, 213–14 (2019) [hereinafter 
A Constitutional Minimum Threshold]. 
 215. This is particularly true of Section 2339B. WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF 
TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL TERRORISM 
PROSECUTIONS 65–68, 71 (2015) [hereinafter CRIMES OF TERROR]. 
 216. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2018) (“Whoever provides material support or re-
sources or conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of mate-
rial support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in prepa-
ration for, or in carrying out [various crimes associated with terrorism] or attempts 
or conspires to do such an act” is guilty of violating the statute). 
 217. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2018) (“Whoever knowingly provides material sup-
port or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do 
so” violates the statute). 
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The legal definition of material support is central to the ex-
ecutive’s substantial power under this prosecutorial regime. Un-
der federal law, material support includes: 
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including 
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, fi-
nancial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assis-
tance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, com-
munications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who 
may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medi-
cine or religious materials.218 
In addition to criminalizing these wide-ranging activities, 
Sections 2339A and 2339B bolster the government’s prosecuto-
rial powers by converting what ought to be secondary liability 
crimes, specifically aiding and abetting, into primary liability of-
fenses.219 In doing so, these statutes transform minor offenses 
into crimes carrying serious penalties.220 They also upend tradi-
tional features of criminal complicity law, including eschewing 
any need for the substantive offense (terrorist violence) to be 
completed.221 
This broad prosecutorial regime is supplemented by the 
FTO designation process, which gives the executive substantial 
discretion to designate these groups.222 Pursuant to federal stat-
ute, the Secretary of State can declare a group to be an FTO as 
long as it: (A) “is a foreign organization”; (B) “engages in terrorist 
activity . . . or terrorism . . . or retains the capability and intent 
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism”; and (C) “threatens 
the security of [U.S.] nationals or the national security of the 
United States.”223 For purposes of Section 2339B, the FTO des-
ignation becomes effective once it is published in the Federal 
Register.224 Typically, a designated organization has no 
 
 218. 18. U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). 
 219. Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses, supra note 214, at 10–
11. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 10–11, 11 n.24 (noting that an aiding and abetting charge typically 
requires completion of the principal offense). 
 222. 18 U.S.C. § 1189 
 223. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
 224. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii); § 1189(a)(2)(B)(i). 
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opportunity to challenge its designation before publication oc-
curs.225 While it may challenge its designation in court post pub-
lication, 226 judicial review is limited in scope.227  
Complementing the government’s criminal material sup-
port prosecutions, Section 2333 of the ATA and Section 1605A of 
the FSIA allow private individuals to pursue individuals, enti-
ties, and foreign governments involved with terrorist groups or 
activities. Under Section 2333, “[a]ny national of the United 
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by rea-
son of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, sur-
vivors or heirs, may sue [responsible individuals or entities] 
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United 
States.”228 Under Section 1605A, private parties may sue coun-
tries designated as state sponsors of terrorism229 for terrorism-
related crimes. Under this provision: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in 
which money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
 
 225. Indeed, Congress is the only entity entitled to notice about a designation 
decision prior to publication. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(1). However, if the designated or-
ganization has sufficient contacts with the United States, then it may be entitled 
to notice before the State Department formally designates it. See infra Section 
II.B.2. 
 226. 18 U.S.C. § 1189. After designation, the organization has two years to file 
a petition for revocation with the Secretary. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B)(ii)(I); see id. § 
1189(a)(4) (detailing the revocation process). If the petition is denied, the organiza-
tion has thirty days to appeal the Secretary’s denial of a revocation to the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. § 1189(c)(1). Alternatively, the designated organiza-
tion may avoid petitioning the Secretary and seek direct judicial review of its FTO 
designation in the D.C. Circuit within thirty days from the date of notice in the 
Federal Register. Id. 
 227. Id. § 1189(c)(3) (stating that the court may set aside a FTO designation only 
where it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law”; “contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity”; “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory 
rights”; “lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole 
or in classified information submitted to the court”; or “not in accord with the pro-
cedures required by law”). In conducting its review, the court is confined to the ad-
ministrative record compiled by the Secretary during the designation process, as 
well as any classified information used to make the designation, which the court 
must consider ex parte and in camera. Id. § 1189(c)(2). 
 228. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 229. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(6) (“[T]he term ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ means a 
country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined . . . is a 
government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism 
. . . .”). 
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personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the 
provision of material support or resources for such an act if 
such act or provision of material support or resources is en-
gaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign 
state while acting within the scope of his or her office, em-
ployment, or agency.230 
As with the FTO designation process, the Secretary of State 
has broad authority to designate foreign countries as state spon-
sors of terrorism.231 Unlike the FTO designation process, how-
ever, there is no formal mechanism for a country to challenge its 
designation as a state sponsor.232  
Far from run-of-the-mill tort suits, Sections 2333 and 1605A 
supplement executive power under Sections 2339A and 2339B 
by targeting similar types of cases, furthering the same legisla-
tive purpose and objectives, and facilitating collaboration be-
tween private parties and the federal government in the fight 
against terrorism. 
Starting with the first category—similarity in case types—
the civil and criminal terrorism laws focus mostly on material 
support and target a similar set of “terrorist” entities. On the 
material support point, the vast majority of Section 2333 litiga-
tion involves alleged, underlying violations of Sections 2339A 
and/or 2339B and is therefore subject to the same definition of 
material support.233 While 1605A cases do not involve underly-
ing violations of the criminal material support laws,234 the 
 
 230. Id. § 1605A(a)(1). 
 231. See Troy C. Homesley III, Comment, “Towards a Strategy of Peace”: Pro-
tecting the Iranian Nuclear Accord Despite $46 Billion in State-Sponsored Terror 
Judgments, 95 N.C.L. REV. 795, 819 (2017). 
 232. See E. Perot Bissell V & Joseph R. Schottenfeld, Exceptional Judgments: 
Revising the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 127 
YALE L.J. 1890, 1911–12 (2018) (contrasting the FTO designation process with the 
absence of a similar process under Section 1605A). 
 233. See, e.g., Maryam Jamshidi, How the War on Terror Is Transforming Pri-
vate U.S. Law, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 559, 562 (2018). Defendants need not be con-
victed under Sections 2339A and 2339B in order to be sued under Section 2333. 
Boim v. Quranic Literary Inst. & Holy Land Found., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 234. While the statute does not refer to the criminal material support laws, cer-
tain direct forms of terrorist activity covered by Section 1605A, such as aircraft 
sabotage or hostage taking, are linked to other public laws found in international 
treaties. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h). 
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majority of 1605A cases are material support claims, which rely 
on the same definition of the term embraced by Sections 2339A 
and 2339B.235 Because of this shared focus on material support, 
the criminal and civil cases encompass nearly any behavior con-
nected in some way to terrorism or terrorist entities. For exam-
ple, since they prohibit a wide range of conduct and do not re-
quire the actual commission of terrorist violence, the criminal 
material support laws allow the government to prosecute indi-
viduals and entities “regardless of their proximity to terrorism 
or terrorist groups . . . .”236 Though the civil laws require that an 
act of violence occur, Sections 2333 and 1605A also empower 
plaintiffs to pursue expansive theories of liability against de-
fendants with loose ties to terrorism. In the case of Section 2333, 
judicial interpretations of the statute have gradually eschewed 
any requirement that defendants generally intend their actions 
to facilitate terrorist violence.237 This has allowed Section 2333 
plaintiffs to pursue defendants that have engaged in activities 
often several degrees removed from terrorist groups or activi-
ties.238 These defendants have frequently included financial or-
ganizations that allegedly facilitated bank transfers for charita-
ble institutions purportedly affiliated with terrorist 
organizations.239 
The civil and criminal material support cases also effec-
tively implicate the same set of “terrorist” entities because they 
often require an FTO connection.240 Like Section 2339B cases 
themselves, Section 2333 suits based on Section 2339B can only 
be brought against material support going to an FTO.241 While 
 
 235. See id. § 1605A(h)(3). 
 236. Jamshidi, supra note 233, at 579. 
 237. Id. at 591–94. 
 238. Id. at 619. 
 239. See, e.g., Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 278 F. Supp. 3d 636 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (Section 2333 case brought against UK bank for allegedly transfer-
ring funds for thirteen charities purportedly affiliated with Hamas); Strauss v. 
Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (Section 2333 cases 
brought against French bank for maintaining accounts owned by a French non-
profit that funded Palestinian charitable organizations allegedly affiliated with Ha-
mas). Most cases brought under Section 2333 fail on the merits. See Jamshidi, su-
pra note 233, at 620–21. 
 240. One notable difference between the criminal and civil cases is that the crim-
inal material support laws are mostly directed at individuals, while the civil laws 
are usually directed at institutions. Jamshidi, supra note 233, at 601–02. 
 241. See, e.g., Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 204–05 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (Section 2333 case involving underlying Section 2339B claim alleging 
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Section 2333 cases based on Section 2339A can implicate terror-
ist activities by non-FTO groups, winning those cases is difficult 
absent a relationship between the group in question and a des-
ignated FTO.242 Even though Section 1605A does not expressly 
condition suit on FTO support, most of these cases involve aid to 
such groups.243 
As for the second category—furthering the same legislative 
purpose and objectives—prevention and deterrence of terrorism 
are at the heart of both the civil and criminal material support 
laws. In considering passage of Section 2339B, Congress noted 
that “law enforcement at all levels must be given reasonable and 
legitimate investigative tools to enhance their capability of 
thwarting, frustrating, and preventing terrorist acts before they 
result in death and destruction.”244 Similarly, Section 2333 and 
1605A’s legislative histories make clear that their purpose is 
partly aimed at combatting terrorism.245 In describing the need 
for Section 2333, one senator declared that “[n]ow more than 
ever, countries around the world must be vigilant and relentless 
in the fight against terrorism.”246 In passing the original version 
of Section 1605A, the House Report struck a similar tone.247 An 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity was necessary, in Con-
gress’s view, because state sponsors had “become better at hid-
ing their material support for their surrogates . . . .”248 
This brings us to the third and final way in which the civil 
and criminal material support suits work in tandem—facilitat-
ing collaboration between private parties and the executive. In 
 
material support to a charity providing funds to Hamas, a designated FTO); 
Strauss, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 419, 442 (Section 2333 case involving underlying 2339B 
claim alleging material support to purported alter-egos of Hamas). 
 242. See infra note 255 for a discussion of one such Section 2333 case, Ahmad v. 
Christian Friends of Israeli Communities. 
 243. See, e.g., Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(1605A case involving alleged material support to Hamas, a designated FTO); Bluth 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2016) (same); Roth v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 78 F. Supp. 3d 379 (D.D.C. 2015) (same). 
 244. H.R. Rep. No. 104-383, at 42 (1995). Section 2339B was passed in order to 
address concerns that Section 2339A failed to effectively prevent terrorism. See 
Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the De-
mands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13 (2005) (noting criticisms of Section 
2339A as hamstringing anti-terrorism efforts by requiring proof defendants had the 
intent or knowledge their aid would support a particular terrorist crime). 
 245. See 137 Cong. Rec. 3303 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 104–383. 
 246. 137 Cong. Rec. 3303. 
 247. H.R. REP. NO. 104–383. 
 248. Id. at 62. 
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pursuing the “supporters” of terrorism and terrorist groups, the 
civil terrorism statutes, like the criminal material support laws, 
do more than target individual illegal acts. As their legislative 
history suggests, the criminal and civil laws aim, more broadly, 
to dismantle the ecosystem that purportedly maintains terrorist 
activities and groups.249 Indeed, some civil terrorism plaintiffs 
view their work as aimed precisely at these public ends.250 Some 
have felt duty-bound to share relevant evidence with the U.S. 
government. For example, in several cases, plaintiffs have pro-
vided information to assist with ongoing criminal suits or inves-
tigations.251 On certain occasions, the U.S. government has re-
turned the favor and directly collaborated with Section 2333 and 
1605A plaintiffs. In at least one case, the U.S. government re-
portedly sent a team of FBI agents to the Gaza Strip to collect 
evidence on a plaintiff’s behalf.252 In another suit, the U.S. 
Treasury Department provided information to the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers so they could attach funds held in U.S. bank accounts in 
fulfillment of a 1605A judgment against Iran.253 
In short, Section 2333 and 1605A cases are more than just 
private suits to remedy private injuries—they are tools for sup-
plementing the executive’s criminal efforts against terrorist 
groups and activities. Because of how they are structured, the 
civil laws effectively prohibit plaintiffs from deviating from the 
criminal material support statutes’ objectives.254 On the rare 
 
 249. See supra notes 242–46 and accompanying text. 
 250. As the lead plaintiff in one 1605A case said about her family’s motivations 
for filing suit, “[w]e don’t want to be victims of terror anymore. We want to be sol-
diers in the war on terrorism; the courtroom is our battlefield.” Newsweek Staff, We 
Want to Hurt Iran, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 18, 2003, 7:00 PM), http://
www.newsweek.com/we-want-hurt-iran-132447 [https://perma.cc/UXH2-LWEC]. 
Plaintiffs in a leading Section 2333 case expressed a similar desire to “shut[] down 
the [terrorist] fundraising network” and set a broad precedent to deter future fund-
ing of terrorism, rather than to simply collect damages. ORDE KITTRIE, LAWFARE: 
LAW AS A WEAPON OF WAR 59 (2016). 
 251.  For example, plaintiffs in Boim v. Quranic Literary Institute and Holy Land 
Foundation, provided evidence they gathered to the U.S. government to help with 
a criminal case against several Boim defendants. KITTRIE, supra note 250, at 59–
60. Plaintiffs in another ATA case, Linde v. Arab Bank, also reportedly provided 
materials to the U.S. government to assist with its investigation into Arab Bank. 
Id. at 64. 
 252. Id. at 71. 
 253. Id. at 79. 
 254. As discussed in Section III.B.2, this approach involves focusing primarily 
on Arab and/or Muslim groups and countries. 
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occasion plaintiffs have attempted to do so, they have been 
swiftly defeated.255 
2. Civil Liberty Concerns 
As with the FBI’s surveillance programs and citizen-on-cit-
izen monitoring, the civil and criminal material support statutes 
bolster presidential authority, often at the expense of civil liber-
ties.256 Topping the list of civil liberty issues is the definition of 
material support, as well as the FTO designation process. 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”), the Su-
preme Court upheld the material support definition against 
First Amendment challenges.257 In the process, the Court also 
demonstrated how the material support concept inevitably un-
dermines free speech rights, whether under the criminal or civil 
laws.258 As the HLP Court held, the prohibition against material 
support includes activities such as training members of a terror-
ist organization on how to use humanitarian and international 
law to peacefully resolve disputes; teaching them how to petition 
intergovernmental bodies, like the United Nations, for relief; 
 
 255. For example, in Ahmad v. Christian Friends of Israeli Communities, the 
court dismissed a Section 2333 claim—based in part on underlying violations of 
Section 2339A—brought against U.S. charities purportedly providing financial sup-
port to Israeli settlers. No. 13 Civ. 3376, 2014 WL 1796322, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 
2014). Even though plaintiffs had presented allegations that arguably made out a 
claim against the settlers for engaging in terrorist activity, the court dismissed the 
complaint. Id. at *3. In doing so, it suggested that a “knowing” donor to Israeli set-
tler groups would not, inevitably, know their money would support terrorist activi-
ties; while, by contrast, a knowing donor to Hamas “would know that Hamas was 
gunning for Israelis . . . and that donations to Hamas . . . would enable Hamas to 
kill or wound, or try to kill, or conspire to kill more people in Israel.” Id. (quoting 
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
In this fashion, the court intimated that being affiliated with the sort of “established 
terrorist organization[s]” typically designated as an FTO—like Hamas—was highly 
persuasive, even in Section 2333 cases based on violations of Section 2339A—which 
does not require a FTO designation. Id. Though plaintiffs’ complaint suffered from 
other shortcomings, the fact that the alleged terrorist activity involved a group that 
defied government-sanctioned views on terrorist organizations arguably weighed 
heavily on the court’s dismissal decision. See id.  
 256. See, e.g., SAID, supra note 215, at 65–68 (discussing judicial interpretations 
of Section 2339B and their implications for free speech and association rights); The 
New McCarthyism, supra note 53, at 10–15 (arguing that the government’s use of 
the criminal material support laws, particularly Section 2339B, violates the First 
Amendment’s right to association). 
 257. 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010). 
 258. Id. at 26, 36–39. 
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and engaging in “political advocacy” on their behalf.259 While the 
Court conceded that these activities constitute speech, it 
stripped them of their protected status because they were coor-
dinated with or under the direction of foreign groups the speaker 
knew to be terrorist organizations.260 Whatever one thinks of 
the Court’s rationale, the fact that it declared speech acts to be 
prohibited under the statute demonstrates that material sup-
port necessarily reaches “a fair amount of speech.”261 Because of 
their reliance on the same broad definition of material support, 
the civil statutes also implicitly raise free speech concerns.262 
While at least one court has declined to strike down the FTO 
designation statute as facially unconstitutional,263 the designa-
tion process is fraught with civil liberty concerns for both desig-
nated groups and third parties. With respect to designated 
FTOs, the designation process fails to sufficiently protect these 
groups’ Fifth Amendment rights.264 As applied to particular des-
ignated organizations, some courts have agreed.265 FTO 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the “judgment 
of Congress and the Executive that providing material support to a designated for-
eign terrorist organization—even seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist 
activities of that organization.” Id. at 36. The Court also suggested that applying 
the material support prohibition to independent, uncoordinated speech may be un-
constitutional. Id. at 39. 
 261. Sinnar, supra note 122, at 1369; see Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law 
Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1455, 1457–58 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in HLP “indicates 
that the government’s prerogatives in designating a group that has not and does 
not seek to directly harm the United States outweigh the First Amendment rights 
of the individual citizen hoping to aid a foreign entity”). 
 262. Even though the First Amendment only protects against government sup-
pression of speech, private restrictions can still threaten free speech values. Erica 
Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2163, 2164–66 (2018). 
 263. E.g., United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1153–55 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 264. Sahar Aziz, Note, The Laws on Providing Material Support to Terrorist Or-
ganizations: The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a Legitimate Tool for Prevent-
ing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 45, 73–76 (2003) [hereinafter Laws on 
Providing Material Support]. 
 265. In general, the D.C. Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review FTO 
designations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1), has held that “a foreign entity without property 
or presence in this country has no constitutional rights, under the Due Process 
Clause or otherwise.” People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 
22 (DC Cir. 1999). However, where the organization has “entered the territory of 
the United States and established substantial connections with this country . . . [it 
is] entitled to the protections of the Constitution.” Nat’l Council of Resistance of 
Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 203 (D.C. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter NCRI]. In 
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designations are also driven by political concerns and lack any 
publicly available guidance on how the Secretary makes her de-
terminations.266 
As for third parties, their free speech rights can be affected 
by FTO designations as well. Though the courts have rejected 
collateral First Amendment challenges to FTO designations, 
these designations can effectively prevent third parties from do-
nating money or giving other support to FTOs engaged in chari-
table work267 or to charitable groups connected to FTOs, no mat-
ter how tenuously.268 Furthermore, the designation process has 
been criticized for violating the freedom of association and due 
process rights of third parties,269 though the courts have implic-
itly rejected these arguments as well.270 
While the designation of state sponsors of terrorism under 
Section 1605A does not present civil liberty issues,271 a number 
 
NCRI, the court held that a designated terrorist organization that had established 
substantial connections with the United States did not receive but was entitled to 
notice from the Secretary of its imminent designation before the designation was 
formally made, as well as a pre-designation opportunity “to be heard at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 208–09. 
 266. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 6, at 137–40. 
 267. Aziz, supra note 264, at 85–87. 
 268. For example, the executive has accused charitable groups in a given geo-
graphic location of being part of a “terrorist network” with a designated FTO, based 
merely on the charities’ presence in that location. Wadie Said, The Material Support 
Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 586–88 (2011). In these kinds of 
cases, third parties are effectively prohibited from supporting humanitarian aid ef-
forts in entire regions. See id. at 588–89. 
 269. See Aziz, supra note 264, at 79 (arguing that “[t]he criminal and civil pen-
alties that accompany . . . [FTO] designations may stifle freedom of expression and 
association by limiting a person’s ability to choose where her money will be do-
nated”); id. at 82 (arguing that the FTO designation law should be interpreted so 
as to comport with Fifth Amendment due process rights). 
 270. Like freedom of speech claims, third-party freedom of association and due 
process challenges against FTO designations have typically been made against Sec-
tion 2339B. In rejecting these claims, the courts have implicitly suggested that 
these constitutional protections are not violated by FTO designations. See HLP, 561 
U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (holding that Section 2339B “does not prohibit being a member of 
one of the designated groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political 
goals of the group”) (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 
1133 (9th Cir. 2000)); Afshari, 426 F.3d at 1157 (holding that due process rights of 
a criminal defendant in Section 2339B case were not violated by the FTO designa-
tion process, even though defendant could not challenge the government’s designa-
tion of a particular group). 
 271. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96–97 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that “foreign states are not ‘persons’ protected by the Fifth 
Amendment” and noting that “legal disputes between the United States and foreign 
governments are not mediated through the Constitution”). 
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of commentators have noted the “arbitrary” nature of that des-
ignation system, which is often driven by political and policy-
based considerations.272 
3. Rule of Law 
Notwithstanding their civil liberty concerns, Sections 
2339A, 2339B, 2333, and 1605A, as well as the process for des-
ignating FTOs and state sponsors of terrorism, are all consistent 
with formalist legality. They are part of publicly promulgated 
statutes and are general, clear, and constant through time.273 
Sections 2339A, 2339B, 2333 and FTO designations are non-ret-
roactive. While state sponsor designations274 and Section 1605A 
can have retroactive effect,275 the bar on retroactivity is not ab-
solute.276 It is also unclear whether the rule of law applies to 
relationships between countries, including to laws one country 
creates that affect another.277 
 
 272. See, e.g., Homesley, supra note 231, at 822 (arguing that the “arbitrariness 
of [the state sponsor] designation decisions is . . . a looming concern”); Keith Seal-
ing, “State Sponsors of Terrorism” is a Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism 
Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than It Did Before 9/11, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 119, 136 (2003) (“Arguments can be made that some countries on the list 
no longer deserve that status, and arguments can likewise be made that, for politi-
cal reasons, countries not on the list do belong there.”). 
 273. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that Section 2339B, the most con-
troversial of these laws, is clear and “provide[s] a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice of what is prohibited.” HLP, 561 U.S. at 20–21 (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)) (brackets in original). 
 274. For purposes of a Section 1605A suit, a defendant country must be desig-
nated as a state sponsor of terrorism “at the time the act [that is the subject of the 
1605A suit] occurred, or [be] so designated as a result of such act, and . . . either 
remains so designated when the claim is filed under this section or was so desig-
nated within the 6-month period before the claim is filed under this section.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 275. See Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68–69 (D.D.C. 
1998) (finding that Congress expressly directed that Section 1605(a)(7), the precur-
sor to Sec. 1605A, be given retroactive effect). 
 276. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Im-
plications for the European Union and the United States, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 229, 
291 (2010) (noting that “there is no evidence of a general practice of states accepting 
the rule of law as international customary law” nor does “‘[t]he United Nations 
Charter, which is the expression of the constitutional international order . . . explic-
itly provide that its organs and members states are subordinated to the principle of 
the rule of law’”) (quoting Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 
AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 351–54 (2008)). 
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Though Sections 2339A, 2339B, 2333, and 1605A arguably 
create liability for those who have no intention of supporting ter-
rorist violence or activities, this does not violate the rule of law. 
Indeed, the formalist approach allows for rules that embrace ex-
pansive notions of fault. For example, civil strict liability laws, 
which require neither intent to harm nor negligence, are con-
sistent with the formalist rule of law as long as they “define as 
clearly as possible the kind of activity that carries a special sur-
charge of legal responsibility.”278 Where criminal strict liability 
laws are concerned, more serious rule of law problems emerge, 
particularly where serious penalties are involved.279 These laws 
are typically ones where guilt attaches even when a person acts 
with due care and “innocent” intent.280 While this appears to de-
scribe Section 2339B, Congress and the Supreme Court seem to 
agree that there is no “innocent” intent where one is knowingly 
supporting a terrorist organization, even if one does not intend 
to support its violent activities.281 
Though many of these laws give the government substantial 
discretion to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property, that 
discretion is still bound by rules, even if they ought to be made 
more robust.282 These laws are not impossible to comply with or 
internally inconsistent and do not directly contradict other 
laws.283 To the extent government actors are involved in 
 
 278. FULLER, supra note 11, at 75.  
 279. Id. at 77–78. 
 280. Id. at 77. 
 281. See HLP, 561 U.S. 1, 29–30 (2010). 
 282. See, e.g., Laws on Providing Material Support, supra note 264, at 91 (sug-
gesting various changes to the FTO designation process including allowing organi-
zations under investigation for FTO designation to “have the opportunity to provide 
counter-evidence that will be included in the judicially reviewable administrative 
record”). 
 283. See, e.g., HLP, 561 U.S. at 8 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that Section 
2339B is impermissibly vague under the Fifth Amendment and violates their right 
to free association under the First Amendment); see Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Dep’t of Just., 352 F.3d 382, 392, 400 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument 
that Section 2339B violates the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause for failing to 
require proof of “personal guilt”), vacated on other grounds, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 
2004). In terms of the FTO designation process, the State Department’s practices 
have seemingly shifted to align with the due process holding in NCRI. See Chai v. 
Dep’t of State, 466 F.3d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that the State Depart-
ment sent a letter to people it thought “might represent” several organizations 
slated for re-designation as FTOs, offered to provide “the unclassified portion of the 
administrative record before the Department,” and gave the representatives “15 
days from receipt of the record to submit a response”). 
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enforcing these laws, official action is congruent with those stat-
utes. Indeed, the government’s prosecution of criminal material 
support cases is aligned with the statutes’ stated objective to 
prevent and deter individuals from providing material support 
to terrorist groups and activities.284 
As Part II has established, the FBI’s domestic surveillance 
program and material support prosecutions, as well as their pri-
vate analogues, comply with the rule of law, while giving vast 
powers to the executive branch and generally threatening civil 
liberties. This is precisely where political accountability is most 
necessary and important, even though it has largely failed to 
materialize.285 Part III explores the reasons for this accounta-
bility deficit by examining the rule of law’s relationship to polit-
ical accountability and comparing these programs to other na-
tional security initiatives where political accountability has 
manifested. 
III. UNDERMINING POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Building on Parts I and II, this Part explores why FBI sur-
veillance programs, citizen-on-citizen-monitoring, and the pub-
lic and private material support statutes have failed to generate 
meaningful political checks on the executive. It begins by ex-
plaining the rule of law’s impact on political accountability. It 
then applies that theory to the FBI surveillance programs, citi-
zen-on-citizen monitoring, and the public and private material 
support statutes, showing how law has undermined political ac-
countability for those activities. It ends by comparing those ini-
tiatives to the Muslim Ban, Section 215 and 702 surveillance, 
and the Border Wall, which have all generated political efforts 
to check executive power. 
As this Part demonstrates, the rule of law sometimes leads 
to and other times undermines political accountability for exec-
utive programs that discriminate or have other negative effects 
on communities of color. Law’s influence on this accountability 
depends upon “social cohesion”—namely, the process by which 
 
 284. Private actions under Sections 2333 and 1605A are consistent with the 
same set of government objectives. 
 285. See, e.g., Diala Shamas, Where’s the Outrage When the FBI Targets Mus-
lims?, NATION (Oct. 31, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/wheres-outrage-
when-fbi-targets-muslims/ [https://perma.cc/Y4QH-KATF] (describing lack of pub-
lic outrage against FBI surveillance of Arabs and Muslims). 
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different groups join together politically to support or advocate 
for a particular objective. Law’s ability to generate social cohe-
sion depends, in turn, on how the executive’s legalistic programs 
align with social norms and otherwise impact society. 
For instance, the rule of law undermines social cohesion and 
erodes political accountability for programs that use facially 
neutral laws to target socially disfavored minority communities. 
These legalistic programs align with and legitimize existing 
norms that marginalize these groups, while doing so in a facially 
neutral way that is socially acceptable. This makes it harder for 
impacted communities to generate social cohesion with other 
groups, which are unaffected by these programs and disinter-
ested in aligning with these groups. 
By contrast, the rule of law facilitates social cohesion and 
political accountability for executive programs that are explicitly 
discriminatory. Even if these programs primarily affect disfa-
vored groups, they conflict with and undermine norms against 
overt discrimination. Many individuals are offended by and op-
posed to this brand of discrimination, regardless of whether they 
are directly targeted. Law also facilitates social cohesion and po-
litical accountability for executive action that has negative con-
sequences for a large number of individuals or a small but di-
verse group of Americans. Because these programs directly 
impact the interests of a range of groups, they generate a com-
mon interest in opposing these initiatives, even if a disfavored 
minority group is also affected. 
To substantiate this theory, the rest of Part III demon-
strates how FBI surveillance, material support laws, and their 
private analogues have disproportionately impacted Arab and 
Muslim Americans; how the rule of law has legitimized that dis-
crimination; and how this legitimization has made political ac-
countability for these executive initiatives elusive. It contrasts 
these programs with other legalistic initiatives: specifically, the 
Muslim Ban, Section 215 and 702 surveillance, and the Border 
Wall—all of which bolster executive power, threaten individual 
rights, and negatively impact communities of color but have gen-
erated sustained efforts at political accountability. As this dis-
cussion shows, these efforts—which have either achieved con-
crete gains or are ongoing—have been precipitated by the 
explicitly discriminatory nature of these programs (the Muslim 
Ban), their negative impact on the rights of many individuals 
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(Section 215 and 702 surveillance), or their negative effect on the 
interests of a small but diverse group of Americans (the Border 
Wall). 
The discussion throughout Part III also adds nuance to the 
standard account in legal scholarship that majoritarian politics 
necessarily disfavor minority rights. As reflected in the works of 
Professors Derrick Bell286 and John Hart Ely,287 this theory pos-
its that the white majority has little incentive to protect a mi-
nority group unless its own material interests are implicated. 
Without that protection, communities of color, especially disfa-
vored ones, are unlikely to realize their rights and liberties. 
However, as this Part establishes, laws that are viewed as ex-
plicitly discriminatory or that affect the interests of a small but 
diverse array of political actors can generate efforts at political 
accountability for executive action, even where the majority and
/or its material interests are not substantially involved (Muslim 
Ban and Border Wall). This accountability may result from coa-
litions between communities of color or between minorities and 
non-identitarian groups dedicated to social justice (Border Wall). 
A. Political Accountability, Social Cohesion, and the Rule 
 of Law 
The rule of law depends upon the “ruler’s” obedience to 
law.288 In a democracy, a powerful incentive for that obedience 
comes from individuals uniting together to hold the ruler ac-
countable for her transgressions.289 In practice, “[o]nly when 
[the people’s] commitment to police the behavior of the state is 
powerfully credible . . . does a ruling party, president, or sover-
eign develop a self-interest in adhering to the rules of the game 
. . . .”290 As this section demonstrates, social cohesion is central 
 
 286. Bell, supra note 41. 
 287. ELY, supra note 41. 
 288. Catalina Smulovitz, How Can the Rule of Law Rule? Cost Imposition 
Through Decentralized Mechanisms, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra 
note 97, at 168. 
 289. Barry R. Weingast, A Postcript to “Political Foundations of Democracy and 
the Rule of Law”, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 97, at 109–10. 
 290. LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 70 
(1999) (emphasis in original); see Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 97, at 1, 59 (“In a democratic society 
. . . a certain degree of initiative from ordinary citizens, beyond a willingness to 
stand in line on election day, is a precondition for law to function as it should.”). 
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to this political accountability. That cohesion is, in turn, affected 
by the rule of law, which influences social norms, attitudes, and 
behaviors, in ways that can either undermine or support social 
cohesion. 
Social cohesion is predicated on the notion that individuals 
have different interests, goals, and values, but that generating 
“a common political identity”291 between them is necessary for 
these individuals to cohere together and ensure government is 
responsive to their interests and objectives.292 One way to 
achieve this cohesion is to draw on a common “moral core” be-
tween groups.293 This core, which goes beyond material inter-
ests, represents the “ability of individuals to respond to and 
identify with one another on the basis of mutuality and reciproc-
ity, without exchanging equal quantities of support, without cal-
culating individual advantages, and above all without compul-
sion.”294 
The work of Professors Ely and Bell underscores the im-
portance of this social cohesion for protecting minority rights 
and interests. Though both theories primarily focus on how 
courts should or do respond to cases of minority discrimination, 
they can inform accountability efforts in the political domain as 
well. 
The inspiration for Ely’s theory comes from Justice Harlan 
Stone’s influential footnote four in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.295 That footnote calls for “more exacting judicial 
scrutiny” of statutes directed at particular “religious . . . or na-
tional . . . or racial minorities . . . ”296 because “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may . . . tend[] seriously to 
 
 291. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL 67 (2005 ed. 1993). 
 292. See ÉTIENNE BALIBAR, CITIZENSHIP 19 (Thomas Scott-Railton trans., Polity 
Press 2015) (2012) (describing the body politic as a “system of relationships that 
citizens establish among themselves,” which emerge out of their conflicting interests 
and values). 
 293. See Jane Mansbridge, Conflict and Self-Interest in Deliberation, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 107, 108–09 (Samantha Besson 
& Jose Luis Marti eds., 2006) (“The most efficient societies, as well as often the 
most just, solve many . . . collective action problems by appealing . . . to a ‘moral 
core’ within each individual that consists both of cognitive commitments to princi-
ples of duty, fulfillment of promises, and the like and of more emotionally-based 
reasons for making the good of others one’s own.”). 
 294. JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY 
472 (1992). 
 295. See generally ELY, supra note 41. 
 296. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily [use-
ful] to protect [minority groups] . . . .”297 Building off this point, 
Ely argues that those communities of color that are the “object 
of widespread vilification” are particularly vulnerable in a dem-
ocratic society and unlikely to generate the political alliances 
necessary to realize their rights.298 
In his influential work on “interest convergence,” Professor 
Bell develops a different but related line of argument—namely, 
that communities of color are more likely to achieve civil rights 
and civil liberties victories where their interests converge with 
those of the white majority.299 Focusing on the seminal school 
desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education, Bell argues 
that “the decision in Brown to break with the [Supreme] Court’s 
long-held position on [school segregation] cannot be understood 
without some consideration of the decision’s value to whites 
. . . .”300 While Bell concedes that some whites may have been 
motivated by the immorality of racial inequality, he argues that 
it was primarily the prospect of “economic and political advances 
at home and abroad” that desegregation would produce, which 
appealed to the interests of most whites and led to the result in 
Brown.301 
 
 297. Id. 
 298. ELY, supra note 41, at 153. Some scholars have disputed the Ely/Carolene 
Products theory of minority disadvantage and argued that “other things being 
equal, ‘discreteness and insularity’ will normally be a source of enormous bargain-
ing advantage, not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American poli-
tics.” Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–
24 (1985). Others have disagreed with this take. See William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 782, 874 (1995) (“The organizational benefits of being ‘discrete and insular’ 
are more than offset by the fact that, because of racial prejudice, other groups are 
less willing to enter into political bargains with discrete and insular minorities.”). 
 299. Bell, supra note 41, at 523. 
 300. Id. at 524. In Brown, the Court rejected the principle of “separate but equal” 
articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), concluding that it had “no 
place” in public education. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Under Plessy’s “separate but 
equal” doctrine, “equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided sub-
stantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate.” Id. at 488. 
 301. Bell, supra note 41, at 524. The interest convergence theory has been criti-
cized on various grounds, including for taking a simplistic approach to the “interest” 
of Black and White people, undermining the agency of Black plaintiffs and White 
judges, failing to account for racially egalitarian judicial decisions, limiting the 
range of tactics for achieving racial justice, and promoting racial conspiracy theo-
ries. See generally Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2011). 
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Despite their force and clarity, these theories do not explain 
how the law itself affects social cohesion. This relationship—be-
tween the rule of law and social cohesion—is captured by schol-
arship on law’s expressive value, as well as by the rule of law 
literature. As this scholarly work demonstrates, law will some-
times further social cohesion and political accountability for 
communities of color, while other times it will not. 
As the expressive theory of law implicitly suggests, law in-
fluences social cohesion by shaping and reinforcing social norms, 
attitudes,302 and behaviors.303 Even without enforcement, law 
can have “an important effect in signaling [sic] appropriate be-
havior and in inculcating the expectation of social opprobrium 
and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced 
norm.”304 As part of its expressive work, law communicates to 
society who is, and is not, an appropriate target for its disciplin-
ing authority, and distinguishes “in” groups from “out” 
groups.305 Law’s targeting and designation of these groups is 
particularly potent where it reinforces prevailing social and po-
litical norms.306 For example, in the Jim Crow South, law bol-
stered existing notions about who was and was not a valued 
member of society. In Brown, the Supreme Court recognized this 
expressive effect of law when it described Jim Crow segregation 
“as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”307 
 
 302. Cass R. Sunstein, Conflicting Values in Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 
1668 (1994).  
 303. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 602–04 (1996) (explaining how expressive theories of punishment support de-
terrence theories aimed at curbing criminal behavior). Law can also alter estab-
lished norms and behaviors. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2026 (1996) [hereinafter On the Expressive Function of 
Law]. 
 304. On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 303, at 2032. 
 305. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED 
THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (exploring the various ways 
law enables racial discrimination and marginalization of African-Americans). 
 306. See Clarke, supra note 8, at 522–23 (“The legitimation of . . . biased atti-
tudes [through law] may . . . increase the prevalence of discrimination and further 
entrench inequality.”); Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to 
Do with It or an Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 403, 439–40 (2011) (“[T]o the extent that law is generally viewed as a system 
of rules that shape politics, power, and society, it becomes the vehicle with which 
the status quo and existing power relationships are maintained.”). 
 307. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (internal quotations 
omitted). Of course, discriminatory laws can have material consequences for tar-
geted minority groups. Clarke, supra note 8, at 516–18. While these material 
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Rule of law scholars have similarly noted law’s broad social 
effects, including how it can strengthen or weaken respect for 
moral values and government authority and create or maintain 
social stratification.”308 At the same time, they have noted how 
laws that have negative consequences can and often do inspire 
broad social and political backlash. For example, civil disobedi-
ence is partly grounded in the idea, however contestable, that it 
is permissible to flout laws that have pervasively bad social or 
political effects.309 Indeed, these tactics of civil disobedience 
were important to bringing an end to Jim Crow laws in the 1950s 
and 60s. 
Taken together, this scholarship suggests that law’s effect 
on social cohesion depends, in part, on whether law is used to 
reinforce social norms about communities of color and/or has 
negative consequences that are pervasively felt. This means the 
rule of law may undermine social cohesion and erode political 
accountability for legalistic programs that target disfavored mi-
nority groups in facially neutral ways. In these situations, law 
legitimizes the discriminatory norm and validates the marginal-
ization of the targeted community. The validity of this legalized 
discrimination is further reinforced by its facially neutral, non-
overt nature, which is a generally accepted form of discrimina-
tion in U.S. society.310 These circumstances make it harder for 
impacted minorities to generate social cohesion with other 
groups that are unaffected by these programs and already disin-
terested in aligning with these communities. 
By contrast, where executive action discriminates against 
minority groups but has other pervasively negative effects on so-
ciety, the rule of law may generate social cohesion and facilitate 
political accountability for those programs. This includes execu-
tive programs that are explicitly discriminatory—that is, overtly 
communicating negative views or treatment of a particular 
group or particular individuals due to their membership in that 
 
consequences can impact social cohesion, this Article focuses exclusively on law’s 
expressive impact on communities of color. 
 308. RAZ, supra note 98, at 177. 
 309. Id. at 262–75. 
 310. See Valentino et al., supra note 38, at 759 (describing research showing that 
“racial attitudes . . . most powerfully influence policy views when racial messages 
[are] subtle and cues implicit”). 
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group.311 While recent studies suggest that at least some whites 
may view explicit discrimination as permissible,312 other studies 
show that, since the Civil Rights Movement, explicit bias has re-
mained socially unacceptable and offensive to many people.313 
Because of these negative consequences, the rule of law facili-
tates social cohesion against explicitly discriminatory programs 
even where a disfavored group is targeted. For similar reasons, 
the rule of law may lead to social cohesion and political account-
ability for executive actions that have other pervasively negative 
consequences, such as eroding the rights of many or small but 
diverse groups of people. 
As demonstrated below, this dynamic—social cohesion’s 
critical role in politically checking government coupled with 
law’s influence over that cohesion—helps explain why there has 
been little to no accountability for the FBI’s domestic surveil-
lance program, material support statutes, and their private an-
alogues. It also explains why the Muslim Ban, Section 215 and 
702 surveillance, and the Border Wall have generated efforts at 
political accountability for the executive. As described below, the 
FBI surveillance program, material support statutes, and their 
private analogues disproportionately target Arabs and Muslims 
and treat these groups as dangerous purveyors of terrorism in 
ways that are facially neutral and not overtly discriminatory. 
This reinforces prevailing views about this community and un-
dermines the social cohesion necessary to check executive power. 
By contrast, even though Muslims and Arabs are primarily im-
pacted, the Muslim Ban has generated social cohesion against 
executive power due to the ban’s explicitly discriminatory na-
ture. Section 215 and 702 surveillance and the Border Wall con-
troversy have also facilitated social cohesion in favor of 
 
 311. I borrow here from Professor Jessica Clarke’s definition of “explicit bias.” 
As she defines it, this bias is “what a reasonable listener could consider to be views 
about attributes of a particular group or the attributes of particular individuals due 
to group membership” that are “conveyed to some audience by words or symbols,” 
which may be obvious but can also be expressed in “‘coded’ language” or “deduced 
through inference.” Clarke, supra note 8, at 513. 
 312. See, e.g., Valentino et al., supra note 38, at 768 (“Many whites now view 
themselves as an embattled and even disadvantaged group, and this has led to both 
strong in-group identity and a greater tolerance for expressions of hostility toward 
out-groups.”). 
 313. See id. at 758–59 (cataloguing political science scholarship and anecdotal 
evidence demonstrating that explicit forms of racist political discourse have become 
unacceptable since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s). 
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restraining the executive. This is due to their negative conse-
quences either for a broad majority of Americans or a small but 
diverse coalition of groups. 
B. FBI Surveillance, Material Support Statutes, and Their 
 Private Analogues 
The rest of Part III explores how the rule of law either un-
dermines or supports social cohesion and political accountability 
for the various domestic national security programs examined in 
this Article. Part III.B explores the FBI’s surveillance programs, 
citizen-on-citizen monitoring, and public and private material 
support cases. Parts III.C and D turn to the Muslim Ban, Section 
215 and 702 surveillance, and the Border Wall. 
As this discussion demonstrates, the presence or absence of 
political accountability in some of these cases (Section 215 and 
702 surveillance, as well as FBI surveillance, material support 
statutes and their private analogues) aligns with the canonical 
account of majoritarian politics offered by Professors Ely and 
Bell. At the same time, other executive policies (the Muslim Ban 
and Border Wall) suggest that law may generate political ac-
countability in circumstances left out of or discounted by Bell 
and Ely’s accounts. For example, both professors either implic-
itly or explicitly overestimated the need to appeal to the white 
majority’s material interests, whether political or economic.314 
They also underestimated the importance of developing political 
ties with groups that are either not part of the majority, includ-
ing other communities of color,315 or are defined by a general 
commitment to social justice rather than identity. Contrary to 
 
 314. Bell, for example, insists that minority rights depend on convergence with 
the white majority’s material goals, rather than its moral commitments. See, e.g., 
Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 185, 
227 (2012). Similarly, for Ely, the reason prejudice distorts the democratic political 
process is because it prevents minorities and majorities from recognizing their over-
lapping material interests. See Ely, supra note 41, at 153. (“‘Race prejudice divides 
groups that have much in common (black and poor whites) and unites groups (white 
rich and poor) that have little else in common than their antagonism for the racial 
minority.’”) (citation omitted).  
 315. See, e.g., Philip Lee, A Wall of Hate: Eminent Domain and Interest-Conver-
gence, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 421, 429 (2019) (noting that interest convergence theory 
has been applied to a diverse set of issues where it has been used to show how “the 
interest of minority groups in achieving equality and fair treatment overlapped 
with the interests of the majority group”). 
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these views, this Part shows that law can generate political ac-
countability even where the majority or its material interests 
are not substantially implicated. This includes facilitating coali-
tion building between minority groups316 or between minorities 
and non-identitarian groups oriented around social justice. 
The next section begins by demonstrating how FBI surveil-
lance, citizen-on-citizen monitoring, and the public and private 
material support cases disproportionately impact Arab and Mus-
lim Americans. It then explains how this disproportionate im-
pact undermines the social cohesion necessary to check execu-
tive power under these programs. 
1. FBI Surveillance and Citizen-on-Citizen 
 Monitoring  
Since 9/11, the FBI’s domestic intelligence gathering has re-
flected an overemphasis on surveilling Arabs and Muslims.317 
With a few exceptions, these practices have been enabled by laws 
and program that are facially neutral but nevertheless reflect 
prejudice and stereotyping of Arab and Muslim communities as 
predisposed to terrorism. 
The FBI’s monitoring of Arab and Muslim groups has been 
facilitated, first and foremost, by the rules governing its surveil-
lance protocols. While the DIOG prohibits using “[r]ace, ethnic-
ity, religion, or national origin alone” as “the sole basis for initi-
ating investigative activity,” it also notes that these 
characteristics may be taken into account where there is “an in-
dependent authorized law enforcement or national security pur-
pose for initiating investigative authority.”318 In such cases, 
Ethnicity may be considered in evaluating whether a subject 
is—or is not—a possible associate of a criminal or terrorist 
group that is known to be comprised of members of the same 
 
 316. While the Border Wall also features inter-minority alliances, see infra Sec-
tion III.D.2, the clearest example of such solidarity can be found in popular 
pushback against the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) surveillance of Arab 
and Muslim communities. See infra Part IV. 
 317. Kassem & Shamas, supra note 32, at 677. 
 318. DIOG, supra note 140, § 4.1.1. 
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ethnic grouping—as long as it is not the dominant factor for 
focusing on a particular person.319 
The DIOG also authorizes the FBI to “identify locations of 
concentrated ethnic communities in the field office’s domain, if 
these locations will reasonably aid the analysis of potential 
threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain aware-
ness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”320 In 
explaining how this rule might be applied, the DIOG notes that 
where “intelligence reporting reveals that members of certain 
terrorist organizations live and operate primarily within a cer-
tain concentrated community of the same ethnicity, the location 
of that community is clearly valuable—and properly collecti-
ble—data.”321 Similarly, “the locations of ethnic-oriented busi-
nesses and other facilities may be collected if their locations will 
reasonably contribute to an awareness of threats and vulnera-
bilities and intelligence collection opportunities.”322  
In line with these rules, the FBI has reportedly surveilled 
various Arab and Muslim American communities across the 
country. While there is little publicly available data about the 
FBI’s intelligence gathering practices across different racial and 
religious groups,323 anecdotal evidence suggests that Muslim 
and Arab communities have disproportionately borne the brunt 
of these aggressive practices.324 As Professor Wadie Said has de-
scribed, the residents of Dearborn, Michigan—which has the 
highest percentage of Arab and Muslim American residents in 
the country—have long complained of government surveillance, 
including by the FBI.325 As Said argues, this claim is borne out 
by the high proportion of Dearborn residents included in the gov-
ernment’s watchlist of “known or suspected terrorists.”326 Resi-
dents of this town are the second highest entrants on that list 
after residents of New York City even though they have “eighty 
 
 319. Id. § 4.3.3.1(B). 
 320. Id. § 4.3.3.2.1. 
 321. Id. § 4.3.3.2.2. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Kassem & Shamas, supra note 32, at 679. 
 324. Id. at 680; Wadie E. Said, Law Enforcement in the American Security State, 
2019 WIS. L. REV. 819, 829–30 (2019) [hereinafter Law Enforcement in the Ameri-
can Security State]. 
 325. Said, supra note 324, at 829. 
 326. Id. 
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times less” the population.327 Other Muslim communities have 
reported regular interactions with the FBI. For example, in Min-
neapolis-St. Paul, which has a large Somali population, “[y]oung 
male residents of Somali origin . . . report being approached with 
some regularity by FBI agents, asking if they are interested in 
joining an extremist group such as ISIS.”328 
Other FBI practices targeting Arab and Muslim Americans 
include systematic policies of mapping mosques and Muslim 
communities around the country,329 sending informants into 
mosques,330 and coaxing young men into becoming terrorists 
and then arresting them when they do.331 The FBI also report-
edly conducts so-called “voluntary interviews” with Arab and 
Muslim Americans,332 which are often coercive. For example, 
FBI agents have allegedly told individuals who have asked for 
their lawyers to be present that “they can do [the interview] the 
easy way or the hard way.”333 During these interrogations, indi-
viduals have sometimes been asked questions that delve into 
their religious and political views, such as, “What Islamic lectur-
ers do you follow” and, “Do you hate Israel?”.334 
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 829–30. 
 329. Sabrina Alimahomed-Wilson, When the FBI Knocks: Racialized State Sur-
veillance of Muslims, 45(6) CRITICAL SOC. 871, 875 (2018). 
 330. Jerry Markon, Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 5, 2010), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010
/12/04/AR2010120403720.html [https://perma.cc/FCQ4-FEZB]. Reliance on inform-
ants and undercover agents is a substantial part of the FBI’s surveillance of Arabs 
and Muslims. JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41416, AMERICAN 
JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATTING A COMPLEX THREAT 1–5 (2013), https://fas.org
/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND4L-ETHJ]. 
 331. FBI Terror Stings: Entrapment or Prevention?, CBS (Nov. 30, 2010), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-terror-stings-entrapment-or-prevention/ [https://perm 
a.cc/NAV5-M4S8]. 
 332. While in the past these interviews largely focused on immigrants, they have 
increasingly targeted Arabs and Muslims who are U.S. citizens. Alimahomed-Wil-
son, supra note 329, at 879. 
 333. Shamas, supra note 285. 
 334. Id. Though the FBI’s practices remain ongoing, the NYPD’s surveillance of 
Arab and Muslim communities has been successfully challenged in court. See Has-
san v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d. Cir. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs’ com-
plaint raised nonconclusory allegations that were sufficient to state a valid claim 
that NYPD surveillance of Muslim groups, individuals, and spaces violated the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments); Abigail Hauslohner, NYPD Settles Third Law-
suit over Surveillance of Muslims, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/national/nypd-settles-third-lawsuit-over-muslim-surveillance/2018
/04/05/710882b2-3852-11e8-9c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html [https://perma.cc/3PQ 
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At times, the FBI’s discriminatory approach to Arab and 
Muslim communities has been explicitly discriminatory. For ex-
ample, in 2011, news of an FBI training manual on Islam leaked 
publicly.335 As one journalist described it, the manual, which 
was presented to counterterrorism agents at the FBI Academy 
in Quantico, Virginia,336 had “nothing to do with crime and eve-
rything to do with . . . [Muslim] religious practice and social be-
havior.”337 The manual included a number of troubling state-
ments and generally made little to no distinction between pious 
Muslims and terrorists.338 Though the FBI subsequently dis-
tanced itself from the manual and claimed it was no longer in 
use,339 the incident reinforced broader concerns that FBI coun-
terterrorism practices are focused substantially on Arab and 
Muslim communities for prejudicial reasons.340 
The Nationwide SAR Initiative also encourages surveillance 
of Arab and Muslim communities based on stereotypical narra-
tives about their propensity for terrorism.341 SAR reports, which 
are comprised of official and private reporting to law enforce-
ment, are littered with numerous unsubstantiated reports about 
“Middle Eastern men” engaged in “suspicious” activities.342 
 
K-27M8] (reporting on settlement agreement between NYPD and plaintiffs in Has-
san v. City of New York); Adam Goldman, NYPD Settles Lawsuit over Muslim Mon-
itoring, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na-
tional-security/nypd-settles-lawsuits-over-muslim-monitoring/2016/01/07/bdc8eb9 
8-b3dc-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html [https://perma.cc/T529-3YVH] (re-
porting on NYPD settlement of two other cases against the same surveillance pro-
gram). These legal victories were proceeded by political organizing in which Mus-
lims New Yorkers forged alliances with other groups experiencing similar forms of 
abuse at the hands of the NYPD. See infra Part IV. 
 335. Spencer Ackerman, FBI “Islam 101” Guide Depicted Muslims as 7th-Cen-
tury Simpletons, WIRED (July 27, 2011), https://www.wired.com/2011/07/fbi-islam-
101-guide/ [https://perma.cc/39WG-28HR]. 
 336. Alimahomed-Wilson, supra note 329, at 871. 
 337. Ackerman, supra note 335. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Other FBI materials have similarly equated Islamic piety with a predispo-
sition for terrorist activity. See, e.g., FBI, THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM 
CONVERSION TO JIHAD 10 (May 2006), http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf [https://
perma.cc/35YZ-84X8] (listing pre-radicalization indicators as including “[w]earing 
traditional Muslim attire,” “[g]rowing facial hair,” and “[f]requent attendance at a 
mosque or prayer group”). 
 341. Duque Franco, supra note 193, at 642–46. 
 342. See, e.g., SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS, JOINT REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
CENTER (LOS ANGELES REGION) 24, https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/asset
_upload_file262_12586.pdf [https://perma.cc/D39A-XGCZ] (reporting “[u]nknown 
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Similarly, the Operation TIPS spinoffs, including the See Some-
thing, Say Something programs and CVE, encourage racial and 
religious profiling of Arabs and Muslims and reinforce un-
founded biases about their so-called “inclination for terrorist ac-
tivity.”343 The See Something, Say Something program has, for 
example, attracted a “seemingly common, kind of untrained eye 
that sees an al Qaeda operative lurking under every prayer 
cap.”344 While the government’s public-facing description of 
CVE is ideologically and religiously neutral, it too disproportion-
ately focuses on the American Muslim community.345 The CVE 
program strongly implies that American Muslims “shoulder a 
particularized responsibility for national security that is not 
shared by other groups. . .”346 and treats “radical” perspectives 
on Islam347 and U.S. policies in the Muslim-majority world348 as 
hallmarks of potential terrorist inclinations.349 
2. Public and Private Material Support Cases 
As with the FBI surveillance programs and citizen-on-citi-
zen monitoring, cases under Sections 2339A, 2339B, 2333 and 
 
(male middle eastern) seen on board bus 6738, with high powered camera photo-
graphing city hall”); id. at 21 (reporting “while driving . . . I saw 4 Middle Eastern 
MA’s . . . taking pictures of downtown skylines”); id. at 20 (reporting that “[s]ubject 
was taking pictures of another person on a Metrolink train, who was dressed in a 
‘Middle Eastern’ costume”). 
 343. David Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering, Race, 
and the First Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 109 (2012); Irina 
D. Manta, Choosing Privacy, 20 N.YU. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 657–59 (2017). 
 344. Feisal G. Mohamed, “See Something, Say Something” and Impunity for Pro-






 345. Why Countering Violent Extremism Programs Are Bad Policy, supra note 
180. 
 346. Aziz Z. Huq, The Social Production of National Security, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 637, 706 (2013). 
 347. Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, supra note 163, at 882. 
 348. Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”, 3 UC IRVINE L. REV. 809, 878 
(2013). 
 349. See Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 147, 199 (2014) [hereinafter Policing Terrorists in the Community] (arguing 
that CVE encourages Muslims to keep a watchful eye on those espousing “radical” 
religious or political beliefs). 
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1605A primarily implicate, directly or indirectly, Muslim and/or 
Arab individuals, groups, or countries. Like the executive’s sur-
veillance-oriented programs, these cases are also facially neu-
tral, rather than explicitly discriminatory, in their targeting. 
A major reason why criminal and civil material support 
cases disproportionately impact Arabs and Muslims has to do 
with FTO and state sponsor designations, as well as the general 
international focus of the material support laws. As mentioned 
earlier, Section 2339B requires a connection to a designated 
FTO.350 Since the State Department first began making those 
designations in 1997,351 sixty-two of the eighty-two total FTOs 
have been Arab and/or Muslim.352 As one scholar puts it, the 
executive has “effectively employ[ed] its designation authority to 
halt almost all domestic activities and organizations associated 
with the Middle East or Islam under the auspices of combating 
terrorism.”353 While Section 2339A does not have a FTO require-
ment and is not expressly limited to foreign terrorism, the pred-
icate crimes that trigger its application often have an interna-
tional nexus.354 For example, Section 2339A prohibits material 
support in connection with “[a]cts of terrorism transcending na-
tional boundaries”355 or conspiracy “to commit at any place out-
side the United States an act that would constitute the offense 
of murder, kidnapping, or maiming if committed in . . . the 
United States.”356 This focus on international activity has effec-
tively oriented Section 2339A around individuals allegedly 
aligned with Muslim and/or Arab entities, which are dispropor-
tionately associated with international rather than domestic ter-
rorism.357 Given its reliance on Sections 2339A and 2339B, Sec-
tion 2333 is subject to similar tendencies. As for Section 1605A, 
 
 350. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
 351. Sean D. Murphy, U.S. Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization, 94 
AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 365 (2000). 
 352. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://
www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/ (last visited June 10, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/QM2J-9UXX]. I have used my own expertise and research on this issue to 
distinguish between groups that are and are not Arab and/or Muslim. 
 353. Aziz, supra note 264, at 91. 
 354. Sinnar, supra note 122, at 1357. 
 355. 18 U.S.C § 2332b; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (listing Section 2332b as a predicate 
crime). 
 356. 18 U.S.C § 956; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (listing Section 956 as a predicate 
crime). 
 357. Sinnar, supra note 122, at 1337. 
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it applies only to those countries designated by the State Depart-
ment as sponsors of terrorism.358 Since that law was passed in 
1996, there have been eight designated state sponsors of terror-
ism, with six being Arab and/or majority Muslim.359 
This nexus between material support laws and Arab and 
Muslim groups is reflected in the data. Though scattered, avail-
able information suggests most terrorism prosecutions, includ-
ing for material support, are brought against Arabs and/or Mus-
lim individuals,360 often for vague or non-violent crimes.361 For 
example, a recent study found that between 2012 and 2017 
nearly all forty-five indictments charging violations of Section 
2339A involved individuals who “came under the scrutiny of law 
enforcement based on the perception they sympathized, or had 
declared allegiance to, self-proclaimed Islamist militants 
abroad.”362 Section 2333 and 1605A cases exhibit the same dis-
proportionate focus on Arab and Muslim groups. Of the over 
eighty cases brought under Section 2333, nearly seventy have 
involved underlying terrorist activity allegedly committed by 
 
 358. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2). 
 359. These countries are Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq. 
Cuba and North Korea have also been designated as state sponsors of terrorism. 
Cuba, as well as Iraq, South Yemen (which no longer exists), and Libya, have been 
removed from the state sponsor list. See DIANNE E. RENNACK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
R43835, STATE SPONSORS OF ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM — LEGISLATIVE 
PARAMETERS: IN BRIEF 8–9 (2006), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R43835.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y8CL-XBP4]. Currently, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea are 
listed as state sponsors. State Sponsors of Terrorism: Bureau of Counterterrorism, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (last vis-
ited June 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X5G8-D4F9]. 
 360. See Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, Part II,: Who Are 
the Terrorists?, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-
america/who-are-terrorists/ (last visited June 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4VP5-
NQ9U] (reporting that of the 491 individuals charged with terrorism-related crimes 
or who died engaging in such crimes since 9/11, 452 have been Muslim). 
 361. See LORENZO VIDINO & SEAMUS HUGHES, ISIS IN AMERICA: FROM 
RETWEETS TO RAQQA, 7–8 (2015) (noting that, between March 2014 and December 
2015, the overwhelming majority of U.S.-based ISIS supporters (73%) were not in-
volved in plotting terrorist attacks in the U.S., and instead were arrested for “intent 
to do harm” overseas or for providing material support, specifically “personnel and 
funds,” to fighters in Syria and Iraq); CRIMES OF TERROR, supra note 215, at 147 
(noting that “only a very small percentage of terrorism prosecutions have reflected 
an actual security threat . . . .”). 
 362. Scott Sullivan, Prosecuting Domestic Terrorism as Terrorism, JUST 
SECURITY (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44274/prosecuting-domes-
tic-terrorism-terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/Y5P4-8HBM]. 
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Arab and/or Muslim entities.363 The lion’s share of Section 
1605A litigation has also been raised against Arab and/or Mus-
lim-majority countries.364 
Like their surveillance counterparts, the public and private 
material support suits rely on discriminatory stereotypes about 
Arabs and Muslims as being dangerous, irrational terrorists. 
This is partly reflected in the sanctions associated with the stat-
utes. This regime, which is extremely punitive, appears designed 
not only to deter and prevent terrorism but also to disable its 
“violent” Muslim adherents.365 Commenting on the criminal ma-
terial support statutes, one scholar notes how sentencing de-
fendants to long prison terms in these cases effectively com-
municates the view that “those affiliated with terrorist 
activity—primarily young Muslim men—are uniquely danger-
ous. . . [and] must . . . be incapacitated to protect society from 
their ideologically violent goals.”366  
3. The Impact on Social Cohesion 
Together, FBI surveillance, citizen-on-citizen monitoring, 
and the public and private material support cases reinforce prej-
udices against Arabs and Muslims within American society. 
While these prejudices may fluctuate depending upon political 
and social factors,367 they have endured since 9/11. According to 
polls conducted between 1993 and 2014, one in five Americans 
 
 363. Maryam Jamshidi, Antiterrorism Act Table of Cases (Aug. 14, 2020) (un-
published research) (on file with author). 
 364. According to published decisions available on Westlaw, in comparison to 
the more than 100 cases brought under the FSIA’s terrorism exception against Arab 
and/or Muslim states, there have been less than twenty cases against Cuba and six 
against North Korea, as of this writing. 
 365. See, e.g., Is History Repeating Itself?, supra note 121, (arguing that sentenc-
ing policies subject young Muslim men to prison terms that are disproportionately 
severe given the non-violent nature of their crimes and lack of meaningful criminal 
history); see generally Jamshidi, supra note 233 (describing Section 2333’s auto-
matic trebling of damages plus loose liability requirements as part of the “‘world-
wide battle’” against terrorism). 
 366. Ahmed, supra note 121, at 1523. 
 367. See Murtaza Hussain & Maryam Saleh, Bigoted Election Campaigns, Not 
Terror Attacks, Drive Anti-Muslim Activity, INTERCEPT (Mar. 11, 2018), https://the-
intercept.com/2018/03/11/anti-muslim-activities-politics-terrorism-islamophobia/ 
[https://perma.cc/4MF8-VNPA] (reporting that anti-Muslim sentiment is driven by 
elections in which politicians resort to discriminatory tropes and rhetoric about 
Muslims to win votes). 
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view Muslims as threats to the United States.368 Another poll 
conducted in 2014 found that only 27 percent of Americans had 
favorable views of Muslims, while only 32 percent had favorable 
views of Arabs.369 While another poll from December 2017 
claimed that attitudes toward Arabs and Muslims have im-
proved,370 more recent reports suggest that acceptance of anti-
Muslim tropes is increasing again. For example, in 2019, a poll 
titled the National Islamophobia Index asked Americans to 
agree or disagree with several negative stereotypes associated 
with Muslims, including that “[m]ost Muslims living in the 
United States are more prone to violence than others”; “[m]ost 
Muslims living in the United States are hostile to the United 
States”; “[m]ost Muslims living in the United States are less civ-
ilized than other people”; and “[m]ost Muslims living in the 
United States are partially responsible for acts of violence car-
ried out by other Muslims.”371 The poll found that between 2018 
and 2019 there was a four point increase in overall agreement 
with these statements.372 Another report, issued by the Council 
on American Islamic Relations (CAIR),373 recorded 10,015 inci-
dents of anti-Muslim bias from 2014 to June 2019.374 During the 
 
 368. THE PRINCE ALWALEED BIN TALAL CTR. FOR MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN 
UNDERSTANDING, GEORGETOWN UNIV., THE SUPER SURVEY: TWO DECADES OF 
AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON ISLAM & MUSLIMS 32 (The Bridge Initiative, 2015), https://
bridge.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/The-Super-Survey-1.pdf [https 
://perma.cc/5AF9-WRLV]. 
 369. Mary Wisniewski, American Opinion of Arabs, Muslims Is Getting Worse: 
poll, REUTERS (July 29, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-muslims-poll
/american-opinion-of-arabs-muslims-is-getting-worse-poll-idUSKBN0FY1ZR20140 
729 [https://perma.cc/UB2D-DPNW]. 
 370. Poll: American Attitudes Improving Towards Arabs and Muslims, VOA 
NEWS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/usa/poll-american-attitudes-im-
proving-toward-arabs-muslims [https://perma.cc/E7ST-K4N9]. 
 371. DALIA MOGAHED & ASKA MAHMOOD, INST. FOR SOC. POL’Y & 
UNDERSTANDING, AMERICAN MUSLIM POLL 2019: PREDICTING AND PREVENTING 
ISLAMOPHOBIA 19 (2019), https://www.ispu.org/american-muslim-poll-2019-pre-
dicting-and-preventing-islamophobia/ [hereinafter AMERICAN MUSLIM POLL 2019] 
[https://perma.cc/EKR3-RDBW]. 
 372. Id. 
 373. About Us, CAIR, https://www.cair.com/about_cair/about-us/ (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U3MS-SEJH]. 
 374. COUNCIL ON AM. ISLAMIC RELS., THE BIAS BRIEF: TRUMP’S IMPACT ON ANTI-
MUSLIM BIAS 5 (Sept. 2019), http://www.islamophobia.org/images/2019/Bias_Brief
/BB_2_-_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8U7W-JP68]. The report does not explicitly 
define “anti-Muslim bias” and instead lists various types of abuse included under 
this category, including harassment, denial of religious accommodation, intimida-
tion, and bullying. Despite this and other shortcomings noted below, the report 
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same period, the organization recorded a total of 1,164 anti-Mus-
lim hate crimes375 and 506 “anti-mosque” incidents.376 
As some of these reports and other research show, govern-
ment discrimination fuels and supplements this private discrim-
ination against Muslims. Indeed, the CAIR report explicitly con-
nects private, anti-Muslim incidents with state action.377 For 
example, in explaining the increase in anti-Muslim bias in 2017, 
the report partly blames the Muslim Ban, which was promul-
gated at the start of that year.378 This relationship between pri-
vate and public discrimination has also been noted by legal 
scholars and policy analysts.379 As Professor Sahar Aziz has 
written, “[a]s the public interprets the government’s actions as 
part of reasonable national security policies, private actors feel 
justified in discriminating against Muslims in employment, 
housing, education, and public accommodations.”380 
These dynamics—that is, the existence of pervasive preju-
dice against Arabs and Muslims reinforced by government ac-
tion—help explain why there have been little to no political ef-
forts that have successfully rolled back FBI surveillance and 
material support prosecutions, as well as their private ana-
logues. These legally sanctioned programs communicate the 
message that, while “theoretically entitled to formal rights, 
[Muslims and/or Arabs] do not stand in for or represent the 
[American] nation.”381 This promotes a view of Arabs and Mus-
lims, embedded in law, as enemies “who seek to destroy the 
‘American way of life.’”382 By labeling Arabs and Muslims as the 
 
represents one of the few attempts to aggregate data on the treatment of American 
Muslims in the United States. Id. 
 375. Id. at 7. 
 376. Id. at 10. The report does not define “anti-mosque” incidents except to note 
that “the highest single type of incidents [consisted] of damage . . . destruction, or 
vandalism to mosque property at 148” and that “[t]hirty-seven [incidents] were re-
lated to land zoning issues.” Id. 
 377. Id. at 6. 
 378. Id. 
 379. See AMERICAN MUSLIM POLL 2019, supra note 371, at 19 (noting that “Is-
lamophobia is not simply a phenomenon of societal sentiment, but is a structural 
phenomenon, manifesting in legislation, budget decisions, and law enforcement 
practices at the local, state, and federal levels” and that “public toleration for many 
of these [Islamophobic] practices is linked to higher [incidence of private anti-Mus-
lim sentiment]”). 
 380. Aziz, supra note 349, at 186. 
 381. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1594 
(2002). 
 382. Id. at 1595. 
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dangerous “terrorist other,”383 these laws and programs frus-
trate the creation of a shared identity between this community 
and other members of U.S. society. While all Americans may not 
share the same concerns Arabs and Muslims have with U.S. 
counterterrorism policies, the possibility exists for different 
groups to come together in the service of curbing executive au-
thority under these legalistic national security programs. This 
could be precipitated by a common commitment to civil liberties, 
similar experiences under those programs, or through a shared 
belief in other values and goals. The likelihood of this social co-
hesion is, however, frustrated by legalistic national security ini-
tiatives that buttress commonly held stereotypes about Arabs 
and Muslims, further marginalize those communities, and do 
not affect other groups. 
This outcome stands in stark contrast to other national se-
curity programs that discriminate or otherwise negatively affect 
minorities. The following section begins this comparative study 
by looking at the Muslim Ban. The section that follows examines 
Section 215 and 702 surveillance and the controversy surround-
ing the Border Wall. Together, these three case studies empha-
size law’s dynamic role in impacting social cohesion and gener-
ating political accountability for minority rights and interests. 
As these case studies demonstrate, where the rule of law is 
wielded in ways that appear explicitly discriminatory or have 
negative consequences for a large or small but diverse group of 
people, it generates political efforts at accountability for the ex-
ecutive, no matter who is impacted. 
C. The Muslim Ban 
While the Muslim Ban primarily affects the rights of Arabs 
and Muslims, both citizen and noncitizen alike, its initial prom-
ulgation and subsequent revisions have triggered substantial 
public outcry. Though various factors have likely sparked this 
social cohesion, the ban’s explicitly discriminatory intent is a 
particularly significant influence. Anger and opposition to this 
discrimination has led to ongoing efforts to end the ban. This 
section examines these issues, beginning with background on 
the Muslim Ban and its rule of law credentials, continuing with 
 
 383. Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereo-
types Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y.C. L. REV. 33, 35 (2009). 
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its impact on Arab and Muslim Americans, and ending with the 
backlash it has received from across American society. 
Only one week after his inauguration, President Trump 
signed executive Order 13,796 (“First Muslim Ban”), prohibiting 
nearly all non-U.S. citizen nationals from seven Muslim-major-
ity states—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, and Soma-
lia—from entering the United States for ninety days.384 
Amongst other provisions, the order also placed an indefinite 
ban on the entry of all Syrian refugees.385 Evoking Section 212 
of the INA, the First Muslim Ban framed these restrictions as 
necessary to protect American citizens against terrorism.386 Un-
der Section 212, the President has broad authority to “suspend 
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or 
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions 
he may deem appropriate” upon making a finding that such en-
try “would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States.”387 
Since it was first issued, the Muslim Ban has had three 
main iterations.388 After a nationwide preliminary injunction 
was issued against parts of the First Muslim Ban,389 the Admin-
istration rescinded that order and issued a revised ban on March 
6, 2017 (“Second Muslim Ban”).390 Though it somewhat nar-
rowed the original ban, including by removing Iraq and 
 
 384. Exec. Order No. 13769 § 3(c), 3 C.F.R. 272 (2017) [hereinafter FIRST 
MUSLIM BAN]. The order did not apply to certain categories of travelers and allowed 
for exceptions “on a case-by-case basis.” Id. § 3(c), (g). While the ban did not explic-
itly list the countries it applied to, it incorporated, by reference to 8 U.S.C. § 
1187(a)(12), those countries that were already subject to certain restrictions under 
the U.S. government’s visa waiver program. These countries included Iraq, Syria, 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. Fact Sheet: Protecting the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry to the United States, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 29, 
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/29/protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-
entry-united-states [https://perma.cc/5WRJ-42HR]. 
 385. FIRST MUSLIM BAN § 5(c). The order also temporarily suspended the U.S. 
refugee resettlement program for 120 days. Id. § 5(a). 
 386. Id. §§ 1–2. 
 387. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). 
 388. There was also a “fourth” version of the Muslim Ban, which reactivated the 
U.S. refugee resettlement program albeit with “enhanced vetting” capabilities. 
Exec. Order No. 13815, 3 C.F.R. 390 (2017). 
 389. Washington v. Trump, 2017 WL 462040, No. C17-0141JLR, (W.D. Wash. 
Feb. 3, 2017), denying stay pending appeal, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 
(9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), reh’g en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 390. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 3 C.F.R. 301 (2017), amended by Effective Date in 
Executive Order 13780, 3 C.F.R. 468 (2017) [hereinafter SECOND MUSLIM BAN]. 
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eliminating the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees, the Second 
Muslim Ban continued to prohibit most travel from the six re-
maining countries.391 This revised ban was immediately chal-
lenged in court, leading to more injunctions.392 
In June 2017, the Supreme Court weighed in and granted 
the government’s certiorari petition challenging the injunctions 
against the Second Muslim Ban.393 Pending its merits review, 
the Court limited the scope of those outstanding injunctions and, 
subject to those restrictions, allowed the Second Muslim Ban to 
go into temporary effect.394 Before the Supreme Court’s merits 
review could take place, however, portions of the Second Muslim 
Ban expired on September 24, 2017.395 In response, President 
Trump issued a proclamation permanently and indefinitely re-
stricting travel by non-U.S. citizens from Chad, Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Venezuela (“Third 
Muslim Ban”).396 As with the First and Second Muslim Bans, 
the Third Muslim Ban was met with renewed litigation.397 
 
 391. SECOND MUSLIM BAN § § 1(d)–(g). 
 392. IRAP v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d in part and vacated 
in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted and injunction partially stayed 
by Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated and remanded by, 138 S. Ct. 353 
(2017); Hawai’i v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted and injunction partially 
stayed by Trump v. IRAP, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated and remanded by Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
 393. Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2086. 
 394. See id. at 2088 (limiting preliminary injunctions against Second Muslim 
Ban only to those foreign nationals with a “credible claim of a bona fide relationship 
with a person or entity in the United States”). 
 395. Chad Li, President Trump Replaces Expired Travel Ban with New Re-
strictions on Eight Countries, OGLETREE DEAKINS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://ogle-
tree.com/insights/president-trump-replaces-expired-travel-ban-with-new-re-
strictions-on-eight-countries/ [https://perma.cc/HY5D-LRAQ]. 
 396. Proclamation No. 9645, 3 C.F.R. 135 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter THIRD 
MUSLIM BAN]. The new ban placed different immigration restrictions on each af-
fected country. It also dropped Sudan from the list of banned countries, though it 
was later re-added in January 2020. See infra note 406. The ban on North Korea, 
which had little migration to the United States, and Venezuela, which applied only 
to a group of government officials and their families, was viewed as an attempt to 
undermine claims of anti-Muslim bias by adding two non-Muslim majority coun-
tries to the list. Id. § 2 (f)(ii); Oliver Laughland, Trump Travel Ban Extended to 
Blocks on North Korea, Venezuela, and Chad, GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2017), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/25/trump-travel-ban-extended-to-blocks-
on-north-korea-and-venezuela [https://perma.cc/J2F7-9MLT]. 
 397. Once again, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits upheld nationwide injunctions 
against parts of the Third Muslim Ban. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. 
Haw.) [hereinafter Hawaii I], aff’d in part and vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th 
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While the rule of law issues with the first, short-lived ver-
sion of the ban were particularly stark,398 litigants challenged 
all three bans on rule of law grounds for exceeding the govern-
ment’s statutory authority and being inconsistent with the Con-
stitution.399 Whatever validity those arguments may have had, 
the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in June 2018 upholding 
the Third Muslim Ban’s rule of law credentials, concluding that 
it was consistent with the President’s authority under the INA 
and the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.400 
 
Cir. 2017) (per curiam) [hereinafter Hawaii II], rev’d Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018); IRAP v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) [hereinafter IRAP 
I], aff’d, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter IRAP II], rev’d Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). However, neither those decisions, nor the underlying district 
court injunctions, ultimately impacted the Third Muslim Ban. On December 4, 
2017, the Supreme Court stayed the district court injunctions pending appellate 
review and allowed the Third Muslim Ban to go into immediate effect. Adam Lip-
tak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-
court.html [https://perma.cc/6HL9-MQ3Z]. Once the Ninth and Fourth Circuits 
weighed in, they also stayed their orders pending Supreme Court review of the 
Third Muslim Ban. Hawaii II, 878 F.3d at 702; IRAP II, 883 F.3d at 274. 
 398. While all three bans were publicly promulgated, general, constant through 
time, non-retroactive, and internally coherent, there are credible arguments that 
the First Muslim Ban violated the rule of law’s requirement that law be clear and 
subject to rational lawmaking processes. As described below, the first ban was 
drafted quickly without proper internal review and was so poorly written that gov-
ernment officials did not clearly understand its scope. See infra notes 437–40 and 
accompanying text. The executive subsequently issued various forms of guidance 
during the first hours and days following the ban’s implementation, clarifying the 
scope of the order in a piecemeal and often confusing fashion. See, e.g., OFF. 
INSPECTOR GEN. OIG-18-37, DHS IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER #13769 
“PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED 
STATES” 16–23, 26–31, 46–48, 56–58 (2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/assets/2018-01/OIG-18-37-Jan18.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON MUSLIM 
BAN] [https://perma.cc/D824-6AB8] (documenting various issues with creation, 
promulgation, and implementation of internal guidance for First Muslim Ban). 
There were also serious questions about whether DHS’s Office of Customs and Bor-
der Protection initially complied with court orders enjoining application of parts of 
the First Muslim Ban. Id. at 6–7. 
 399. See, e.g., IRAP II, 883 F.3d 233 (upholding district court injunction against 
certain parts of Third Muslim Ban as violating the First Amendment’s Establish-
ment Clause); Hawaii II, 878 F.3d 662 (upholding district court injunction against 
certain parts of the Third Muslim Ban as exceeding the President’s statutory au-
thority under the INA). 
 400. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2415, 2423 (2018) [hereinafter SCOTUS Mus-
lim Ban]. Though relying on different rationale, the dissenting judges—Justices 
Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg—con-
cluded that the Muslim Ban violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. 
Id. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2433–34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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The majority decision also implicitly upheld the ban’s com-
pliance with other formalist rule of law requirements. In partic-
ular, the majority referenced the ban’s purported adherence to a 
rational lawmaking process. In the First and Second Muslim 
Bans, the Administration had variously ordered a “review” to 
determine what information was needed from which countries 
to ensure foreign nationals desiring to travel to the United 
States did not pose a “security or public-safety threat.”401 As 
part of its rationale for upholding the Third Muslim Ban, the 
majority emphasized that review process and its attendant pro-
cedures, 402 which were detailed in the ban’s text.403 
While bolstering the Muslim Ban’s formalist credentials, 
the Supreme Court’s decision effectively “set no limit on the 
president’s ability to exclude . . . groups on the basis of race or 
nationality, so long as he claims their entry would be detri-
mental to the United States for some foreign policy or national 
security reasons.”404 Indeed, since the Court’s decision, Trump 
has banned more countries. Though Chad is no longer on the 
list,405 the Administration has added six more nations, bringing 
the total number of banned countries to thirteen.406 While these 
newly added countries are not all majority Muslim, they are 
mostly non-white and have substantial Muslim populations.407 
 
 401. FIRST MUSLIM BAN § 3(a); SECOND MUSLIM BAN § 2(a). 
 402. SCOTUS Muslim Ban, 138 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 403. THIRD MUSLIM BAN §§(1)(c)–(j). In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor ques-
tioned the legitimacy of this review process, which she described as supposedly ex-
amining hundreds of countries but yielding a report of a “mere 17 pages.” Id. at 
2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 404. Shirin Sinnar, Trump v. Hawaii: A Roadmap for New Racial Origin Quotas, 
STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (June 26, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/06/26/trump-v-
hawaii-a-roadmap-for-new-racial-origin-quotas/ [https://perma.cc/86S9-5CTG]. 
 405. Eric Beech, U.S. Lifts Travel Ban on Chad Citizens: White House, REUTERS 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chad-security/u-s-lifts-
travel-ban-on-chad-citizens-white-house-idUSKBN1HH3FW [https://perma.cc
/NJ3G-CKDL]. 
 406. The six new countries are Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Myanmar, Tanza-
nia, and Sudan. Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699, 6701–02 (Jan. 31, 2020). 
While the restrictions vary for each country, the new ban generally applies only to 
citizens of these states who are seeking to enter the United States as immigrants, 
i.e., permanent residents or green card holders. Id. at 6703. 
 407. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Opinion, Trump Administration Adds Six Coun-
tries to Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01
/31/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/3W4F-ZUPZ] (noting that 
“[a]ll six countries have substantial Muslim populations”); Grace Meng, New Travel 
Ban Reflects Trump Administration’s Discriminatory Intent, HILL (Feb. 4, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/481363-new-travel-ban-reflects-
JAMSHIDI_FINAL DRAFT_CLEAN_12.28.20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/20 2:08 PM 
2021] THE DISCRIMINATORY EXECUTIVE 149 
 
Indeed, according to reports, the new order has doubled the 
number of affected Muslims to 320 million worldwide.408  
Though the Muslim Ban has had an obvious impact on for-
eign nationals, it has also had clear and dramatic effects on 
American citizens.409 Given the ban’s focus on countries with 
Muslim majorities or large Muslim populations,410 most of these 
affected American citizens are likely of Muslim heritage.411 In-
deed, some of these Americans brought suit against all three ver-
sions of the Muslim Ban, arguing that it prevented them from 
reuniting with their relatives.412 Since the Third Muslim Ban 
went into effect in December 2017, there has been mounting ev-
idence of this family separation. According to one report exam-
ining 549 visa waiver applications filed under the Muslim Ban’s 
waiver process,413 15.3 percent of these applications were “sib-
lings who were separated from each other,” 26 percent were 
“children who were separated from parents,” and 37.7 percent 
 
trump-administrations-discriminatory-intent [https://perma.cc/Y8S5-36PL] (de-
scribing expansion of Third Muslim Ban as “designed to curtail legal immigration 
by nonwhite people, Muslims, and those with lower incomes”). 
 408. Sam Levin, ‘Trump is Deciding Who is American’: How the Travel Ban is 
Tearing Families Apart, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/2020/feb/16/trump-is-deciding-who-is-american-how-the-new-travel-ban-
is-tearing-families-apart [https://perma.cc/ZPM4-HMHR]. 
 409. Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, supra note 117, at 98. 
 410. Vahid Niayesh, Statistics Show that Trump’s “Travel Ban” Was Always a 
Muslim Ban, QUARTZ (Oct. 28, 2019), https://qz.com/1736809/statistics-show-that-
trumps-travel-ban-was-always-a-muslim-ban/ [https://perma.cc/7YEB-5L7U] (re-
viewing data from December 2017, at the start of the Third Muslim Ban, through 
mid-2019 and demonstrating that banned Muslim countries experienced steep 
drops in the number of immigrant visas issued, while non-Muslim countries—Ven-
ezuela and North Korea—had virtually unchanged numbers compared to pre-ban 
levels). 
 411. Other U.S. citizens who are neither Muslim nor from affected countries 
have undoubtedly been impacted as well, including spouses and fiancées. One 
might argue, then, that the Muslim Ban is not just a case of explicit discrimination 
but also a situation where executive action impacted a small but diverse group of 
communities. Without discounting this overlap, the Muslim Ban’s discriminatory 
cast has been especially prominent in shaping political accountability efforts. See 
infra notes 427–34 and accompanying text. 
 412. See, e.g., IRAP I, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 593–94 (D. Md. 2017) (noting claims 
by various U.S. citizens and legal permanent resident plaintiffs “assert[ing] that 
they will suffer harm from the implementation of the [ban] in the form of prolonged 
separation of family members located in the Designated Countries”); Hawaii I, 265 
F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1150–51 (D. Haw.) (detailing claims by various U.S. citizens and 
legal permanent residents who are Muslim and/or from affected countries and al-
leging injury based, in part, on an inability to reunite with family members). 
 413. THIRD MUSLIM BAN § 3(c) (allowing eligible individuals from banned coun-
tries to enter the United States on a case-by-case basis). 
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were “partners who were separated from each other.”414 At the 
time, the State Department had granted only 5.1 percent of all 
visa waivers filed under the ban.415 
Despite the disproportionate impact on their communities, 
Muslim and Arab Americans have not been alone in opposing 
the order. To the contrary, both before and after the Supreme 
Court upheld the Muslim Ban, there has been substantial social 
cohesion in favor of rejecting the ban and curbing executive au-
thority. When the First Muslim Ban was issued, it immediately 
led to significant public outcry across demographic groups.416 
Starting one day after its promulgation, large protests took place 
at various sites around the country and world.417 In the United 
States, protesters gathered at various airports, including New 
York’s JFK, Chicago’s O’Hare, Los Angeles’s LAX, and Washing-
ton’s Dulles airport.418 During many of these demonstrations, 
participants held signs of solidarity emblazoned with statements 
like “We Are All Immigrants” and “Let Refugees In.”419 
 
 414. The Muslim and African Bans, BRIDGE INITIATIVE, https://
bridge.georgetown.edu/research-publications/reports/muslimban/ (last visited June 
26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6YLA-QZLM]. 
 415. This figure is based on visa waivers filed between December 2017 and 
March 2019. Id. While recent evidence suggests the number of waiver approvals 
increased between March 2019 and April 2020, three in four waiver applications 
were still denied during this period. Id. 
 416. Chelsea Bailey & Katie Wong, Global Demonstrations over Trump’s Policies 
Heat Up Amid Anger over Travel Ban, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2017, 10:37 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/global-demonstrations-over-trump-s-pol-
icies-heat-amid-anger-over-n716831 [https://perma.cc/SH5H-5QA6]. 
 417. See, e.g., id.; Chris Riotta, Nationwide Protests Erupt after Supreme Court 




 418. Protests Erupt at Airports Nationwide over Immigration Action, CBS (Jan. 
29, 2017, 12:50 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/protests-airports-immigra-
tion-action-president-trump/ [https://perma.cc/3H52-NMP9]. 
 419. Id. 
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A host of discrete groups—from governors420 to mayors421 
to universities422—have spoken out against the Muslim Ban. In 
particular, Japanese American individuals and groups have con-
demned the ban, drawing parallels to World War II-era intern-
ment of individuals of Japanese heritage in the United States.423 
Jewish American groups have also railed against the ban, invok-
ing the legacy of Jews fleeing the Holocaust and other persecu-
tion in Europe.424 Outrage over the ban has been expressed in 
other ways, as well. According to reports, the ACLU received $24 
million in donations the weekend after the First Muslim Ban 
went into effect, which was more than it had received in all of 
 
 420. See, e.g., Press Release, Dannel P. Malloy, Governor Conn., Gov. Malloy 
Statement on Federal Court Order Blocking Travel Ban (Mar. 15, 2017), https://
portal.ct.gov/Malloy-Archive/Press-Room/Press-Releases/2017/03-2017/Gov-Malloy 
-Statement-on-Federal-Court-Order-Blocking-Travel-Ban [https://perma.cc/8CQT-
DX29] (statement from Connecticut governor commending court order blocking 
Muslim Ban); Ryan Quigley, Governor McAuliffe Releases Statement on Trump Ex-
ecutive Order, ABC 8 NEWS (Jan. 28, 2017, 9:33 PM), https://www.wric.com/news
/governor-mcauliffe-releases-statement-on-trump-executive-order/ [https://perma.c 
c/XVQ2-PFCP] (statement from Virginia governor opposing Muslim Ban). 
 421. See, e.g., Statement, Bill de Blasio, Mayor N.Y.C., Statement from Mayor 
Bill de Blasio on President Trump’s Travel Ban (Mar. 6, 2017), https://
www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/133-17/statement-mayor-bill-de-blasio-pre 
sident-trump-s-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/24C6-ZYPD] (statement from New 
York City mayor opposing Muslim Ban); Statement, Eric Garcetti, Mayor L.A., 
Statement: Mayor Garcetti on Revised Travel Ban Executive Order (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.lamayor.org/statement-mayor-garcetti-revised-travel-ban-executive-o 
rder [https://perma.cc/47RV-432C] [hereinafter Garcetti Statement] (statement 
from Los Angeles mayor opposing Muslim Ban). 
 422. Susan Svrluga, Universities Respond to New Executive Order on Immigra-
tion with Concern, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2017, 6:49 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/03/06/universities-respond-to-new-executiv 
e-order-on-immigration-with-concern/ [https://perma.cc/U8T8-DN5L]. 
 423. Richard Wolf, Children of Japanese American Legal Pioneers from World 
War II Fight Travel Ban, USA TODAY (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/politics/2017/10/10/children-japanese-american-legal-pioneers 
-world-war-ii-fight-travel-ban/740910001/ [https://perma.cc/2MDY-UDGK]; JACL 
Continues Opposition to Newly Issued Immigration Ban, Japanese American Citi-
zens League (Sept. 25, 2017), https://jacl.org/jacl-continues-opposition-to-newly-is-
sued-immigration-ban/ [https://perma.cc/W3H5-KKM2]. 
 424. Revised Executive Order on Immigration Remains Dangerous and Wrong, J 
STREET (Mar. 6, 2007), https://jstreet.org/press-releases/revised-executive-order-
immigration-remains-dangerous-wrong/#.XtbeMS85Q0o [https://perma.cc/SCG5-
MJ7K]. 
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2016.425 Starbucks pledged to hire 10,000 refugees worldwide in 
response to the order.426 
While some opposition to the ban suggests “majority” inter-
ests may be at play,427 most of the social cohesion has focused 
on the ban’s explicitly discriminatory cast. This opposition to the 
ban’s overt discrimination is the strongest and most consistent 
argument against the ban raised by Arab and Muslim Ameri-
cans, various religious428 and ethnic organizations,429 as well as 
diverse professional groups430 and politicians.431 The Muslim 
Ban has, for example, been decried as “out of step with values of 
religious tolerance and equality,”432 as embracing “xenophobia
/Islamophobia that contradicts our American values,”433 and as 
reflecting an “obsession with religious discrimination [that] 
is disgusting, un-American, and outright dangerous.”434  
 
 425. Alia E. Dastagir, Outrage over Trump’s Immigrant Ban Helps ACLU Raise 
More Money Online in One Weekend than in All of 2016, USA TODAY (Jan 29, 2017, 
6:09 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/01/29/aclu-fundrais-
ing-records-muslim-immigrant-ban/97218098/ [https://perma.cc/3XH6-2TJ2]. 
 426. Tribune News Services, Starbucks to Hire 10,000 Refugees in Response to 
Trump’s Executive Order, CHIC. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:51 PM), https://www.chica-
gotribune.com/business/ct-starbucks-refugees-trump-executive-order-20170129-
story.html [https://perma.cc/ET6V-GGYJ]. 
 427. Svrluga, supra note 422 (opposing the ban because it does not “recognize 
the importance of international medical graduates, physicians, and medical re-
searchers to the nation’s health security”); Letter from Foreign Policy Experts on 
Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017
/03/11/us/politics/document-letter-foreign-policy-trump.html [https://perma.cc/ZY8 
M-F54B] (describing numerous national security officials who opposed the ban be-
cause it hurts U.S. national security and undermines the fight against terrorism). 
 428. Jack Jenkins, A List of Faith Groups Opposing Trump’s New Muslim Ban, 
THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:18 PM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/faith-
groups-opposing-new-muslim-ban-d88a75caea/ [https://perma.cc/EDV9-F2RS] (de-
scribing various faith groups as condemning the Muslim Ban for its “affront to re-
ligious freedom”). 
 429. See, e.g., supra notes 423–28 and accompanying text. 
 430. See, e.g., Paul Fain, Forceful Response: The Trump Administration’s Entry 
Ban Triggered Wide Condemnation from Colleges, Associations, Faculty Groups 
and Others in Higher Education, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 30, 2017), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/01/30/higher-education-leaders-denounce-tru 
mps-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/MTE8-BLHR] (compiling various responses from 
higher education professionals condemning the Muslim Ban’s discriminatory aims). 
 431. See sources cited supra notes 420–25 and accompanying text. 
 432. Garcetti Statement, supra note 421. 
 433. Mahita Gajanan, ‘Still a Muslim Ban’: Lawmakers React to President 
Trump’s Travel Ban, TIME (Mar. 6, 2017, 1:36 PM), https://time.com/4692116/don-
ald-trump-travel-ban-internet-reaction/ [https://perma.cc/P8HA-HSN4]. 
 434. Id. 
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There is ample evidence to support these claims, including 
Trump’s many explicit anti-Muslim comments, the text of the 
First Muslim Ban, and the process by which the first ban was 
promulgated. Many of those anti-Muslim comments were made 
during the 2016 presidential election. These included Trump’s 
“‘call[] for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering 
the United States’”; his statement that “‘Islam hates us . . . . 
[W]e can’t allow people coming into this country who have this 
hatred of the United States’”; his claim that “[w]e’re having prob-
lems with Muslims, and we’re having problems with Muslims 
coming into the country’”; and his statement that Muslims “‘do 
not respect us at all’ and ‘don’t respect a lot of the things that 
are happening throughout not only our country, but they don’t 
respect other things.’”435 
The text of the First Muslim Ban also provides evidence of 
its discriminatory nature. While it did not express an explicit 
intention to ban Muslims, the First Muslim Ban contained other 
indications that strongly suggest such intent.436 In addition to 
exclusively impacting Muslim majority countries,437 the First 
Muslim Ban contained various thinly veiled stereotypes about 
Muslims. As part of its purpose, the ban stated that “[t]he 
United States cannot, and should not, admit those . . . who would 
place violent ideologies over American law” or “those who engage 
in acts of bigotry or hatred (including ‘honor’ killings [or] other 
forms of violence against women . . .)”438—all of which are stere-
otypes associated with Muslims.439 
Finally, the process through which the first order was issued 
points to motives that are illegitimate, at the very least. Accord-
ing to reporting at the time, the First Muslim Ban circumvented 
 
 435. SCOTUS Muslim Ban, 138 S. Ct. 2415, at 2435–37 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). Trump continued to allude to a “desire to keep Muslims out of the coun-
try” even as litigation against the Muslim Ban was ongoing. Id. at 2437. 
 436. Abed Ayoub & Khaled Beydoun, Executive Disorder: The Muslim Ban, 
Emergency Advocacy, and the Fires Next Time, 22 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 215, 225 
(2017). 
 437. Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 
Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01
/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/TR66-BSLZ]. 
 438. FIRST MUSLIM BAN § 1. 
 439. Ayoub & Beydoun, supra note 436. 
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the executive branch’s own review processes.440 The Secretary 
of DHS, the agency responsible for the order’s implementation 
at the U.S. border, had seen it only a few days before it was is-
sued and was caught off guard when it suddenly went into ef-
fect.441 Nor was the order subject to legal review and analysis by 
DHS attorneys.442 As a result of this haphazard process, the or-
der was so poorly drafted—it was unclear, for example, whether 
it covered legal permanent residents443—and abruptly imple-
mented that it immediately caused chaos at airports in the 
United States and abroad.444 
Resistance to the Muslim Ban remains ongoing. Street pro-
tests against the First Muslim Ban died down in early February 
2017,445 likely in response to judicial decisions enjoining that 
ban’s key provisions. After the Supreme Court upheld the Mus-
lim Ban, demonstrations erupted again, though not at previous 
levels.446 Other forms of opposition, including through media447 
and legal advocacy,448 as well as political lobbying,449 have been 
even more important and consistent. A congressional hearing on 
the ban was held in September 2019, featuring testimony from 
 
 440. Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump’s Rush to Enact an Immigra-
tion Ban Unleashed Global Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/01/29/us/politics/donald-trump-rush-immigration-order-chaos.htm 
l [ttps://perma.cc/9Y8Y-KCY9]. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. As detailed in a subsequent government report on the First Muslim 
Ban’s implementation, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) at the Department of 
Justice, as well as the White House Counsel’s office, reviewed the original ban. IG 
REPORT ON MUSLIM BAN, supra note 398, at 8. According to the report, however, 
the OLC opinion had a “dearth of analysis” and simply stated that the “proposed 
Order is approved with respect to form and legality.” Id. at 9. 
 443. Id. at 20–21. 
 444. Shear & Nixon, supra note 440. 
 445. Colin Moynihan, About 20 Rabbis Arrested During Protest over Trump 
Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/nyre-
gion/rabbis-arrested-protest-trump-muslim-ban.html [https://perma.cc/TR7R-Q69 
7]. 
 446. Riotta, supra note 417. 
 447. See, e.g., Meng, supra note 407 (op-ed from immigration advocate criticizing 
Muslim Ban). 
 448. Sharon Samber, Still Fighting the Muslim Ban After Two Years, HIAS (Jan. 
26, 2019), https://www.hias.org/blog/still-fighting-muslim-ban-after-two-years 
[https://perma.cc/7VFP-JPZ4]. 
 449. See NO MUSLIM BAN EVER CAMPAIGN, https://www.nomuslimbanever.com 
(last visited June 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9QP4-EBRD] (political and legal advo-
cacy campaign aimed at ending Muslim Ban). 
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American families impacted by the order.450 Earlier that year, 
Democratic congressional members introduced the NO BAN Act 
to end the Muslim Ban and place limits on the President’s ability 
to enact similar orders in the future, including by limiting exec-
utive authority under Section 212 of the INA.451 As of this writ-
ing, both bills remain pending in Congress. Democratic Presi-
dential nominee Joe Biden has also issued a statement 
committing to repeal the Muslim Ban.452 
D. Section 215 and 702 Surveillance and Border-Land 
 Controversies 
As with laws that are explicitly discriminatory, laws that 
empower the executive and undermine civil liberties have often 
generated political accountability where either a sizable portion 
of the population or a small but diverse range of groups have 
been negatively affected. This section explores this phenomenon 
by examining Section 215 and 702 surveillance, as well as the 
Border Wall, the legal bases for these initiatives, political reac-
tions to them, and resulting efforts to restrict executive power. 
In 2013, revelations about secret surveillance programs cre-
ated under Sections 215 and 702—a telephony metadata collec-
tion program as well as a program known as PRISM—helped 
trigger congressional legislation curbing those initiatives and re-
forming the statutes themselves. Even though Arab and Muslim 
Americans were likely targeted by these national security pro-
grams, the revelations made clear that the rights of millions of 
Americans were also impacted. These broad-based negative con-
sequences helped trigger political accountability for these pro-
grams and privacy protections for all Americans, Arabs and 
Muslim included. In the case of the Border Wall, a small but di-
verse coalition of impacted individuals, including various com-
munities of color and social justice groups, have come together 
 
 450. Oversight of the Trump Administration’s Muslim Ban Before the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/even-
tsingle.aspx?EventID=2268 [https://perma.cc/MF87-G3TE]. 
 451. National Origin-Based Antidiscrimination for Nonimmigrants Act (NO 
BAN Act), S. 1123, 116th Cong. (2019); National Origin-Based Antidiscrimination 
for Nonimmigrants Act (NO BAN Act), H.R. 2214, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 452. Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants, BIDEN 
PRESIDENT, https://joebiden.com/immigration/ (last visited July 1, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/LPM5-MZHH]. 
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to push back against this initiative. This political backlash, 
which remains ongoing, has contributed to congressional refus-
als to fully fund the Wall and continuing public protests. 
1. Section 215 and 702 Surveillance 
Like FBI surveillance, the material support cases and their 
private analogues, Section 215 and 702 surveillance, are exam-
ples of formally legalistic national security programs that ex-
pand executive power and erode civil liberties. However, unlike 
those other programs, the rule of law has generated social cohe-
sion that has led to restrictions on these surveillance initiatives. 
To demonstrate this, this section starts by laying out the general 
contours of the FISA statute, which is the background frame-
work for Sections 215 and 702. It then examines the statutes 
themselves, their compliance with the rule of law, as well as the 
telephony metadata and PRISM programs created under them. 
It concludes by looking at the political accountability these initi-
atives have generated. 
FISA generally gives the executive “extremely powerful in-
vestigative techniques, permitting access to private communica-
tions of all kinds.”453 Originally enacted in 1978,454 the statute 
allows the executive to engage in various types of intelligence 
work targeting foreign powers and their agents.455 Generally, 
FISA applies where that intelligence gathering is connected to 
any U.S. person or territory, where there is a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, and where a search warrant would normally 
be required.456 The statute also creates two judicial bodies: the 
 
 453. DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY 
INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 4:1 (2010). 
 454. FISA was passed in response to revelations about the executive’s long-
standing mass surveillance of U.S. citizens, including political activists and dissi-
dents. Walter F. Mondale et al., No Longer a Neutral Magistrate: The Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court in the Wake of the War on Terror, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
2251, 2259–62 (2016) These revelations were exposed by the Church Committee, 
the same Congressional body whose work led to the creation of the FBI’s Levi 
Guidelines, noted earlier. Berman, supra note 47, at 12. 
 455. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 453, § 4:2. Amongst its authorizations, FISA 
allows for physical searches targeting foreign powers or agents of foreign powers; 
the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices; and court orders compelling the 
production of tangible things in connection with certain national security investi-
gations. Id. 
 456. JENNIFER GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY YOU 
SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 184 (2017). 
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR)—that are re-
sponsible for overseeing the government’s foreign surveillance 
work.457 This judicial review, which the executive typically par-
ticipates in ex parte,458 provides few meaningful restrictions and 
has historically had little impact on the presidency’s broad FISA 
powers.459 
In 2008, Congress amended FISA to add Section 702.460 
While leaving much of FISA intact, Section 702 has created a 
“new and independent source of intelligence collection authority, 
beyond that granted in traditional FISA.”461 Under this provi-
sion, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelli-
gence may jointly authorize the targeting of “persons reasonably 
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire for-
eign intelligence information,” for up to one year.462 The execu-
tive may not, however, use this authority to “intentionally tar-
get[] … any person known to be in the United States or any U.S. 
person reasonably believed to be located abroad.”463 Before im-
plementing any authorized targeting, “the Attorney General and 
the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the [FISC] 
written certification and any supporting affidavit, under oath 
and under seal . . . .”464 
In a departure from regular FISA, Section 702 does not re-
quire the government establish probable cause that its target is 
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.465 Nor does the 
government need to establish that the target is engaging in 
 
 457. KRIS & WILSON, supra note 453, at § 4:2. The FISC considers applications 
for electronic surveillance, while FISCR considers FISC denials of electronic sur-
veillance applications. Id. § 5:1. 
 458. Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1161, 1162 (2015). As discussed below, pursuant to 2015 amendments to the 
statute, FISA now allows for amicus curiae to participate in some cases. See infra 
note 526 and accompanying text. 
 459. Scott Boykin, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Separation 
of Powers, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 33, 34–35 (2015). 
 460. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
50 U.S.C.). 
 461. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 404 (2013) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 462. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a). 
 463. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 405 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1)–(3)). 
 464. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(1)(A). This requirement is subject to an exception de-
tailed in the statute, but not relevant here. Id. at § 1881a(h)(1)(B). 
 465. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 404. 
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illegal activity.466 Also unlike regular FISA, the government is 
not required to specify the nature and location of each facility or 
place where the electronic surveillance will be conducted.467 
Though the FISC reviews the executive’s targeting certification 
for a number of elements,468 the court “is limited in the role it 
can play with regard to reviewing the certification . . . . As long 
as the certification [and other] elements are present . . . the 
Court shall enter an [ex parte] order approving the certification 
. . . .”469 
While 702 surveillance is subject to “statutory [limitations], 
judicial authorization, congressional supervision, and compli-
ance with the Fourth Amendment,”470 the statute effectively al-
lows the executive to “listen to Americans when we talk to for-
eigners overseas about matters of foreign intelligence 
interest.”471 Indeed, both before and since its passage, many 
civil libertarians and members of Congress have criticized Sec-
tion 702 because of its threats to the Fourth Amendment rights 
of all Americans.472 
A few years before Section 702 became law, Congress passed 
Section 215, which also expanded the government’s surveillance 
powers under FISA.473 Amending FISA Section 502, Section 215 
of the USA PATRIOT Act gives the FBI authority to obtain court 
orders from the FISC “requiring the production of any tangible 
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other 
items) . . . .”474 Under the original language of Section 502, 
which was passed in 1998, the FBI could only request business 
records from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, 
storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.475 While this 
 
 466. GRANICK, supra note 456, at 213. 
 467. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 404. 
 468. See id. at 405 (detailing various elements of FISC review). 
 469. Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Tele-
phone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 140 (2015) [hereinaf-
ter Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content] 
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 470. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 404. 
 471. GRANICK, supra note 456, at 214. 
 472. Id. at 119; LAURA DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: 
PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 36, 64–65 (2016) [hereinafter 
FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE]. 
 473. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–140, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001). 
 474. Id. 
 475. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 14, 25. 
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authority was already quite broad,476 Section 215 removes even 
these restrictions and makes it possible for the government to 
seek any kind of business or personal record from “just about 
any institution or company.”477 
Section 215 initially removed other limitations placed on 
Section 502,478 including its exclusive application to records that 
pertained to a “foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”479 
The statute was amended in 2005 to change this and require 
that the executive establish “reasonable grounds to believe that 
the tangible things” are “relevant to an authorized investigation 
. . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a 
United States person or to protect against international terror-
ism or clandestine intelligence activities” and show that the rec-
ords “pertain to (i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; 
(ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power . . .; or 
(iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent 
of a foreign power . . .,” amongst other things.480 
Under Section 215, an investigation shall not be conducted 
“of a United States person” solely on the basis of First Amend-
ment protected activities.481 Like Section 702, as long as the ex-
ecutive’s application meets all the statutory requirements, the 
FISC “shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified, 
approving the release of tangible things.”482 
As with Section 702, scholars, civil libertarians, and mem-
bers of Congress have long decried the rights-eroding effects and 
substantial power Section 215 gives to the executive.483 As one 
scholar describes it, by removing various limitations on records 
 
 476. Id. at 14. 
 477. Id. at 25. 
 478. Id. at 14–15. 
 479. Compare USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-140, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 
(2008), with Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-
272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998). 
 480. USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005, PL 109–
177, March 9, 2006, 120 Stat 192; Section 702 and the Collection of International 
Telephone and Internet Content, supra note 469, at 797–802. 
 481. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(B). 
 482. Id. § 1861(c)(1). 
 483. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, The Metadata Program in Eleven Documents, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-
metadata-program-in-eleven-documents [https://perma.cc/LDZ3-88BT] (reporting 
on 2005 letter sent by then-Senators Barack Obama, John Kerry, Richard Durbin, 
as well as Senator Chuck Hagel, deriding Section 215 for facilitating “‘fishing expe-
ditions’” against innocent Americans). 
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requests, Section 215 effectively allows the government to “col-
lect information on people not suspected of wrongdoing, as long 
as it relate[s] to an authorized investigation.”484 
Though these concerns with the laws’ constitutional impli-
cations and bolstering of executive power are important and le-
gitimate, neither these nor other aspects of Sections 215 and 702 
run afoul of the rule of law. Indeed, Congress passed the FISA 
statute to ensure that “the statutory rule of law . . . prevail[s] in 
the area of foreign intelligence surveillance.”485 Consistent with 
this, both statutes are general, clear, constant through time, 
non-retroactive, and internally coherent.486 To the extent exec-
utive action has been judicially determined as incongruent with 
these statutes, publicly available information suggests it has 
typically been brought into alignment or otherwise sanc-
tioned.487 It is also far from clear that either Section 215 or 702 
facially contradict applicable constitutional jurisprudence.488 
 
 484. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 26 (emphasis in 
original). 
 485. S. REP. NO. 95–604, pt. 1, at 7 (1977). Notwithstanding Congress’s aim, 
many scholars have debated whether FISA places meaningful restrictions on exec-
utive action, especially when it comes to civil liberties. See, e.g., FUTURE OF 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472 at 2–3 (arguing that FISA is no longer suf-
ficient to protect the civil liberties of Americans); Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Le-
galism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
J. 112, 113–20 (2015) (arguing that FISA created “intelligence legalism” that sub-
jects the executive’s foreign surveillance to meaningful legal limits but fails to fully 
protect civil liberties). 
 486. One might argue that Section 215 and 702 are inconsistent with the rule of 
law since the programs promulgated under those statutes are often secret. As dis-
cussed below, however, it is far from clear that secrecy is always prohibited by the 
rule of law. See infra note 510. Even if it is, the statutes themselves are public and 
give people notice about what the government is authorized to do, even if it is done 
secretly. 
 487. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion and Order 45–121, [Redacted], (FISA Ct. 
Oct. 18, 2018) (holding that the FBI’s queries of Section 702 information and related 
procedures violated the statute and the Fourth Amendment and imposing certain 
documentation requirements on FBI), https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/docu-
ments/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_FISC_Opin_18Oct18.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/5RRH-6BLN]. With respect to the telephony metadata and PRISM pro-
grams discussed below, executive action was conducted with FISC oversight, 
though that oversight was arguably weak. See FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, 
supra note 472, at 48–49, 68–72 (detailing FISC oversight of the telephony 
metadata and PRISM programs). 
 488. The Fourth Amendment is most salient to Section 702 surveillance, while 
Section 215 implicates both the First and Fourth Amendments. Starting with Sec-
tion 702, it expressly requires compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1881a(b)(6). The Fourth Amendment, however, generally does not apply to non-
U.S. persons who are outside of and do not have a “‘substantial connection’” to the 
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Notwithstanding their rights-eroding, executive-embolden-
ing effects, there was little public outcry against Section 215 and 
702 surveillance for many years. While there may be various 
reasons for this, one possible explanation is that these programs 
were perceived to focus only on those associated with terrorism, 
namely Arabs and Muslims.489 Indeed, to the extent government 
officials publicly discussed these initiatives, they claimed they 
were only used to spy on “terrorists.”490 
In June 2013, everything changed. Edward Snowden, a gov-
ernment contractor working for the National Security Agency 
(NSA), disclosed the existence of secret surveillance programs 
conducted pursuant to both statutes.491 Confirming the fears of 
critics, the revelations made clear that millions of Americans’ 
communications were being monitored.492 The programs re-
vealed by Snowden included a telephony metadata collection 
program, which was authorized under Section 215, as well as 
Internet and telephone content collection programs493—called 
PRISM—which were authorized under Section 702.494 
 
United States. Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Inter-
net Content, supra note 469, at 222. Nor does the Fourth Amendment require a 
traditional warrant for collection of incidental communications between those per-
sons and U.S. persons or persons inside the United States. United States v. Hasba-
jrami, 945 F.3d 641, 667 (2d Cir. 2019). As for Section 215, it expressly prohibits 
investigations against U.S. persons based on First Amendment protected activity. 
See supra note 481 and accompanying text. Additionally, “[u]nder the third-party 
doctrine, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when the government acquires 
information that people provide to corporations [as occurs under Section 215], be-
cause they voluntarily provide their information to another entity and assume the 
risk that the entity will disclose the information to the government.” Avidan Y. 
Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist Fourth Amendment, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2015). 
 489. Polling done after the Snowden revelations suggests most Americans re-
main comfortable with surveillance of “terrorists.” See infra note 526 and accompa-
nying text. 
 490. GRANICK, supra note 460, at 206–07. 
 491. Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed U.S. Spy Programme, BBC (Jan. 17, 
2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964 [https://perma.cc
/KED6-WYNK]. 
 492. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 38. 
 493. Metadata “consists of information that describes who is communicating; po-
tentially where they are located; the origin, path, and destination of each commu-
nication; and the length of the exchange.” FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, su-
pra note 472, at 18. Content consists of “actual words spoken – or written — in the 
course of a communication.” Id. 
 494. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of 
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/ZZ5Y-
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The telephony metadata program, which was run by the 
NSA, required major phone companies to collect and turn over 
“‘comprehensive communications routing information’” held 
about their customers.495 This included “‘session identifying in-
formation (e.g. originating and terminating telephone number 
. . . .)’ . . . . the truck identifier for each call (indicating which lo-
cal cell phone tower was used in the connection), telephone call-
ing card numbers, and the time and duration of each call.”496 
Under PRISM, which involved both the NSA and FBI, the gov-
ernment collected electronic communications from providers like 
Microsoft, Facebook, Google, and Apple.497 Through PRISM, the 
FBI, with FISC approval, ordered these Internet companies to 
use specified search terms, known as “selectors,” to retrieve and 
turn over information to the government.498 Section 702 placed 
few restrictions on how or what selectors were chosen, while 
FISC also did not review selectors to ensure their appropriate-
ness.499 
Public reactions to news of these surveillance programs 
were largely negative.500 In an attempt to mitigate this 
 
XGQK] (detailing Section 215 program); Glenn Greenwald, NSA Prism Program 
Taps into User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data [https://perma.c 
c/4Q84-L7TX] (detailing PRISM). Both the telephony metadata and PRISM pro-
grams were originally developed by the Bush Administration without clear legal 
authority. Specifically, the programs were part of STELLARWIND, a mass secret 
surveillance initiative created shortly after 9/11. FUTURE OF FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 18–19; GRANICK, supra note 456, at 200–05. 
STELLARWIND collected telephony and Internet metadata, as well as telephone 
and Internet content. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 18. 
The telephony metadata portion of STELLARWIND was eventually justified under 
Section 215, while Section 702 was passed to provide legal cover for Internet and 
telephone content collection. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, 
at 47; GRANICK, supra note 456, at 205–13. The Internet metadata portion of 
STELLARWIND, which was retrospectively authorized under FISA’s pen register 
and trap-and-trace provision, was abandoned in December 2011, though some have 
argued it continued in different form. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra 
note 472, at 45–48. 
 495. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 48. 
 496. Id. 
 497. GRANICK, supra note 456, at 214. 
 498. Id. at 117. 
 499. Id. at 118. 
 500. See Bart Jansen & Carolyn Pesce, Anti-NSA Rally Attracts Thousands to 
March in Washington, USA TODAY (Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation/2013/10/26/nsa-dc-rally/3241417/ [https://perma.cc/G2B6-R2PN] (re-
porting on nationwide protests against NSA surveillance programs leaked by Ed-
ward Snowden); Heather Kelly, Protests Against the NSA Spring Up Across U.S., 
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backlash, the executive branch made several disclosures aimed 
at bolstering the programs’ rule-of-law credentials. With respect 
to Section 215 surveillance, the Obama Administration released 
various statements, fact sheets, redacted FISC opinions, and a 
White Paper, arguing that the program was compliant with stat-
utory law and the Constitution.501 The Administration made 
similar disclosures about PRISM through press releases, public 
Congressional hearings, and the declassification of various doc-
uments.502 In addition to this, within a week of the first Snow-
den-related news article, a bipartisan group of thirteen senators 
asked an independent agency within the executive, the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, to investigate the surveil-
lance programs.503 A week later, the board held a meeting with 
President Obama and senior staff about its investigations.504 
The board eventually released unclassified reports about 
both programs.505 With respect to telephony metadata collec-
tion, the board recommended termination because the program 
“lack[ed] a viable legal foundation under Section 215, im-
plicat[ed] constitutional concerns under the First and Fourth 
Amendments, rais[ed] serious threats to privacy and civil liber-
ties as a policy matter, and has shown only limited value.”506 As 
for PRISM, while scholars lambasted it for violating Section 
 
CNN (July 5, 2013), https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/04/tech/web/restore-nsa-pro-
tests [https://perma.cc/9RRC-HVHQ] (same). 
 501. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 760 (2014). 
 502. Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Con-
tent, supra note 469, at 121–22. 
 503. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 49. 
 504. Id. 
 505. PRIVACY AND CIV. LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT, 
(2014) [hereinafter PRIVACY BOARD REPORT ON 215 PROGRAM]; PRIVACY AND CIV. 
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, 
(2014) [hereinafter PRIVACY BOARD REPORT ON 702 PROGRAM]. 
 506. PRIVACY BOARD REPORT ON 215 PROGRAM, supra note 505, § VII. At least 
one court considering legal challenges to the telephony metadata program also con-
cluded it did not comport with Section 215. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 
2015) (holding that telephony metadata program exceeded authority under Section 
215). 
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702,507 the board concluded that it provided “considerable value 
. . . in the government’s efforts to combat terrorism and gather 
foreign intelligence” and that “at its core, the program is 
sound.”508 Nevertheless, the board also noted that “some fea-
tures outside of the program’s core, particularly those im-
pact[ing] U.S. persons, raise questions regarding the reasonable-
ness of the program” and made a “series of policy 
recommendations to ensure [PRISM] includes adequate and ap-
propriate safeguards for privacy and civil liberties.”509 
While both PRISM and the telephony metadata program ar-
guably had rule-of-law problems,510 they were supported by an 
extensive legal architecture meant to ground those initiatives in 
formal legality—including FISC review of surveillance applica-
tions and legal opinions from the Department of Justice.511 Nev-
ertheless, the public controversy they generated ended one of the 
secret surveillance programs, placed limitations on the other, 512 
led to restrictions on Sections 702 and 215, and reformed judicial 
review under FISC and FISCR. 
Many of these changes came in the form of federal legisla-
tion known as the USA Freedom Act, which was passed in 
 
 507. See, e.g., Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and In-
ternet Content, supra note 469, at 194–95 (arguing that PRISM contradicted Section 
702’s clear language). 
 508. PRIVACY BOARD REPORT ON 712 PROGRAM, supra note 505, at 134. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Because it exceeded the statutory bounds of Section 215, the telephony 
metadata program violated the rule of law. As programs that were kept secret from 
the public, one might argue that both PRISM and the telephony metadata programs 
violated the rule of law on that ground as well. While it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to delve into this issue, government secrecy, though varied in kind and 
sometimes justified for national security reasons, can undermine formal legality. 
See David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 286 (2010) (“By giving of-
ficials greater leeway to pursue unpopular and unethical policies, secrecy . . . 
threatens the rule of law.”). At the same time, “if the public expressly grants some-
one the authority to keep certain secrets, and if the grantee faithfully applies that 
authority subject to post hoc review, it is fair to see this exchange as a victory for 
democracy, not simply as a concession to practical necessity.” Id. at 287. 
 511. Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Account-
ability, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 69, 74–75 (2015). 
 512. See id. at 76 (noting that “Snowden’s revelations with regard to a variety of 
surveillance activities . . . provoked anger from a wide and bipartisan swath of the 
U.S. public . . . [which] in turn forced the Obama administration, Congress, and the 
courts to respond”). 
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2015.513 Most notably, the Act, which amends FISA, prohibits 
bulk collection under Section 215’s telephony metadata pro-
gram.514 Under this amendment to FISA, phone companies are 
no longer required to turn over all relevant information and only 
have to deliver a subset specifically requested by the NSA.515 In 
order to obtain a FISC order for telephony metadata, the govern-
ment must include a specific selector term—such as one identi-
fying a person, entity, account, or device—and demonstrate a 
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the term is associated 
with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power engaged in 
or preparing for an act of international terrorism.516 Applica-
tions to the FISC also must include a statement of facts estab-
lishing reasons to believe the records sought are relevant to an 
authorized investigation to protect against terrorism.517 Once 
obtained, the records are subject to minimization procedures 
that require the executive destroy all records it determines are 
unrelated to foreign intelligence.518 
While recent reports suggest Section 215’s telephony 
metadata program was shuttered in early 2019,519 the executive 
branch has continued to defend the statute’s utility and push for 
its renewal.520 Despite these efforts, Section 215 was allowed to 
expire on March 15, 2020, though Congress is expected to renew 
it with reforms.521 
 
 513. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Ef-
fective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–23, 129 Stat. 268 
(2015) [hereinafter USA Freedom Act]. 
 514. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 52. 
 515. Id. 
 516. USA Freedom Act § 101. The telephone companies will then use the FISC-
approved selector to collect the government-requested data. FUTURE OF FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 52. 
 517. USA Freedom Act § 101. 
 518. Id. 
 519. Ellen Nakashima, Repeated Mistakes in Phone Record Collection Led NSA 




 520. Jordain Carney, Congress Set for Clash Over Surveillance Reforms, HILL 
(Feb. 24, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/484150-congress-set-for-
clash-over-surveillance-reforms [https://perma.cc/8LFE-6YYG]. 
 521. Id.; McKinney & Crocker, supra note 20. Section 215’s savings clause allows 
the statute to still be used for ongoing investigations that began before its expira-
tion or for new investigations into events that started or occurred before that date. 
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-140, § 224, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); Charlie 
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With respect to PRISM, the NSA eventually stopped using 
specific collection protocols that had vastly expanded Section 
702’s reach.522 This included abandoning “about” collection, 
which had facilitated retrieval of digital communications that 
were “about” a target but did not actually involve the target.523 
If the NSA had not made this decision, and continued to use 
“about” collection, it would have been subject to recent federal 
legislation that subjects such intelligence gathering to congres-
sional oversight.524 
More broadly, the USA Freedom Act led to important 
changes to FISC and FISCR aimed at making judicial review of 
executive action more meaningful.525 These reforms included 
appointing amicus curiae to assist judges in “consideration of 
any application for an order or review that, in the opinion of the 
court, presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law” 
and declassifying decisions, orders, and opinions issued by the 
FISC and FISCR “that include[] a significant construction or in-
terpretation of any provision of law . . . .”526 
While these changes have fallen short of fixing all the exec-
utive abuse and civil liberty problems raised by Section 215 and 
702 surveillance,527 they represent a rare bright spot in the na-
tional security arena. Sections 215 and 702 give the executive 
broad authority with troubling implications for civil liberties. 
The post-Snowden reforms made to these laws have limited that 
power. Those limits would not have been possible without social 
cohesion among countless Americans who had an interest in 
curbing the executive’s surveillance programs. Prior to the 
Snowden revelations, when many believed FISA surveillance 
 
Savage, House Departs Without Vote to Extend Expired FBI Tools, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/27/us/politics/house-fisa-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/3YSC-AVZQ]. 
 522. Louise Matsakis, Congress Is Debating Warrantless Surveillance in the 
Dark, WIRED (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/section-702-warrant-
less-surveillance-debate/ [https://perma.cc/9VJD-FDCR]. 
 523. Id. “About collection” means that “multiple people, none of whom is a target, 
may nevertheless be monitored because of the topic of their conversation, so long 
as one of the parties to the conversation is a foreigner located overseas.” GRANICK, 
supra note 456, at 121. 
 524. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 103, 
132 Stat. 3 (2017). 
 525. FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 142–43. 
 526. USA Freedom Act §§ 401, 402. 
 527. See FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, supra note 472, at 136–69 (detail-
ing additional necessary reforms to FISA surveillance). 
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was limited to “terrorists,” there was little to no public outcry 
about Sections 215 and 702. Indeed, polling on surveillance post-
Snowden suggests Americans still support government surveil-
lance targeted at terrorism and, therefore, primarily impacting 
Muslim and Arabs.528 It is because the negative consequences of 
Sections 215 and 702 surveillance were understood to impact 
millions of people that these sentiments were overcome and the 
rule of law and political accountability aligned, however imper-
fectly, to curb executive authority under those programs. 
2. The Border Wall 
While not impacting as many Americans as Section 215 and 
702 surveillance, the Trump Administration’s plan to seize pri-
vate land along the U.S.-Mexico border has targeted a small but 
diverse group of individuals and received substantial ongoing 
pushback. Though this opposition may be partly triggered by the 
Administration’s explicitly racist motives for building the Wall, 
529 it has primarily revolved around the rights and interests of a 
small group of individuals who are directly impacted by the gov-
ernment’s seizure of land and the Wall construction. As dis-
cussed below, while white ranchers are also actively involved, 
this anti-Wall coalition includes indigenous tribes, members of 
the Latinx community, and religious and environmental groups. 
As this mix of groups demonstrates, social cohesion in the ser-
vice of minority rights and interests can be achieved not only 
between the white majority and minority groups, but also among 
communities of color and non-identitarian groups dedicated to 
social justice. 
This section begins with background on the legal authority 
for the Border Wall, its compliance with the rule of law, and ex-
ecutive efforts to secure private land for its construction. It then 
describes the small but diverse coalition of groups that has 
 
 528. See Lee Raine & Mary Madden, Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snow-
den, PEW RESEARCH (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015
/03/16/americans-privacy-strategies-post-snowden/ [https://perma.cc/C736-JERB] 
(polling from 2014–2015 showing that 82% support surveillance of “suspected ter-
rorists” and that 68% believe it is “okay to monitor someone who exchanged emails 
with an imam who preached against infidels”). 
 529. Lee, supra note 315, at 459–61; Meghan K. Tierney, President Trump’s Big, 
Beautiful Wall: Discrimination, Eminent Domain, and the Public Use Requirement, 
94 CHI. KENT L. REV. 179, 179 (2019). 
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formed to oppose the Wall’s construction and its efforts to polit-
ically restrain the executive’s extensive, rights-eroding powers. 
Trump’s promise to build a Wall along the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der dates back to the 2016 presidential campaign.530 Within 
days of assuming office, the newly elected President issued an 
executive order, directing the “immediate construction of a phys-
ical wall on the southern border” to, among other things, “pre-
vent terrorism.”531 The order itself was authorized by various 
congressional laws.532 While there have been numerous legal 
challenges to the Border Wall’s construction, especially regard-
ing its financing,533 the original order, as well as the laws upon 
which it is based, remain consistent with the rule of law. Both 
the order and the laws authorizing it are general, clear, constant 
through time, non-retroactive, internally consistent, and coher-
ent. Though construction of certain parts of the Border Wall may 
 
 530. Time Staff, Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, 
TIME (June 16, 2015), www.time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-
speech/ [https://perma.cc/Q5UT-NE6E]. 
 531. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793, §2(a) (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 532. The Executive Order lists its legal authority as including the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, the Secure Fence Act of 2006, and the Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017). In general, the executive branch is responsible for con-
trolling the “borders and boundaries of the United States against the illegal entry 
of aliens” and can “contract for and buy an interest in land” where necessary to do 
so. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006). This includes building “physical barriers” at the border. 
See, e.g., The Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638, § 3 (2006) 
(providing that the “Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide for at least two 
layers of reinforced fencing” at the southern border); Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. 1, § 102, 
110 Stat. 3009 (providing “for the construction along the 14 miles of the interna-
tional land border of the United States, starting at the Pacific Ocean and extending 
eastward, of second and third fences, in addition to the existing reinforced fence, 
and for roads between the fences”). Pursuant to this authority, the U.S. government 
first began building a physical barrier along the U.S.-Mexico border during the 
Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations. Susan Montoya Bryan, Past Projects 
Show Border Wall Building Is Complex, Costly, AP (Jan. 12, 2019), https://ap-
news.com/ab1b07e15e6f4e9a9274b576ff3a1d45 [https://perma.cc/B6L3-3P4A]. Tr- 
ump’s wall extends those earlier efforts. Id. 
 533. Various groups and state governments have brought suit to enjoin the 
Trump Administration from using its February 2019 national emergency declara-
tion to re-route funds to build the Wall. See infra note 552 for background on the 
declaration. Some of these efforts have resulted in injunctive relief though they re-
main subject to a Supreme Court stay, as of this writing. See Sierra Club. v. Trump, 
963 F.3d 874, at 897 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming permanent injunction against parts 
of the Border Wall); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Lets Trump Keep Building His 
Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/us
/supreme-court-trump-border-wall.html [https://perma.cc/YUA2-5CCD]. 
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conflict with other laws and may, as a result, run afoul of the 
rule of law,534 there is generally no clear facial contradiction be-
tween the Border Wall order—or the statutes upon which it is 
based—and those other laws. 
Despite the executive’s broad, legally sanctioned power to 
build the Wall, many private landowners along its route have 
refused to allow the government to acquire their land.535 Indeed, 
the Border Wall’s construction poses a direct threat to the pri-
vate property rights of countless landowners. To build the Wall, 
which will be roughly 2,000 miles in length and stretch across 
four states, the government must secure substantial amounts of 
private property.536 Together with land owned by individual 
states, privately held land makes up 67 percent of territory at 
the border.537 
Where parties have been unwilling to sell, the Trump Ad-
ministration has attempted to secure their property through em-
inent domain.538 In accordance with the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, eminent domain allows the government to 
“acquire . . . property [for public use] from unwilling owners in 
exchange for just compensation.”539 While the jurisprudence on 
eminent domain is complex, it is understood to give the executive 
 
 534. There are a number of other potential legal obstacles to building the Wall, 
including, but not limited to, environmental regulations, treaties with indigenous 
tribes, and international environmental agreements. Melissa W. Wright, Border 
Thinking, Borderland Diversity, and Trump’s Wall, 109 ANNALS AM. ASS’N 
GEOGRAPHERS 511, 514 (2019). 
 535. Gerald S. Dickinson, Cooperative Federalism and Federal Takings After the 
Trump Administration’s Border Wall Executive Order, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 647, 
651 (2018). 
 536. Sarah Almukhter & Josh Williams, Trump Wants a Border Wall. See 
What’s in Place Already., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/in-
teractive/2018/02/05/us/border-wall.html [https://perma.cc/GP6Y-3APS]. This in-
cludes land owned by indigenous tribes. Jane Coaston, Eminent Domain, the Big-
government Concept Tactic Trump Needs to Use to Build the Wall, Explained, VOX 
(Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/18/18176893/emi-
nent-domain-trump-border-wall-gop [https://perma.cc/53X7-DQPU]. 
 537. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-399, SOUTHWEST BORDER: 
ISSUES RELATED TO PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE 5 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/670/669936.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5ED-K3HB]. 
 538. See Bob Ortega, The Trump Administration Is Dialing Up Efforts to ‘Build 
that Wall,’ Records Show, CNN (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/22/us
/trump-administration-seizing-border-wall-land/index.html [https://perma.cc/F9AJ 
-Y9KD] (reporting on the Trump Administration’s increased use of eminent domain 
suits in 2019 to seize private land needed to build Border Wall). 
 539. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005); U.S. CONST. amend. 
V. 
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substantial authority to assume ownership over privately held 
property.540 Since construction on the Border Wall began in 
2017, 541 the executive has brought various eminent domain 
cases against entities as varied as ranchers, farmers, and even 
Catholic dioceses.542 
In addition to opposing these legal efforts,543 this diverse 
body of impacted individuals and groups has politically mobi-
lized against the Wall’s construction. Indeed, various groups, in-
cluding environmentalists, human rights activists, immigrant 
advocates, as well as indigenous tribes and Latinx individuals, 
have united to protest the Wall’s construction.544 This coalition, 
which has been built around private property interests as well 
as environmental and social justice concerns, has been key to 
generating broad political opposition to the Wall.545 While it is 
hard to definitively know the racial composition of this move-
ment, it represents more than just convergence between the in-
terests of whites and communities of color.546 Indeed, a number 
 
 540. Lee, supra note 315, at 431; Simon J. Harrall, The Federal Government’s 
power of Eminent Domain Over State Lands Regarding the U.S.-Mexico Border 
Wall, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 635, 655–56 (2019). 
 541. Stephen Dinan, Trump Border Wall Construction Begins, WASH. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/26/trump-bor-
der-wall-construction-begins/ [https://perma.cc/SSS4-9CG3]. 
 542. Elizabeth Findell, Construction of Texas Border Wall Stalls over Fights with 
Landowners, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/construc-
tion-of-texas-border-wall-stalls-over-fights-with-landowners-11576154415 [https://
perma.cc/RE3F-KPAR]. 
 543. Id. Scholars have taken note of the wide swath of groups impacted by the 
Wall’s construction and argued that this cohesion may lead to heightened judicial 
scrutiny of the government’s eminent domain efforts. Lee, supra note 315, at 425. 
 544. Wright, supra note 534, at 512; Nina Lakhani, ‘That’s Genocide:’ Ancient 
Tribal Graves Threatened by Trump Border Wall, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/16/tribe-fights-to-save-ances-
tral-graves-in-the-path-of-trumps-border-wall [https://perma.cc/ZB4Q-BLGL]; Ry- 
an Devereaux, “We Are Still Here”: Native Activists in Arizona Resist Trump’s Bor-
der Wall, INTERCEPT (Nov. 24, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/11/24/arizona-
border-wall-native-activists/ [https://perma.cc/PP5Z-EGMJ]; Katie Zezemia & 
Mark Berman, Trump’s Wall Needs Private Property. But Some Texans Won’t Give 




 545. Wright, supra note 534, at 512. 
 546. Even those scholars applying an interest convergence lens to the Border 
Wall controversy concede that “in addition to racial interests converging, other 
types of convergence are occurring,” including between “property rights organiza-
tions, environmentalists, and immigrants’ rights advocates.” Lee, supra note 529, 
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of political efforts against the Wall have been led by social-jus-
tice groups or through alignments between those groups and 
communities of color.547  
These efforts, which include relatively regular civic demon-
strations against the Wall,548 appear to have borne fruit.549 Ac-
cording to recent polling, 60 percent of Americans oppose major 
new wall construction along the southern border.550 At the 
Texas border, 54 percent of residents oppose the Wall.551 This 
public opposition has also helped generate a number of legisla-
tive obstacles to the Border Wall. This includes various congres-
sional efforts to block the Wall, such as Congress’s general re-
fusal to fully fund the barrier552 as well as congressional bills to 
 
at 455. See Wright, supra note 534, at 512 (arguing that “[t]hrough their alliances 
that merge advocacies for human rights, immigrant well-being, and environmental 
stewardship, antiwall coalitions have formed powerful campaigns that have eroded 
public support for the project”). 
 547. See, e.g., Devereau, supra note 544 (describing the Center for Biological Di-
versity, an environmental non-profit, as leading the fight against the Border Wall). 
 548. See, e.g., Jessica Kutz, At a Protest in Arizona, Border Communities Are 
Fighting Trump’s Wall, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.moth-
erjones.com/environment/2019/11/at-a-protest-in-arizona-border-communities-are-
fighting-trumps-wall/ [https://perma.cc/TSA7-A3LU]; Christal Hayes, Protests 
Planned Against Trump’s National Emergency Over the Border Wall, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/16/trumps-
national-emergency-order-nationwide-protests/2886436002/ [https://perma.cc/XDY 
9-NVZH]. 
 549. See Wright, supra note 534, at 515 (noting that “[a]s antiwall activists pub-
licize the connections linking the project to a cruel politics that reveals a startling 
disdain for human and environmental well-being, congressional and broader public 
support has stalled”). 
 550. Jim Norman, Solid Majority Still Opposes New Construction on Border 
Wall, GALLUP (Feb. 4, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/246455/solid-majority-
opposes-new-construction-border-wall.aspx [https://perma.cc/6WNT-PWMA]. 
 551. Findell, supra note 542. 
 552. While Congress initially refused to fund the Border Wall’s construction, it 
acquiesced after Trump forced a government shutdown over the issue. Jacob 
Pramuk & Christina Wilkie, Trump Declares National Emergency to Build Border 
Wall, Setting Up Massive Legal Fight, CNBC (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com
/2019/02/15/trump-national-emergency-declaration-border-wall-spending-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/E2LN-8MAP]. The resulting funding, however, fell short of the re-
quested amount. Andrew Duehren, Senate Again Passes Resolution to Block Fund-
ing for Border Wall, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sen-
ate-again-passes-resolution-to-block-funding-for-border-wall-11569430599 [https://
perma.cc/6MNN-4FN3]. Trump reacted by declaring a “national emergency” at the 
southern border, which purportedly allowed him to repurpose funds previously al-
located for military projects. Id. Twice, Congress responded by passing bipartisan 
bills to overturn the national emergency declaration and block funding for the wall. 
Duehren, supra note 552. Both times, Trump successfully vetoed those bills. Emily 
Cochrane, Senate Fails to Override Trump’s Veto, Keeping Border Emergency in 
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protect private landowners from eminent domain litigation.553 
There have even been local legislative efforts to restrict the 
Wall’s construction, including at least one bill in the Texas leg-
islature.554 
Despite the President’s broad authority to construct the 
Border Wall under federal law, the Wall’s impact on the rights 
of diverse groups has exerted some checks on presidential au-
thority. While the Trump Administration has built portions of 
the Border Wall, it has mostly been on land already owned by 
the federal government555 and in areas where barriers already 
exist.556 Though many eminent domain cases remain pending557 
they will likely deaccelerate the overall building process, in-
crease the cost of construction, and/or result in changes to the 
wall’s route, even if the cases are ultimately successful.558 
 
Place, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/us/politics
/senate-veto-override-border.html [https://perma.cc/ZY7T-6KA3]. In December 
2019, Congress approved another spending bill that allocated more funding for the 
wall, though the amount still fell short of the Administration’s request. Emily 
Cochrane, Congress Approves Spending Package to Avoid Shutdown, Clearing It for 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/us/poli-
tics/government-shutdown-bill.html [https://perma.cc/C9F8-33NC]. 
 553. See, e.g., Protecting the Property Rights of Border Landowners Act of 2017, 
H.R. 3943, 115th Cong. (2017) (unsuccessful legislative effort to restrict federal em-
inent domain power for purposes of “constructing a wall, or other physical barrier, 
along the international border between the United States and Mexico”). 
 554. Tex. S. Con. Res. 31, 85th Leg., R. S. (2017). This legislation failed to pass. 
Harrall, supra note 540, at 638. 
 555. Nick Miroff, Trump Planning to Divert Additional $7.2 billion in Pentagon 




 556. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Border Wall Land Grabs Accelerate as Owners Shel-
ter from Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05
/29/us/politics/border-wall-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/V3RQ-KVCF]. 
 557. Id. 
 558. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-09-56, 
PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRUCTING THE SOUTHWEST BORDER FENCE 16 (2009) 
(generally noting impact of eminent domain litigation on construction of fencing at 
the U.S.-Mexico border, including ensuing costs and delays). Adding to the cost of 
these eminent domain cases are the number of litigants. In Texas, where the ma-
jority of border land is privately owned, there are hundreds if not thousands of po-
tential defendants. Courtney Kube & Julia Ainsley, Trump Admin Preparing to 
Take Over Private Land in Texas for Border Wall, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-admin-preparing-take-over-
private-land-border-wall-n1082316 [https://perma.cc/UMD8-AN6V]. 
JAMSHIDI_FINAL DRAFT_CLEAN_12.28.20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/20 2:08 PM 
2021] THE DISCRIMINATORY EXECUTIVE 173 
 
The Muslim Ban, Section 215 and 702 surveillance, and the 
Border Wall controversy demonstrate that legally sanctioned 
programs that bolster executive authority and undermine civil 
liberties can still generate political accountability for minority 
rights and interests. This social cohesion can occur even if the 
majority and/or their material interests are not substantially in-
volved. Part IV explores the implications of some of these in-
sights for fixing the political accountability problems facing the 
FBI’s surveillance programs, citizen-on-citizen monitoring, and 
public and private material support cases. 
IV. PRELIMINARY SOLUTIONS 
Synthesizing the various observations from Parts I, II, and 
III, there are several potential solutions to the accountability 
problems facing the FBI’s domestic surveillance programs, citi-
zen-on-citizen monitoring, and public and private material sup-
port cases. These solutions are pitched as general demands 
made to ensure that the rule of law and politics more effectively 
check executive power. The purpose is to provide scholars and 
advocates with a preliminary framework for thinking about the 
types of strategies that may resolve these programs’ political ac-
countability deficit. Ultimately, their feasibility and effective-
ness will turn both on the particularities of each program and 
the acquiescence of one or more branches of the federal govern-
ment. Implementation may be fraught, both from a program-
matic and institutional perspective, but the hope is that a basic 
road map can inform this important work. 
The first solution is to call for an end to the FBI surveillance 
program, citizen-on-citizen monitoring, and public and private 
material support statutes. The second solution is to demand that 
these programs’ civil liberty problems be addressed. The third is 
to both address their civil liberty shortcomings and call for these 
programs to be applied more broadly across American society. 
The remainder of this section will briefly explore the implica-
tions of each solution, without favoring any one in particular. 
Before exploring these approaches, it is worth mentioning 
one solution that is not pursued here: adopting a substantive ap-
proach to the rule of law. While the spirit behind this approach—
that the law’s content aligns with morality and justice—is ap-
pealing, the implications have troubled many philosophers and 
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theorists for good reason.559 The main stumbling block is in de-
ciding what morality and justice mean or require in any given 
situation or society. As Professor Brian Tamanaha has noted, 
“[t]o suggest that society’s views on these subjects cohere at the 
highest level of political and moral principle . . . denies the ulti-
mately contestable nature of the disputes.”560 Even Professor 
Ronald Dworkin, substantive legality’s foremost adherent, con-
ceded that the approach poses important and intractable philo-
sophical questions that formal legality does not.561 In short, a 
substantive approach to the rule of law is fraught with potential 
landmines that far from guarantee disfavored communities of 
color will be protected from the activities of a powerful executive. 
As for the first proposed solution, ending the discriminatory 
programs discussed here is supported by their disproportionate 
impact on Arab and Muslim Americans, their dubious effective-
ness (at least as currently implemented),562 and the civil liberty 
concerns they raise—regardless of who is targeted. Of course, 
some might counter that these programs, particularly their pub-
lic forms, promote valid national security objectives despite their 
many deep problems. Indeed, in the eyes of some, both FBI sur-
veillance and the criminal material support statutes are im-
portant parts of the government’s preventative approach to ter-
rorism.563 For example, the criminal material support statutes 
allow the government to intervene before an act of terrorism has 
occurred and, in particular, prevent the flow of financing and 
materials, like weapons, that may be used in terrorist acts.564 
While there are also significant downsides associated with a pre-
ventative counterterrorism strategy,565 including the civil lib-
erty issues discussed here, a preventative approach may not be 
 
 559. See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 30, at 103. 
 560. Id. 
 561. Dworkin, supra note 111, at 263–64. 
 562. See Ahmed, supra note 121, at 1562–63 (arguing that the disproportionate 
impact of counterterrorism policies on Muslim Americans make them distrustful of 
cooperating with law enforcement and, as a result, have serious ramifications for 
U.S. national security policies). 
 563. Robert Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?: Anticipatory Prosecution and the 
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429 (2007). 
 564. Abrams, A Constitutional Minimum Threshold, supra note 214, at 216–17. 
 565. See Chesney, supra note 563, at 433–46 (cataloguing costs and benefits of 
preventative approach to terrorism in the context of material support prosecutions). 
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a wholly unreasonable way of addressing terrorist violence, par-
ticularly if those costs can be adequately remedied.566 
At the same time, abolition may be the only way of address-
ing the systemic discrimination and accountability issues plagu-
ing these programs. Without evidence of explicit discrimination, 
there is little chance the rule of law and politics will combine to 
limit these programs in any meaningful way. Even if such evi-
dence existed, it is hard to know whether and how such reforms 
would materialize, as demonstrated by ongoing but still incom-
plete efforts at political accountability for the Muslim Ban. Elim-
inating these programs also draws inspiration from historic ef-
forts to dismantle police and prisons—institutions riven by 
racism and prejudice—that are picking up steam.567 
This brings us to the second solution: strengthening these 
programs’ civil liberty protections. This could be achieved by ap-
plying strict scrutiny to First Amendment protected activity cov-
ered by the material support statutes, creating stronger due pro-
cess protections for groups designated or about to be designated 
as FTOs, and creating a specific intent requirement for cases un-
der Section 2339B.568 In addition, domestic intelligence gather-
ing could be subjected to the Fourth Amendment protections it 
currently lacks.569 Even if such changes could be achieved, the 
executive might still disproportionately apply these programs to 
Arabs and Muslims. A similar phenomenon can be seen in do-
mestic policing. While constitutional protections are compara-
tively more robust than in the national security sphere,570 there 
is ample evidence that these protections have done little to pre-
vent policing practices from disproportionately impacting Black 
 
 566. Aziz, supra note 264, at 47. 
 567. See, e.g., Garrett Felber, The Struggle to Abolish the Police Is Not New, BOS. 
REV. (June 9, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/race/garrett-felber-struggle-abolish-
police-not-new [https://perma.cc/N5Q6-TNM6]. 
 568. Aziz, supra note 264, at 90–92; see Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for 
the Crime of Providing Materials Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 
BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 915 (2004) (arguing that “the First Amendment right of asso-
ciation [should require] that the government [have to] prove [in a Section 2339B 
case] that the donor in making the donation intended to further the terroristic ac-
tivities of the organization”). 
 569. Rascoff, supra note 137, at 591. 
 570. See SAID, supra note 215, at 73–104 (demonstrating how various eviden-
tiary and constitutional protections generally available in criminal trials are loos-
ened or eroded in trials involving federal terrorism charges). 
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and Brown communities.571 More broadly, where laws dispro-
portionately impact communities of color, rights-based solutions 
may be insufficient to remedy subordination.572 
This tees up the third and final solution: applying these pro-
grams across U.S. society. In a different context—namely 
strengthening civil rights and civil liberties for noncitizens in 
emergencies—Professor David Cole made a similar argument 
for expanding rights burdens across the population: 
A political process that weighs everyone’s security on one side 
of the balance, but weighs the rights and liberties of only a 
voiceless and often demonized “alien” minority on the other, 
is a recipe of overreaction . . . . A different approach with sub-
stantially more hope for taming the time-tested proclivity to 
overreact [in a time of crisis] would be to insist that, as much 
as possible, all persons share equally the costs and burdens 
that we have so often selectively imposed on foreign nation-
als.573 
While this solution ought to be combined with the second 
proposed solution, it may still lead to troubling outcomes. For 
example, broad application of Section 2339A would mean target-
ing domestic terrorist groups and potentially even expanding the 
definition of terrorism to reach other types of groups or activities 
deemed criminal. Depending on how broad a definition is 
adopted, it could be twisted to cover the actions of protestors and 
activists.574 This would be particularly concerning given the 
harsh prison sentences that apply to federal terrorism convic-
tions.575 If Section 2339B were applied to domestic groups with-
out statutory amendment, this would clearly violate both the 
 
 571. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, 
CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2018). 
 572. Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1866 (2019). 
 573. COLE, supra note 14, at 23. 
 574. See Harsha Panduranga & Faiza Patel, Domestic Terrorism Bills Create 
More Problems Than They Solve, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.just-
security.org/65998/domestic-terrorism-bills-create-more-problems-than-they-solve/ 
[https://perma.cc/2W5N-JUHT] (describing broad definition of terrorism in pro-
posed federal domestic terrorism legislation as easily twisted “to cover protestors 
or activists”). 
 575. Aziz, supra note 121, at 1526–27. 
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statute, which is limited to FTOs, and the rule of law. As many 
have argued, it would also raise First Amendment concerns.576 
On the surveillance side, expanding the FBI’s practices 
would mean having the FBI surveil members of all sorts of reli-
gious, political, and social groups, and encouraging private par-
ties to do the same under the citizen-on-citizen monitoring pro-
grams. It would also mean encouraging various communities to 
surveil their fellow community members to ensure they do not 
become “radicalized” toward criminal violence—terrorism or 
otherwise. 
Together, across-the-board application of the material sup-
port and surveillance programs would likely result in increased 
policing of communities of color—indeed, that already appears 
to be happening where executive branch surveillance is con-
cerned.577 On the flip side, part of the value of this approach is 
that broad application could lead to greater political accounta-
bility for these programs. This is demonstrated most powerfully 
by the campaign to end NYPD surveillance of Arabs and Mus-
lims—one of the few examples of successful political organizing 
against national security programs targeting this group.578 In 
order to end the program, Muslim and Arab New Yorkers joined 
with other minority groups, including Black and Latinx commu-
nities, who were subject to similar NYPD practices, like stop-
and-frisk.579 Together, these communities collaborated to pass 
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 578. See, e.g., Shamas, supra note 285 (noting that while there has been back-
lash against NYPD surveillance of Muslim communities, there has been little public 
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Muslims). 
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City Council bills that prohibited racial profiling and created an 
inspector general to monitor the NYPD and prohibit racial pro-
filing.580 Support for these bills was so strong that then-Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg’s attempted veto of both laws was overrid-
den.581 
The troubling outcomes of domestic application of these ini-
tiatives could also lead to broader conversations about the prob-
lems plaguing the government’s counterterrorism programs. 
This much is suggested by reactions to Trump’s threat in May 
2020 to designate Antifa, a domestic anti-fascist movement com-
posed of a loose coalition of individuals and groups, as a terrorist 
entity.582 Many have rejected the move not only for exceeding 
the President’s legal authority but also for its political and con-
stitutional implications, particularly for freedom of speech.583 
As one expert notes, “[if] Trump succeeds in designating Antifa 
it potentially opens the door for American citizens to be charged 
for merely holding their beliefs—even if they are extreme and at 
times, militant.”584 
While the Administration has yet to formally designate the 
movement as a terrorist group, there have been other calls to 
expand and apply federal terrorism laws domestically. These in-
clude popular efforts to list the KKK as a terrorist organization 
and expand the definition of terrorism to include racism.585 
There are also bills pending in Congress to analyze, monitor, and 
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take steps to prevent domestic terrorism.586 As efforts like these 
continue, conversations about the downsides of the executive’s 
counterterrorism powers will likely accelerate. At the same time, 
even if these efforts spur reforms to FBI surveillance, the mate-
rial support statutes, and their private analogues, those reforms 
may yield only limited fixes, much like the post-Snowden 
changes to Sections 215 and 702. 
CONCLUSION 
While the rule of law is important, “one should not take [its] 
value . . . on trust nor assert it blindly.”587 Indeed, “[s]acrificing 
too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law may make 
the law barren and empty.”588 As this Article has demonstrated, 
the rule of law does not always facilitate political accountability 
for troubling exercises of executive power. Understanding this 
complexity can help make the rule of law and politics a more 
effective check on presidential authority, especially where the 
rights and interests of communities of color are concerned. It can 
also help build a deeper understanding of the rule of law’s im-
pact on executive accountability across other domains.589 
As the FBI’s surveillance programs, material support cases, 
and their private analogues demonstrate, facially neutral laws 
that expand executive power and undermine civil liberties while 
targeting marginalized communities undermine the social cohe-
sion necessary to keeping a powerful executive in check. At the 
same time, laws that are explicitly discriminatory or that nega-
tively impact the rights of large or small but diverse groups can 
generate political accountability for executive action—as evi-
denced by the Muslim Ban, Section 215 and 702 surveillance, 
and the Border Wall controversy. These political accountability 
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efforts can materialize even if the majority and/or its material 
interests are not substantially involved. 
These insights add nuance to the canonical view of majori-
tarian politics, while also presenting potential solutions for fix-
ing the accountability problems facing facially neutral national 
security laws that disproportionately impact Arab and Muslim 
Americans. These solutions will likely require drastic action that 
may mean either abolishing these programs altogether or ac-
cepting troubling consequences that may violate the rule of law 
itself. Reckoning with law’s potentially corrosive impact on po-
litical accountability requires that we at least entertain these 
possibilities, in the hope that dramatic action taken now will 
lead to better outcomes for all Americans in the future. 
 
